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Risk and uncertainty characterise most human endeavours. Whether judging risk when buying 
a house, making a career change, considering marriage, or simply ordering food at an unfamiliar 
restaurant, each decision involves evaluating the available evidence to infer the likelihood of 
negative outcomes. Such decisions are often marked by uncertainty, the condition of incomplete 
knowledge about the likelihoods of possible outcomes, which can originate from the 
unpredictability of the environment or the cognitive limitations of the decision maker. This 
thesis aims to advance our understanding of how people routinely grapple with complex risk 
judgments and decisions under uncertainty. Using the exemplary case of decision making in 
avalanche terrain, this thesis investigates three specific aspects of how a population with 
domain-specific experience (backcountry skiers) perform a complex decision task (judging 
avalanche risk and deciding whether to ski) in a highly uncertain context (avalanche terrain). 
Paper 1 tests how the qualitative frame of the question eliciting a risk judgment influences risk 
perception and behaviour intention, and infers the cognitive process that the question frame 
activates. Risk judgments framed in terms of safety were found to result in more cautious, 
conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger. That effect suggests that the 
question frame directed attention in a way that guided selective information sampling. Paper 2 
investigates the relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments across multiple 
judgments of specific instances of an activity distinguished by contextual information. The 
perceived safety of a scenario was found to positively relate to the degree of liking that scenario 
across multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity. That provides a dynamic picture 
of the degree to which cognitive and affective factors are intertwined. Paper 3 examines the 
roles of uncertainty, domain-specific experience, and affective evaluations in the formation of 
confidence in complex risk judgments. Domain-specific experience was found to magnify 
confidence. However, greater experience does not necessarily correspond to more accurate risk 
judgments or better calibrated confidence. Furthermore, affective evaluations were found to 
play a role in the formation of confidence. Confidence was higher when the decision maker’s 
affective evaluation matched their risk perception, and less confident when there was a 
mismatch between the two. The findings are discussed within the wider framework of studying 
the decision process in order to help people make better decisions. This research has theoretical 
and applied relevance for backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain and more broadly in other 




List of Papers 
 
Paper I 
Stephensen, M. B., Schulze, C., Landrø, M., Hendrikx, J., & Hetland, A. (2021). Should I judge 
safety or danger? Perceived risk depends on the question frame. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied. https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000354 
 
Paper II 
Stephensen, M. B., & Martiny-Huenger, T. (2021). Liking and perceived safety across 




Stephensen, M. B., Martiny-Huenger, T., Schulze, C. (2021). Confidence in complex risk 





Studying applied risk judgments and decisions can be a frustratingly messy affair. The complex, 
noisy nature of most decision environments and the multiplicity of cognitive processes 
potentially activated during the decision process make the study of applied decision making a 
daunting task. Yet investigating how a population judges risk and decides behaviour in specific 
information environments is essential for advancing the science of judgement and decision-
making (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020). The characteristics of a decision task, the nature of its 
information environment, and the decision maker’s domain-specific experience can each 
influence the decision making process. It is therefore important that the design of experiments 
used in applied research represent the multifaceted characteristics of the real-life conditions to 
which experimental findings are generalized (Brunswik, 1944, 1955a; Dhami et al., 2004; 
Hammond, 1966; Juslin & Montgomery, 2007). Research on applied decision making should 
involve the complex, goal-directed judgements and decisions that typify human behaviour 
rather than focus exclusively on simple, one-dimensional tasks with well-defined parameters 
of information (Dhami et al., 2004; Juslin, 1994; Juslin et al., 2000; Yeung & Summerfield, 
2012). Accordingly, this thesis employs the task of judging avalanche risk and deciding whether 
to ski to study applied risk judgments and decisions under uncertainty. 
The simplicity of skiing in the mountains is almost comic. First, go to a snow-covered 
mountain. Strap a plank to each foot, take a stick in each hand, and walk up that snow-covered 
mountain. Finally, let gravity propel your thrilling descent down the mountain – joyous 
experience that can, at times, almost feel like flying. Yet the beauty and simple pleasure of 
skiing belie its true complexity, uncertainty, and risk. The combination of snow and mountains 
required for skiing is the very combination that creates the necessary conditions for snow 
avalanches. Avalanche terrain is a complex, variable, and uncertain environment in which a 
decision error can result in severe injury or death. For the increasing number of people 
venturing into the backcountry to ski (Birkeland et al, 2017), their safety depends on their ability 
to understand, identify, and mitigate risk in a hazardous, uncertain environment. 
Judging risk involves evaluating the available evidence to make inferences about the likelihood 
of negative outcomes and their potential impact. For backcountry skiers, that requires 
evaluating macro-level cues such as the regional avalanche danger forecast and the weather 
history, and micro-level cues such as slope angle, terrain features, and snowpack characteristics 
to infer the stability of a slope and the likelihood of triggering an avalanche if they decide to 
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ski. An incorrect decision to ski an unstable slope can result in an avalanche that can injure or 
kill those in its path. Unfortunately, judging avalanche risk is often highly uncertain. The 
complexity of the task, and the variability and inherent unpredictability of the decision 
environment often create a state of incomplete knowledge about the likelihood of those negative 
outcomes (Engeset et al., 2018; Furman et al., 2010; Landrø et al., 2020a, 2020b; Statham et 
al., 2018). As a result, decision errors resulting in avalanche accidents and fatalities are not 
uncommon. 
The Center for Avalanche Research and Education (CARE) at UiT The Arctic University of 
Norway studies how backcountry skiers make risk judgments and decisions within the complex 
environment of avalanche terrain with the aim of improving decision making practices to 
ultimately decrease the frequency of fatal errors. As a CARE-funded doctoral research fellow, 
my thesis investigates how experienced backcountry skiers respond to the task of judging 
avalanche risk. However, the relevance of my thesis is not limited to that specific context or 
task. Decision making in avalanche terrain offers an exemplary opportunity to study the 
complex risk judgments and decisions of an experienced, highly motivated population under 
authentic levels of uncertainty. The findings from this research can be generalized to a range of 
applied disciplines in which people search for and evaluate the available evidence to make 
inferences about the likelihood of negative outcomes and then decide the most appropriate 
behaviour. Analysing specific decision tasks and the processes by which people make those 
decisions increases the heterogeneity of the methods used and the populations and decision 
tasks investigated in the decision sciences, thereby expanding the knowledge base and 
relevance of the field (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020). Ultimately, my research uses the uncertain 
decision environment of avalanche terrain and the complex task of judging avalanche risk to 
advance our understanding of how people routinely grapple with complex decisions under high 
uncertainty. 
For the present thesis, I use hypothetical scenarios of an applied decision context (skiing in 
avalanche terrain) and a population with domain-specific experience (backcountry skiers) to 
examine three distinct aspects of the risk judgment and decision process (judging avalanche 
risk and deciding whether to ski). The study of each of those three aspects of the decision 
process is presented in one of three empirical papers. In paper 1, we investigate the effect of 
question framing on risk perception and behaviour intention. In paper 2, we examine the 
relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments (i.e., the affect heuristic). In paper 3, 
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we explore the formation of confidence in complex risk judgments. I consider those three topics 
in greater detail below when presenting the objectives of this thesis. 
The purpose of what follows is to contextualize and complement those three empirical papers 
rather than merely summarize them. I first elaborate upon the virtues and benefits of studying 
risk judgments and decisions in the context of decision making in avalanche terrain. In response 
to the imagined question, “Why study decision making in avalanche terrain?” I consider how 
that context involves a meaningful, goal-oriented decision task for an experienced and engaged 
population, and the benefits that that affords my research. I then describe the characteristics of 
the decision task and its information environment, and consider how decision making in 
avalanche terrain represents a paradigmatic case for studying complex risk judgments and 
decisions under high uncertainty. Having described the applied context that frames my thesis, 
I then present the objective of my research (Section 2). I introduce the three aspects of the risk 
judgment and decision process that my research examines in the three papers, discuss their 
relevance to the decision task, and define the research questions that we attempt to answer in 
each paper. After that introduction to the context and decision task employed in my research, I 
explain the methodological approach used throughout this project (Section 3) before providing 
a comparative overview of the research conducted for each of the three papers (Section 4). 
Finally, I summarize their results (Section 5) and broadly consider the implications of my 
research findings beyond what is discussed in each of the three papers (Section 6). 
 
1.1 Judging Avalanche Risk: A Meaningful, Goal-Oriented 
Decision Task for an Experienced Population 
Judging avalanche risk offers an exemplary opportunity to study complex, applied decisions. 
However, there are numerous ethical concerns with sending research participants into 
avalanche terrain under conditions of high uncertainty to study their risk judgments and 
decisions. My co-authors and I therefore used hypothetical backcountry skiing scenarios 
throughout this research. We modelled those scenarios on the natural decision environment 
using historic reports of avalanche terrain from national and regional avalanche authorities and 
the technical guidance of avalanche experts. Using hypothetical scenarios as experimental 
stimuli also solved the logistical challenge of aligning the conditions needed to create the 
desired level of uncertainty with the availability of participants. Fortunately, with a 
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comprehensive understanding of avalanche terrain it is possible to design realistic hypothetical 
scenarios that reflect the information properties and affective richness of the environment in 
which those tasks are naturally embedded (Hammond, 1966). Backcountry skiers evaluate a 
multiplicity of information cues to judge the risk of avalanches. CARE researchers (Landrø et 
al., 2020a, 2020b) investigating the information cues used in various decision making 
frameworks identified 53 different information cues that are used for avalanche risk judgments. 
Those information cues include macro-level cues – regional cues that must be interpreted for 
local application as and when relevant – such as the forecasted avalanche danger level, the 
forecasted avalanche problems, and weather history; and micro-level cues – context-specific 
information cues – such as slope angle, terrain features, and snowpack characteristics. All of 
those information cues can be communicated through text and images, and their configuration 
can be manipulated in hypothetical scenarios to create different degrees of risk and uncertainty. 
The information cues we used to design the hypothetical scenarios represent the very 
information that backcountry skiers evaluate to judge avalanche risk both before and during 
tours in avalanche terrain. By maintaining their natural richness, complexity, and uncertainty, 
we aimed for the stimuli presented to participants to be authentic representations of the contexts 
in which the decision task is naturally situated (Dhami et al., 2004). In such scenarios, the 
decision tasks remain entangled with the multiple contextual variables that are present in the 
decision environment (Morrow, 2018), many of which might be irrelevant for the decision task. 
Importantly, the activity, environment, and decision task depicted in the scenarios are familiar 
and meaningful to a population of backcountry skiers. By designing stimuli that reflect the 
richness and complexity of avalanche terrain, we sought to achieve the realism needed to 
engage their natural decision processes (Dhami et al., 2004; Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020). This 
enables an examination of the intersection between the information environment and the 
decision process (Hertwig et al., 2019) and increases the external validity and generalizability 
of the research findings (Dhami et al., 2004). In the methods section further below (Section 3), 
I explain the methodological approach we used to design realistic hypothetical scenarios that 
reflected the complex, rich information environment in which the decision task is naturally 
situated. I also consider the limitations of that approach. 
Our use of the applied context of decision making in avalanche terrain also made it possible to 
recruit participants with domain-specific experience (i.e., backcountry skiers) to participate in 
our studies. This overcomes some of the problems associated with the use of student samples 
such as the limits when generalizing from students to the general public (Hanel & Vione, 2016). 
 
5 
Judging avalanche risk and deciding whether to ski under specific conditions are not trivial 
tasks for backcountry skiers. That the task of judging avalanche risk, the activity of backcountry 
skiing, and the environment of avalanche terrain presented in the experimental stimuli are 
familiar, meaningful, and important for the participants increases the ecological validity of our 
findings (Brunswik, 1944, 1955a; Dhami et al., 2004; Hammond, 1966; Juslin & Montgomery, 
2007). In addition, backcountry skiers are invested in research on decision making in avalanche 
terrain because the findings have implications for their own pleasure and wellbeing. We were 
therefore able to recruit large numbers of backcountry skiers to participate in numerous 
experimental studies (the value of being able to recruit large samples of participants with 
domain-specific experience should not be underestimated). Decision making in avalanche 
terrain offers an excellent opportunity to study authentic decision tasks performed by authentic 
participants who are knowledgeable about those tasks and their environment, and for whom the 
task and environment have affective value and behaviour-relevant, goal-oriented meaning 
(Morrow, 2018). 
 
1.2 Judging Avalanche Risk: A Paradigmatic Case of Risk 
Judgments and Decisions under Severe Uncertainty 
Avalanche terrain is any mountainous area where the combination of terrain, snow, and weather 
can create the necessary conditions for a snow avalanche. It is a complex and highly uncertain 
environment that is objectively dangerous under a range of conditions (Engeset et al., 2018; 
Landrø et al., 2020a, 202b; Niedermeier et al., 2020; Statham et al., 2018). An avalanche occurs 
when the snowpack fails due to instability, causing a mass of snow to suddenly and violently 
slide down the slope at high velocity. Human activities such as skiing can cause the failure of 
the snowpack triggering the release of an avalanche. Although avalanche accidents are 
unintended and unexpected, they are not random or unexplainable; they require that the victims 
exposed themselves to the risk of avalanche (Johnson et al., 2020). To manage that risk, 
backcountry skiers must search for and evaluate a multiplicity of information cues in a complex, 
uncertain, and highly variable environment to make predictive inferences about the likelihood 
of an avalanche and its potential impact. Yet that is no simple task. In 90% of fatal avalanche 
accidents, the victim or someone in the victim’s party triggered the avalanche (McClung & 
Schaerer, 2006; Schweizer & Lütschg, 2000). That statistic implies that accidents occur when 
people mistakenly perceive objectively dangerous conditions as safe. People’s risk judgments 
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and decisions are critical factors in avalanche accidents and fatalities. It is therefore essential to 
consider how people judge risk and to examine the factors that underlie the decision process 
(Slovic, 1987). 
Decision making in avalanche terrain is an ideal task for investigating risk judgments and 
decisions under high uncertainty. Avalanche terrain is a complex decision environment where 
no single cue or combination of cues allows the perfect prediction of risk (Landrø et al., 2020a, 
2020b). The validity and reliability of the available evidence are often limited, ambiguous, or 
conflicting. Ascertaining when the combination of environmental factors such as terrain, slope 
angle, weather history, and snowpack characteristics present a real danger to skiers and deciding 
whether to ski are extremely complex tasks. The complexity, unpredictability, and spatial and 
temporal variability of the decision environment often creates a state of incomplete knowledge 
about the probabilities of possible outcomes (Hertwig et al., 2019; Speekenbrink & Shanks, 
2013; Statham et al., 2018). Such stochastic nature and inherent unpredictability of the 
environment are a source of considerable environmental uncertainty (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; 
Gillies, 2000; Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021; Ülkümen et al., 2016). Consequently, it is virtually 
impossible to eliminate environmental uncertainty when assessing avalanche risk (Engeset et 
al., 2018; Furman et al., 2010; Landrø et al., 2020a, 2020b; Statham et al., 2018). 
The internal uncertainty of the decision maker is also highly prevalent during avalanche risk 
judgments and decisions. Because of the complexity of the task, uncertainty can stem from the 
limited knowledge and skill of even the most experienced backcountry skiers. A task-specific 
strategy defines how a decision maker approaches a complex decision task such as judging 
avalanche risk (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). The accuracy of backcountry skier’s decision, and by 
extension the accuracy of their decision strategy, is the degree to which it corresponds with the 
true state of the world (Brunswik, 1955b; Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020; Hammond et al., 1975). 
This is in contrast to measuring the quality of a decision according to the alternative criteria of 
coherence, which concerns reasoning in accordance with the rules of logic and probability 
theory in a consistent way (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020; Hammond, 1996). That avalanche 
accidents are overwhelmingly the result of human error indicates that accidents occur when the 
perceived avalanche risk fails to correspond with environmental reality. A broader 
conceptualization of this benchmark of accuracy adopts a consequentialist interpretation of 
rationality in cognition (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021; Schurz & Hertwig, 2019) and measures 
accuracy in terms of the success in achieving one’s goal in the world. The measure of accuracy 
concerns the degree to which a decision corresponds with reality so that the decision maker 
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achieves their goal under the constraints and affordances of the decision environment and the 
capacity of the decision maker (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021). In avalanche terrain, this goal 
would be to not trigger an avalanche. Irrespective of whether the correspondence or 
consequentialist perspective on decision accuracy is employed, the most common measure of 
decision accuracy is outcome feedback: whether or not a skier triggered an avalanche. 
Backcountry skiers infer the accuracy of their performance based on the outcome of their 
decisions. Unfortunately, avalanche terrain is an environment where poor decisions are 
frequently marked by invalid feedback (Ebert, 2019; Johnson et al., 2020; Zweifel & Haegeli, 
2014). Although an avalanche event is a definitive indication of decision error, not triggering 
an avalanche is not a definitive indication of a correct decision. It is estimated that the majority 
of mistaken decisions in avalanche terrain fortuitously do not result in an avalanche; luck rather 
than decision accuracy is the cause of many positive outcomes (Tremper, 2008). That implies 
that outcome feedback is an unreliable measure of decision accuracy in avalanche terrain. This 
unreliability of outcome feedback and the absence of representative performance feedback 
make it problematic for decision makers to evaluate the accuracy of their decisions, refine their 
decision strategy, and calibrate their level of competency. Such a wicked learning environment 
obstructs skill development and magnifies the likelihood that decision makers have incomplete 
individual knowledge about the probabilities of possible outcomes (Hogarth et al., 2015). This 
can result in overconfidence and the proliferation of erroneous practices in the decision strategy. 
Decision making in avalanche terrain represents a context in which greater experience might 
not necessarily correspond to greater expertise. A mismatch between perceived risk and reality 
could be present for even the most experienced backcountry skiers in avalanche terrain. Due to 
this combination of external, environmental uncertainty and internal, cognitive uncertainty, 
decision making in avalanche terrain represents a paradigmatic applied case of complex risk 
judgements and decisions under high uncertainty.  
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2 Research Objectives 
The objective of this thesis was to increase our understanding of the cognitive processes that 
underlie complex risk judgments and decisions under uncertainty. Given the characteristics of 
the decision task and information environment that I described in the previous section, decision 
making in avalanche terrain offered an exemplary context for conducting research in pursuit of 
that objective. However, because a multiplicity of cognitive processes are potentially activated 
during such a complex task, I focused my research on the cognitive processes associated with 
three distinct aspects of decision making in avalanche terrain. The study of each of those three 
aspects of the decision process is presented in one of three empirical papers: 
1) In paper 1, my co-authors and I test how the qualitative frame of the question eliciting 
a risk judgment influences risk perception and behaviour intention. Based on the 
measured effect, we infer the cognitive process that the question frame activates. 
2) In paper 2, we investigate the relation between affective evaluations and risk 
judgments (i.e., the affect heuristic) across multiple judgments of specific instances 
of an activity distinguished by contextual information. 
3) In paper 3, we examine the roles of uncertainty, domain-specific experience, and 
affective evaluations in the formation of confidence in complex risk judgments 
We chose those three topics because of their apparent prominence in the process of judging 
avalanche risk and deciding whether to ski, but also because of their theoretical relevance to 
the field of applied judgments and decision making more broadly. There were knowledge gaps 
within the existing literature on framing effects, affective evaluations, and confidence that we 
believed could be effectively studied using this applied context of judgment and decision 
making. Question framing, affective evaluations, and retrospective confidence are important 
natural elements of the decision making in avalanche terrain. Moreover, they are topics that we 
can effectively study using the methods that we envisioned. Studying them in the context of 
risk judgments and decisions in avalanche terrain held the promise of increasing our 
understanding of the cognitive processes that drive the decisions in that specific context and in 
other similar contexts of high uncertainty. 
A potential secondary outcome from this research is that by better understanding the cognitive 
processes that underlie risk judgments and decisions under uncertainty, we might identify 
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opportunities to harness, influence, or mitigate those processes to help decision makers do 
better. Such an outcome would identify important avenues for future research. This secondary 
outcome is particularly relevant for the CARE’s research programme and beyond to other fields 
of applied risk perception and communication. Although Paper 1 considers the possibility of 
harnessing question framing to increase the likelihood of more cautious, conservative behaviour 
in the face of uncertainty, Papers 2 and 3 do not draw similar conclusions about affective 
evaluations or confidence. I therefore consider this secondary outcome of “better risk judgments 
and decisions” later in the General Discussion (Section 6) when considering the results and 
implications of the three papers. 
In the following sub-sections, I introduce the research questions that we addressed in each of 
the three papers and summarize their findings. As each paper studies a different aspect of the 
decision making process, the theoretical context of each paper is unique. In each paper, we 
situate the scope and results of that research within the wider context of the current theory and 
empirical findings for that topic. I therefore refrain from unnecessarily repeating that 
contextualization here, and only briefly introduce the theoretical and applied importance of 
each paper at this time. 
 
2.1 Paper 1: Risk Perception and Question Framing 
Research has demonstrated that framing influences how people respond to or evaluate an object, 
activity, or situation (for reviews see e.g., Kühberger, 1998, 2017; Levin et al., 1998; Maule & 
Villejoubert, 2007; Piñon & Gambara, 2005). Research on framing effects informs policies and 
practices in applied domains such as health (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2011; Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Peters et al., 2011; Rothman & Salovey, 1997) and finance 
(Kirchler et al, 2005; Weber et al., 2000). Although framing can have a troublesome biasing 
effect in many circumstances, not all instances of framing are considered harmful or 
problematic. The purposeful use of framing to promote specific judgments and decisions is an 
established practice in several fields such as media and communications (Block & Keller, 1995; 
Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) and marketing (Biswas, 2009; 
Biswas & Grau, 2008; Levin & Gaeth, 1988). Might framing be strategically employed to 




When judging risk, we evaluate an attribute of an object, action, or situation. Attributes are 
commonly conceptualized in terms of polarized dimensions. For example, we understand the 
attribute speed in terms of the two dimensions “fast” and “slow”. Those two dimensions are 
like the two sides of a coin: distinct but inseparable. The two dimensions provide opposing but 
complementary perspectives on the object of judgment. When judging an attribute such as risk, 
it is a natural process of language to focus on a single dimension of that judged attribute (Hilton, 
2011). For example, when judging speed, we commonly ask “Is it fast?” or, alternatively, “Is it 
slow?” rather than formulating a judgment using both dimensions. Similarly, it is natural for 
backcountry skiers to formulate the judgment as either “How safe are the conditions?” or “How 
dangerous are the conditions?” Crucially, the question frame defines a decision maker’s 
perspective on the target of judgment and establishes the reference point against which they 
make their judgment. 
The use of framing in applied contexts depends on correctly matching the type of frame – and 
the cognitive process that it activates – with the objective for its application. The cognitive 
processes that a frame activates and the direction of the resulting framing effect likely depend 
on the form and domain in which the frame is achieved. Consequently, the different theoretical 
accounts of the framing effect – the valence account, the communication account, and the 
attention account – make conflicting predictions about the direction and prevalence of an effect 
evoked by a question frame. Framing effects have been studied extensively in the context of 
framing the presentation of information about the object(s) of judgment. However, uncertainty 
persists about the cognitive processes (and thus the direction of any possible effect) that are 
activated by the qualitative attribute that frames the question eliciting a judgment (i.e., question 
framing). Previous research on question framing produced conflicting results on the direction 
of the framing effect (e.g., Payne et al., 2013; Comerford & Robinson, 2017). We therefore 
sought to determine how the choice of frame influences perceived risk and behavioural 
decisions and, based on that effect, to infer the cognitive process that a question frames 
activates. 
In Paper 1, we investigated how the qualitative frame of the question that elicits a risk judgment 
influences the perception of avalanche risk and the decision (intention, not action) of whether 
to ski. Risk judgments framed in terms of safety (How safe is it?) were found to result in more 
cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger (How dangerous is it?). 
The direction of that effect suggests that the question frame directed attention in a way that 
guided selective information sampling. The question frame was also found to have an indirect 
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influence on behaviour intention via the direct effect on the risk judgment. Framing the 
judgment of avalanche risk in terms of safety increased the likelihood of more cautious, 
conservative risk perception and behaviour intention. 
 
2.2 Paper 2: Affective Evaluations and Perceived Risk 
Affective evaluations can serve as a compelling orienting mechanism for a range of decision 
tasks including risk judgments (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Finucane et al, 2000; Lerner et 
al., 2015; Lowenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz, 2007, 2012; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2002, 
2004). The more a person likes an object or activity, the safer and more valuable it appears, 
whereas the more a person dislikes an object or activity, the more unsafe and less valuable it 
appears (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002). That relation is 
particularly important in contexts of high uncertainty such as avalanche terrain. When valid, 
definitive evidence of risk is lacking and the available evidence is ambiguous or conflicting, 
reliance upon affective evaluations can increase and might even be considered justified, as the 
terms “gut instinct” and “intuition” suggest (Wilson & Arvai, 2006). 
Evidence for this positive relation between liking and perceived safety (or disliking and 
perceived danger) was found when judging categorical representations of objects and activities 
(Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002). However, risk judgments 
and behavior decisions in the real world most often focus on specific instances of objects and 
activities that are distinguished by contextual information, details, or constraints (e.g., I like to 
ski this specific mountain under these particular conditions and consider it safe action) rather 
than judging their categorical representations (e.g., I like backcountry skiing and consider it a 
safe activity). Although it is reasonable to assume that affective evaluations and risk perceptions 
can differ between levels of perception, does the relation between the two found at the 
categorical level apply to and influence affective evaluations and risk judgments at the 
contextual level? That is important because when faced with a specific potential hazard and 
high uncertainty, decision makers should ideally decide behaviour based on a contextual 
judgment rather than their general, category-level orientation. 
Backcountry skiing is an increasingly popular activity in which people voluntarily engage, most 
often for purely recreational purposes. The very behaviour of going backcountry skiing 
indicates that backcountry skiers like the activity and consider it safe at the categorical level. 
 
12 
This reflects the positive relation between liking and perceived safety that Alhakami and Slovic 
(1994), Finucane et al (2000), and Slovic et al. (2002) found when studying the judgments of 
categorical representations of objects and activities independent of specific contextual 
information, details, or constraints. That a skier likes to ski in the backcountry and generally 
considers it a safe category of activity are certainly sentiments that influence their decisions to 
ski in the mountains. However, once in avalanche terrain, that skier must selectively attend to 
affective and cognitive information cues to judge the risk in that specific situation. Does the 
positive relation between liking and perceived safety demonstrated at the category level hold 
when a skier perceives a specific instance of backcountry skiing distinguished by contextual 
details? We investigated whether both contextual valence and contextual perceived risk diverge 
from categorical perspectives in a way that defies or upholds the positive relation between 
liking and perceived safety. 
Paper 2 examines the relation between affective evaluations (i.e., integral affect) and risk 
perception across multiple judgments of specific instances (i.e., different scenarios of 
backcountry skiing). We tested whether objectively uncertain instances of backcountry skiing 
are disliked and perceived as unsafe, in accordance with the liking-perceived safety relation, 
despite the population liking the activity and perceiving it as safe at the categorical level. The 
positive relation between liking and perceived safety was found to hold across multiple 
judgments of a series of hypothetical scenarios depicting specific instances of the activity. This 
indicates that contextual valence and perceived risk can dynamically diverge from categorical 
valence and perceived risk when judging specific instances of that category. 
 
2.3 Paper 3: Confidence in Relation to the Perceived Source of 
Uncertainty 
Faced with uncertainty, a decision maker’s belief in the accuracy of their decision influences 
the likelihood that that decision is translated into action (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Gill et al., 1998; 
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). It is therefore important that a decision maker’s confidence in their 
risk judgments be justified and accurately calibrated. Otherwise overconfidence can lead to an 
increased likelihood of dangerous behaviour. However, calibrating confidence is extremely 
challenging during learning and skill development (Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020) and 
contention persists about the origin of confidence and the internal effects that drive its 
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(mis)calibration (Boldt et al. 2017; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; Meyniel et al., 2015; Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012). The confidence of experienced decision makers in complex, real-world 
decision tasks that typify behaviour is relatively unexamined as compared to the multitude of 
studies involving novice decision makers (i.e., student samples) performing simple tasks with 
well-defined parameters of information, such as confidence in general knowledge trivia 
(Koehler et al., 2002; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). We therefore used the context of decision 
making in avalanche terrain to investigate how backcountry skiers with domain-specific 
experience formed confidence in the complex task of judging avalanche risk under high 
uncertainty.  
Research has demonstrated that confidence increases with domain-specific experience (Fischer 
& Budescu, 2005; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020). Although experience is often intuitively 
associated with better judgments, the relationship between experience, confidence, and 
judgment accuracy is in fact far more complicated. As explained in the earlier section when 
describing the decision environment, the stochastic nature and inherent unpredictability of 
avalanche terrain make it virtually impossible to eliminate environmental uncertainty when 
assessing avalanche risk. Experience with that judgment task and its information environment 
should relate directly to an increased understanding of that inherent environmental uncertainty: 
it is impossible to out-think or solve the uncertainty of some conditions. Are more experienced 
individuals better able to perceive the inherent environmental uncertainty when judging 
avalanche risk? If so, do they have greater confidence in that perception? Paper 3 explores the 
role of domain-specific experience in the formation of confidence in risk judgments in relation 
to the perceived source of uncertainty for that judgment task. Domain-specific experience was 
found to magnify confidence. However, although greater experience relates to greater 
confidence in risk judgment, greater experience does not necessarily correspond to more 
accurate risk judgments or better calibrated confidence. 
Beyond this examination of confidence in relation to experience and the perceived source of 
uncertainty, we also explore the role of affective evaluations in the formation of confidence. 
Since affective evaluations are understood as influencing the risk judgment process (Blanchette 
& Richards, 2010; Finucane et al, 2000; Lerner et al., 2015; Lowenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz, 
2012; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2002, 2004), they might similarly play a role in the formation 
of confidence in that risk judgment. In Paper 2, we found that the more a person likes a scenario, 
the safer it is perceived, whereas the more a person dislikes a scenario, the more dangerous it 
is perceived. However, despite this positive relation, it is possible that an individual likes a 
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stimulus that is perceived as dangerous or dislikes a stimulus perceived as safe. In Paper 3, we 
explore whether a congruence (e.g., liking a scenario perceived as safe) or an incongruence 
(e.g., liking a scenario perceived as dangerous) between affective evaluations and risk 
judgments influences the formation of confidence. Affective evaluations were found to play a 
role in the formation of confidence. Confidence was higher when the decision maker’s affective 
evaluation matched their risk perception, and less confident when there was a mismatch 




3 Methodological Approach 
The presentation of the methods used in this thesis is divided into two parts: (i) an explanation 
of the methodological approach of the thesis (the present section, Section 3) and (ii) a 
comparative overview of the methods and materials used in each of the three papers (Section 
4). In the present section I explain our methodological approach across all three papers to 
conduct research on risk judgments and decisions using the context of decision making in 
avalanche terrain. This comprises three sub-section. I first explain the framework we used to 
study applied risk judgments and decisions. I then explain the quasi-representative design 
approach we used when developing the hypothetical scenarios. Finally I explain why and how 
we designed uncertain scenarios through the configuration of information cues. 
 
3.1 Framework for Researching Applied Judgment and 
Decision Making 
Studying applied decision making involves three complementary forms of research: 1) 
examining the properties of the decision task and its environment, 2) studying how decision 
makers naturally respond to that task, and 3) investigating methods to help decision makers do 
better (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020). This perspective is rooted in social judgment theory 
(Hammond et al., 1975), a meta-theory that serves as a framework to guide research on applied 
judgment and decision making rather than providing testable hypotheses (Brehmer & Brehmer, 
1988; Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Cooksey, 1996; Dhami et al., 2004; Dhami & Mumpower, 2018; 
Hammond et al., 1975). According to that framework, research should aim to describe judgment 
and decision making processes in order to develop interventions to improve performance of 
that task. Those interventions should seek to empower decision makers to make better decision 
or to provide needed protections when better decisions are impossible (Fischhoff & Broomell, 
2020). The model of the decision environment and the model of how decision makers naturally 
respond to the decision task are crucial benchmarks for determining how judgements and 
decisions can be improved (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Dhami & Mumpower, 2018). The present 
thesis is focused on the second of these three complementary forms of research: investigating 
three aspects of the avalanche risk judgment and decision process in order to better understand 
how individuals with domain-specific experience naturally make judge risk and decide 
behaviour under conditions of high uncertainty. In the general discussion further below, I 
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consider how my research contributes to investigating methods to help decision makers do 
better, both for backcountry skiers in avalanche terrain and more broadly in other fields 
involving applied risk judgments and decisions. 
Studying how decision makers naturally respond to an applied decision task is dependent upon 
a sound understanding of the properties of that task. If we aim to design experiments that have 
the necessary realism to activate natural risk judgment and decision processes, we must 
understand the information properties of the real-life decision environment (Cooksey, 
1996; Dhami et al., 2004; Hammond, 1966; Hammond et al., 1975). For that purpose, we 
availed ourselves of the knowledge and expertise within CARE (to which my thesis is 
connected) and the literature in the field of avalanche safety. Using existing research on the 
multiplicity of information cues used for risk judgments and decisions in avalanche terrain 
(Engeset et al., 2018; Haegeli et al., 2010; Landrø et al., 2020a, 2020b; McCammon & Hägeli, 
2007; Tremper, 2008), my extensive personal experience in avalanche terrain, and the 
invaluable support of CARE-affiliated avalanche experts, notably Markus Landrø (M. Landrø, 
personal communication, June 2017, and September 2019 to January 2020), we sought to 
design hypothetical scenarios that realistically represent the information properties of avalanche 
terrain and the behaviour-relevant, goal-oriented judgments and decisions that backcountry 
skiers make. 
 
3.2 Quasi-representative design 
As I previously explained in the introduction (Section 1), the decision environment is central 
to my thesis. However, due to the ethical concerns with sending research participants into 
avalanche terrain under conditions of high uncertainty to study their risk judgments and 
decisions, we used an experimental approach rather than field studies. We utilized a 
representative design approach of developing realistically complex hypothetical scenarios to 
ensure high ecological validity in the response of participants for whom the task and 
environment are familiar and meaningful. Rather than manipulate a single variable in an 
extremely information-reduced context, which could lead to overestimating the effects of that 
single factor (for a discussion see Dhami et al., 2004; Koriat, 2018), we manipulated the 
information cues within those scenarios while maintaining the complexity and richness of 
information environment in which the decision task is naturally situated. 
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The studies conducted in Paper 1 used a series of scenarios of one design, while the studies 
conducted in Papers 2 and 3 used a series of scenarios of another design. We used different 
scenario designs because of the different contexts for data collection between Paper 1 and 
Papers 2 and 3. Paper 1 involved a series of studies conducted in an auditorium during seminars 
on avalanche safety. The time available during the seminars to conduct the studies was limited 
so we excluded text from the scenarios so that participants could process the available 
information more quickly. By contrast, the studies in Papers 2 and 3 were conducted online 
under no circumstantial time constraints. Participants could use as much time as they needed to 
read the text in each seminar. Figure 1 presents an example of the scenarios used in Paper 1. 
Figure 2 presents an example of the scenarios used in Papers 2 and 3. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the scenarios used in Paper 1 
Note: Information cues are communicated through the image and through the icons indicating 
the slope angle (the first, topmost icon), the forecasted regional avalanche danger level for that 
scenario (the second icon), and the prevailing regional avalanche problems (the last two icons 
indicate that there are two potential avalanche problems in the scenario). The icons used in the 
scenarios are standardized icons defined by the European Avalanche Warning Services 
(EAWS) and used by the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service in daily regional avalanche 





Figure 2. Example of the scenarios used in Papers 2 and 3 
Note: Information cues such as the current avalanche danger forecast, slope angle, terrain 
features, weather history, snowpack characteristics, and the current forecasted hazard(s) are 
communicated through the text and the image in the scenario. 
 
However, representative design requires that stimuli not only realistically represent the 
characteristics of the natural decision environment but that they also be a faithful representation 
of the probabilistic distribution of that environment (Dhami et al, 2004; Dhami & Mumpower, 
2018). Fulfilling that design features requires an ecological analysis of the probabilistic 
structure of the natural decision environment (i.e., the probabilistic distributions of risk and the 
associated information cues). Unfortunately, such ecological sampling data does not exist for 
avalanche terrain and the work required to obtain such data is far beyond the scope of my thesis. 
That the probabilistic distributions of risk and information cues in avalanche terrain varies 
greatly with annual weather variation and local geographic characteristics makes obtaining such 
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ecological sampling data all the more challenging. Moreover, the probabilistic structure of the 
environment also depends upon individual preferences in terms of skiing, risk orientation and 
acceptance, and group dynamics, to name just a few subjective factors (e.g., Mannberg et al, 
2018, 2020). It is therefore difficult to fulfil the design criteria of representative probabilistic 
distributions prescribed by representative design theory for the decision environment of 
avalanche terrain. 
The studies conducted for Papers 2 and 3 used exclusively uncertain scenarios. That we could 
not use a sample of scenarios that faithfully represent the probabilistic distribution of risk in the 
natural decision environment might go some way toward explaining the effects found in those 
studies, particularly those concerning confidence. People naturally search for patterns among 
random sequences and are particularly skilled at perceiving patterns but poor at recognizing 
randomness (Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Oskarsson et al., 2009). It is possible that 
participants in our studies perceived spurious patterns and correlations across the scenarios they 
judged with the result that some scenarios appeared safer and others more dangerous. This 
possibility of perceiving spurious differences in the relative safety/danger between scenarios 
may have been magnified by the design of the studies themselves. The exclusive use of 
uncertain scenarios may have been ecologically invalid for a sample of experienced participants 
who expected a particular distribution of risk among the scenarios that reflected the distribution 
of risk in their prior real-world experience. Two of the studies conducted for Paper 1 employed 
safe, uncertain, and dangerous scenarios but, for the reasons explained above, it was impossible 
to establish whether the proportion of scenarios in those categories represent the probabilistic 
distribution of the natural environment of avalanche terrain. Recognizing this limitation, I 
regard my methodology to be based on a quasi-representative design approach. 
 
3.3 Designing Uncertain Scenarios 
Being unable to determine and thereby sample a proportional distribution of risk, we 
purposefully used uncertain scenarios in this research, notably for the studies conducted for 
Papers 2 and 3. We did so because accidents and fatalities are most frequent during uncertain 
conditions. Risk judgment and decision errors predominantly occur under conditions of 
uncertain risk when a decision maker mistakenly judges objectively dangerous conditions as 
safe. My research is focused on the probabilistic conditions under which accidents are most 
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likely to occur – under conditions of uncertainty – and therefore designed the scenarios to reflect 
those conditions. 
What makes the conditions in avalanche terrain uncertain and how did we achieve that 
uncertainty in the hypothetical scenarios? Risk judgments and decisions most often involve 
making probabilistic inferences based on incomplete and ambiguous evidence (Brehmer & 
Brehmer, 1988; Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Brunswik, 1955a; Cooksey, 1996; Dhami et al., 2004; 
Dhami & Mumpower, 2018; Hammond et al., 1975). Decision makers do not perceive the level 
of risk in the external environment (i.e., the distal state or stimulus) directly or objectively. 
Instead, they make an inferential judgment of risk based on multiple proximal cues that 
imperfectly indicate the true state of that the world (Dhami & Mumpower, 2018; Newel, 2013). 
As many as 53 information cues might be relevant for risk judgments and decision in avalanche 
terrain (Landrø et al., 2020a, 2020b). We constructed and presented he scenarios using a 
selection of those information cues that avalanche experts consider essential for judging 
avalanche risk. Participants used the proximal information cues presented in the scenarios to 
judge avalanche risk. As in the real world, they had to interpret macro level (i.e., regional level) 
information such as the forecasted danger level, weather history, and the prevailing regional 
avalanche problems and apply that interpretation to evaluate micro level cues such as terrain 
and slope angle to judge the avalanche risk of a specific slope. None of the scenarios included 
indicators of either very low or very high risk of avalanche. The available information cues in 
the scenario photo and the icons (see Figure 1) or textual content and photo (see Figure 2) had 
limited reliability and validity, and were ambiguous and/or conflicting. The scenario depicted 
in Figure 2 illustrates how the configuration of information cues create uncertainty. Although 
the steepness of the slope, the weather history, and the prevailing avalanche problem in the 
scenario indicate an increased probability of an avalanche, the low danger level of 2-moderate 
(on a five-category scale), the terrain features, and the lack of any signs in the photograph 
indicative of the presence of the regional avalanche problem indicate a reduced probability of 
avalanche. It was not possible to ascertain that the scenario was safe or dangerous. The risk 
level of the scenario was objectively uncertain given the conflicting evidence. In that way, the 





4 Methods and Materials 
Having explained in the previous section the methodological approach of this thesis, in what 
follows I provide a comparative overview of the methods and materials used in each of the three 
papers. I first explain the provenance of the data for each of the three papers. Then I briefly 
describe the specific methods we used in each paper to investigate the effect of question framing 
on perceived risk and behaviour intention, the relation between affective evaluations and 
perceived risk across multiple judgments of specific instances of a category of activity, and the 
formation of confidence in complex risk judgments. I then present the formulation of the 
judgment tasks and their response scales as they were presented to participants in each paper. 
Finally, I present the main model and statistical analysis that we used in each paper.  
 
4.1 The Origin of Data for Papers 1 to 3 
Paper 1 is based on empirical evidence collected over six independent, pre-registered studies. 
Those six studies used the scenario design represented in Figure 1. Data from those six studies 
are only reported in Paper 1. For Paper 2 and Paper 3, we collected data on risk judgments over 
a series of five studies using the scenario design represented in Figure 2. As Figure 3 illustrates, 
Papers 2 and 3 are based on empirical evidence collected over three common studies and one 
study unique to each paper. The first study in that series of five studies was a pilot study in 
which we measured risk judgments and confidence but did not measure affective evaluations. 
As reported in Paper 2, in the next four studies in that series (the second to fifth studies) we 
measured risk judgments and affective evaluations to test our hypotheses on the relation 
between those two variables. All data testing the hypothesized relation between affective 
evaluations and risk judgments are presented in Paper 2. For exploratory purposes, we 
continued to measure retrospective confidence in all but the fifth and final study in that series. 
Those data on confidence constituted the basis for Paper 3. Paper 3 explores the formation of 
confidence using data on risk judgments, affective evaluations, and participant experience from 
the three common studies reported in Paper 2, and data on risk judgments and participant 
experience from the first pilot study. All data on confidence and their analysis are uniquely 
presented in Paper 3, as Table 1 illustrates. Despite drawing upon data from several common 
studies, the theoretical contextualisation, analyses, results, and their implications are differ 
between Papers 2 and 3. In Paper 3, we clearly declared that the data on risk judgments, 
 
22 
affective evaluations, and participant experience from three of the four studies were previously 
published in the context of testing a hypothesized relation between scenario liking and judged 
safety (i.e., in Paper 2). We further declared that confidence did not pertain to the focus of that 
investigation and therefore we neither analysed nor published data on confidence in Paper 2. 
All studies were conducted in accordance with the ethical research protocols of UiT The Arctic 
University of Norway and the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD). Participants gave 
informed consent prior to all studies. 
 
 




4.2 Study Designs 
Table 1 presents a comparative overview of the studies conducted for each of the three papers. 
Detailed descriptions of the pre-registrations, participants, study designs, materials, measures, 
data collection methods, and data preparation and analyses are presented in each paper. 
 
Table 1. Overview of study designs in Papers 1-3 
Research 
details 
Paper 1:  
Question framing 
Paper 2: 
Liking & Perceived 
Safety 
Paper 3: 
Confidence in complex 
risk judgments 
Sample N = 1599 N = 372 N = 181 
Studies 6 studies 4 studies (see Figure 3) 4 studies (see Figure 3) 
Stimuli Studies 1-4: 6 scenarios 
per participant 
Studies 5-6: 10 
scenarios per participant 
(see scenario example 
in Figure 1) 
4 scenarios per 
participant 
(see scenario example in 
Figure 2) 
Study 1: 6 scenarios per 
participant 
Studies 2-4: 4 scenarios 
per participant 
(see scenario example in 
Figure 2) 




of question that elicited 
the risk judgment 









1. Risk judgment, 
framed in terms of 
safety versus danger 
2. Behaviour intention 
1. Risk judgments1 
2. Affective 
evaluations1 
1. Risk judgments1 
2. Affective 
evaluations1 
3. Confidence reports1 









Notes: 1 The risk judgments, affective evaluations, and confidence reports involved three 
measures, the second reversed, calculate a score for each judgment. 
2 Four measures of self-reported skiing ability, avalanche training, years of backcountry skiing, 
and average number of backcountry skiing days per season were used to calculate a domain-
specific experience score per participant. Due to a technical failure during data collection for 
Paper 1, the covariates were not measured in all studies and are therefore not considered in the 
analyses and results reported in Paper 1. 
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4.3 The Judgment Tasks and How They Were Measured 
Table 2 presents a comparative overview of the judgment tasks in each paper, the formulation 
of those tasks as presented to participants, and the response scales or options. 
 
Table 2. Overview of judgment tasks used in Papers 1-3 
Paper Judgment task Formulation of judgment task Response scale 





Safe condition: “How safe is it?” 
 
 
Danger condition: “How dangerous 
is it?” 
7-point scale labelled Not 
at all safe and Completely 
safe at the limits 
7-point scale labelled Not 
at all dangerous and 




“Would you ski this slope?” Three response options: 
Yes, I cannot say, or No 
2 & 3 Perceived risk 
 
“Regarding the avalanche risk…” 
1) “Is it safe to ski the slope in 
these conditions?” 
2) “Is it dangerous to ski the slope 
in these conditions?” (reverse-
coded) 
3) “Is the snowpack stable enough 
to ski this slope?” 
Three 7-point scales 
labelled Not at all and 




“Regarding your desire to ski this 
slope, the slope appears…” 
1) “Attractive” 
2) “Uninteresting” (reverse-coded) 
3) “Enjoyable” 
Three 7-point scales 
labelled Not at all and 
Very much at the limits 
 Confidence 
report 
“Regarding your judgments of the 
avalanche risk…” 
1) “Are you confident in your 
assessment of the avalanche 
risk?” 
2) “Do you doubt your judgment of 
the avalanche danger?” 
(reverse-coded) 
3) “Are you confident in your 
judgment of the safety of the 
snowpack?” 
Three 7-point scales 
labelled Not at all and 
Very much at the limits 
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4.4 Statistical Models and Analyses 
Table 3 presents a comparative overview of the main model(s) that we fit and the statistical 
analysis that we conducted in each paper. Detailed descriptions of all data preparation and 
analyses are presented in each paper. The data and R script for data processing and analysis for 
all studies in each paper are publicly available on the Open Science Framework. The relevant 
links are provided in each paper. 
 
Table 3. Overview of modelling and statistical analyses for Papers 1-3 
Paper Models Statistical analyses 
1 Judged safety ~ question frame 
Behaviour intention ~ judged safety * 
question frame 
Ordinal regression using multilevel 
models 
Null hypothesis significance testing 
Frequentist inferences 
2 Judged safety ~ scenario liking Linear regression using multilevel 
models 
Null hypothesis significance testing 
Frequentist inferences 
3 Confidence ~ judged safety * participant 
experience + scenario liking 
Linear regression using multilevel 
models 
Parameter estimation using the 
combined individual participant data 








In this section, I present qualitative summaries of the results of each of the three papers. The 
purpose of these summaries is to inform the discussion of those findings and their implication 
in General Discussion (Section 6). Detailed quantitative reports of all results and discussions 
of their implications and limitations are presented in each paper. 
 
5.1 Paper 1: Risk Perception and Question Framing 
Paper 1 investigated how framing the question that elicits a risk judgment in terms of safety or 
danger influences the perceived risk of a slope and the intention to ski it. The different 
theoretical accounts of the framing effect – the valence account, the communication account, 
and the attention account – make conflicting predictions about the direction and prevalence of 
an effect evoked by a question frame. Prior research (Payne et al., 2013; Comerford & 
Robinson, 2017) produced conflicting results about the direction of the question framing effect, 
and thus the cognitive processes that a question frame is inferred to activate. The findings from 
this paper make several contributions to advance our theoretical understanding of framing 
effects. First, this paper establishes the direction of the framing effect when a risk judgment is 
framed in terms of safety or danger. Across six studies, risk judgments framed in terms of safety 
(How safe is it?) were found to result in more cautious, conservative judgments than when 
framed in terms of danger (How dangerous is it?). The graph on the left in Figure 4 illustrates 
that framing effect. Second, uncertainty was not required for that effect. There was a question 
framing effect when judging risk under varying degrees of uncertainty, be it under conditions 
of objective safety, uncertainty, or danger. These findings suggest that the question frame 
directed attention in a way that guided selective evidence sampling to evaluate whether the 
target of judgment meets or fulfils the descriptive state defined by the question frame. The 
direction of the question framing effect we observed across six studies runs counter to what 
might be expected based on alternative accounts of framing that assume a valence or 
communication driven mechanism. Finally, this paper demonstrates the indirect influence of 
the question frame on behaviour intention. As the graph on the right in Figure 4 illustrates, the 
probability that participants would ski a slope monotonically increased with an increase in 
judged safety. Question framing was found to influence judged safety, and judged safety was 
in turn found to be a powerful determinant of behaviour decisions. By selectively phrasing the 
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question that elicits a risk judgment, a decision maker’s attention can be directed in a way that 
strategically influences the perception of risk with the effect of making one behaviour outcome 
more likely. 
 
Figure 4. The effect of question framing on judged safety and behaviour intentions. 
Note: The graph on the left illustrates the probabilities of each judged safety values (1 = Not at 
all safe and 7 = Completely safe) by experimental condition. The vertical bars mark the 95% 
confidence intervals of the probabilities. The graph on the right illustrates the probabilities of 
each response (faceted into three columns = No, I will not ski; Undecided; Yes, I will ski) per 
judged safety value and per experimental condition. Each response option is marked at the top 
of each column in the graph. The vertical bars mark the 95% confidence intervals of the 
probabilities. Both graphs are plotted using the combined data from studies 1 to 4 in Paper 1 in 
which only uncertain scenarios were judged. 
 
5.2 Paper 2: Affective Evaluations and Perceived Risk 
Paper 2 examined the relation between affective evaluations and risk perception across multiple 
judgments of specific instances (i.e., different scenarios of backcountry skiing). As Figure 5 
illustrates, across four studies we found evidence that higher self-reported liking of backcountry 
ski scenarios corresponded to judgments of higher avalanche safety (or, conversely, higher 
disliking corresponded to judgments of higher avalanche danger). Although prior research 
demonstrated the positive relation between liking and perceived safety when judging 
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categorical representations of stimuli (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic 
et al., 2002), this paper extends those findings by demonstrating that the liking-perceived safety 
relation holds across multiple judgments of highly uncertain, specific instances of an activity 
that are distinguished by contextual information. Furthermore, despite the facts that 
backcountry skiers like backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain and deem the activity to be safe, 
specific instances of backcountry skiing assumed a negative contextual valence and were 
perceived as unsafe in accordance with the liking-perceived safety relation. The relation 
between liking and perceived safety holds at the contextual level of perception, even when the 
valence and perceived safety of a specific instance of a stimulus conflicts with the established 
valence and perceived safety of that category of stimulus for the decision maker. Contextual 
judgments of specific instances of an activity can dynamically diverge from the person’s 
orientation toward that category of activity. However, even though the two levels of judgments 
can diverge, that the relation between affective evaluations and perceived risk holds at both 
levels of perception across multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity provides a 
dynamic picture of the degree to which cognitive and affective factors are intertwined. 
 
Figure 5. Scenario liking as a predictor of judged safety per study 
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5.3 Paper 3: Confidence in Complex Risk Judgments 
Paper 3 explores the roles of the perceived source of uncertainty, domain-specific experience, 
and affective evaluations in the formation of confidence in complex risk judgments. Domain-
specific experience was found to magnify confidence, echoing previous findings on the 
development of confidence (Fischer & Budescu, 2005; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020). Yet 
despite their greater confidence, variance in judged safety did not decrease among more 
experienced participants. Confidence in judged safety increased with experience despite highly 
experienced participants demonstrating as much disagreement in judged safety as participants 
with little experience. Even the most experienced participants did not recognize that the safety 
or danger of each scenario could not be established. Confidence was lowest at the mid-range of 
the response scale and highest at either end of the response scale. More experienced participants 
did not judge with greater confidence that it is impossible to establish the safety or danger of 
the scenarios. Instead, as Figure 6 illustrates, more experienced participants had greater 
confidence in their mistaken perceptions that a given scenario was completely safe or 
completely dangerous. Experience with the judgment task did not increase recognition of the 
information limitations and inherent uncertainty of the environment. 
Affective evaluations were also found to play a role in the formation of confidence. As Figure 
7 illustrates, the effect of affective evaluations was specific to whether a scenario was judged 
as safe to some degree (judged safety ≥ 4) or dangerous to some degree (judged safety < 4). 
Liking a scenario perceived as safe or disliking a scenario perceived as dangerous increased 
confidence. By contrast, liking a scenario perceived as dangerous or disliking a scenario 
perceived as safe reduced confidence in the risk judgment. Participants were more confident 
when their affective evaluation matched their risk perception, and less confident when there 
was a mismatch between the two. These findings are evidence of an interplay between affective 





Figure 6. The relation of confidence to judged safety and experience 
Note: The effects of judged safety and participant experience on confidence (confidence ~ 
judged safety * participant experience) when a scenario is perceived as dangerous to some 
degree (plot on left, judged safety < 4) or perceived as safe to some degree (plot on right, judged 
safety ≥ 4). The effect of judged safety is plotted on the x-axis. The effect of participant 
experience is plotted as a solid line for -1 SD participant experience, a dashed line for mean 





Figure 7. The relation of confidence to judged safety, experience, and affective evaluations 
Note: The effects of judged safety, scenario liking, and participant experience on confidence 
(confidence ~ judged safety * participant experience + scenario liking) when a scenario is 
perceived as dangerous to some degree (plot on left, judged safety < 4) or perceived as safe to 
some degree (plot on right, judged safety ≥ 4). The effect of judged safety is plotted on the x-
axis. The effect of participant experience is plotted as a solid line for -1 SD participant 
experience, a dashed line for mean participant experience, and a dotted line for +1 SD 
participant experience. The effect of scenario liking is faceted into -1 SD scenario liking in the 
left column of each plot, mean scenario liking in the middle column of each plot, and +1 SD 
scenario liking in the right column of each plot.  
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6 General Discussion 
In this thesis, I have studied three distinct but complementary facets of the risk judgment and 
decision process using a specific applied context. In three empirical papers, we investigated the 
effect of question framing on risk perception and behaviour intention, examined the relation 
between affective evaluations and risk judgments, and explored the formation of confidence in 
complex risk judgments. The results and implications of those three lines of study are discussed 
in each of the three papers. I will therefore refrain from unnecessarily repeating those 
discussions here. Needless to say, I believe that each of the three research papers succeeds in 
advancing our understanding of a select aspect of the decision making process. 
My ambition for this section is to raise the discussion up a level beyond the specific research 
question(s) addressed in each paper in order to consider the findings from my research in the 
broader context of applied decision making. Accordingly, I will first consider how the 
combined findings from the three papers further reveal the crucial role of affective evaluations 
in multiple stages of the decision making process. I focus on affective evaluations here because 
these implications only become apparent when considering the combined findings from all 
three papers, and so is not discussed in any one paper. I also discuss the limits of those findings 
and propose directions for future research on integral affect. I then consider the relevance of 
the findings from each of the three papers for interventions to help decision makers do better, 
both in avalanche terrain and more broadly. I begin by first discussing how our findings might 
inform interventions to help people make more accurate risk judgments, but also consider the 
challenges and limitations of that pursuit in a context such as decision making in avalanche 
terrain. I then discuss the relevance of our findings in relation to an alternative conceptualisation 
of “better” decisions based on a consequentialist interpretation of decision quality. I consider 
how our research contributes to promoting the safest decision given the available evidence 
rather than the most objectively accurate decision.  
 
6.1 The importance of affective evaluations 
Traditional theories of rational choice eschewed the evaluative and informative role of feelings 
in the decision making process, regarding them as a mere consequence of logical cognitive 
processing (Lerner et al, 2015). Yet theoretical and empirical work in psychology and 
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economics now suggest that affect is a key mechanism that informs, guides, or influences risk 
judgments (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Damasio, 1994; Lerner et al, 2015; Lowenstein et al., 
2001; Schwarz, 2012; Zajonc, 1980). The findings from my research provide further evidence 
of the prominent role of affective evaluations in the judgment and decision making process. 
Appraising the combined results of each of my three papers, it is possible to make inferences 
about the process by which affective evaluations indirectly influence behaviour. 
Behaviour is what ultimately exposes people to risk. Affective evaluations play a crucial role 
in many stages of the decision process that culminates in behaviour. In Paper 2, we found that 
risk judgments relate to affective evaluations: the more a person liked a specific highly 
uncertain context of backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain, the safer they judged it to be. 
Although my research failed to demonstrate that liking had a causal influence on perceived 
safety, other literature provides empirical evidence and theoretical justification for such a causal 
relation (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 
2002; Lerner et al., 2015; Lowenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz, 2012; Slovic et al., 2004; Zajonc, 
1980). In Paper 1, we found that risk judgments are a powerful determinant of behaviour 
intention: the likelihood that an individual would choose to ski a slope increased monotonically 
with judged safety. When considered together, the separate findings from Papers 1 and 2 
suggest that affective evaluation may indirectly influence behaviour. Based on (i) the evidence 
from Paper 2 for the relation between the affective evaluation and the perceive risk of a specific, 
contextually situated stimulus, (ii) prior empirical evidence and theoretical justification that 
affective evaluations influence risk judgments, and (iii) the evidence from Paper 1 that risk 
judgments directly determine behaviour intention, we can infer that affective evaluations 
indirectly influence behaviour via their direct influence on perceived risk. Future research that 
directly tests that inferred indirect causal relation would make a valuable contribution to better 
understanding the role of affective evaluations in the decision making process. 
Another process by which affective evaluations appear to influence behaviour, and ultimately 
risk exposure, is via the formation of confidence in a risk judgment. In Paper 3, we found that 
affective evaluations influence confidence. The more a decision maker likes a scenario 
perceived as safe or dislikes a scenario perceived as dangerous, the greater their confidence in 
that risk judgment. It is the first of those two formulations that is presently relevant since that 
is the behaviour that results in risk exposure. Confidence in a decision is the control process for 
whether that decision is translated into action (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Gill et al., 1998; Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1996). The likelihood that a skier skis a slope increases with their confidence in 
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their perception of the risk of the slope. Not only do affective evaluations indirectly influence 
behaviour through the relation with perceived risk, affective evaluations also indirectly 
influence behaviour through a direct influence on confidence. The results across all three papers 
provide a dynamic picture of the degree to which cognitive and affective evaluations are 
intertwined in the process of judging risk and ultimately deciding behaviour. 
A clear limitation of this thesis is that we were unable to experimentally demonstrate the causal 
relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments and to elucidate how affective 
evaluations emerge in response to a stimulus. In the studies conducted for Paper 2, we attempted 
to manipulate the attractiveness of the backcountry skiing scenarios while holding the risk level 
constant with two different experimental designs: manipulating the presence versus absence of 
ski tracks and manipulating the sunny versus overcast sky in the scenario photo. The purpose 
of those manipulations was to investigate if the subjective affective value of a single feature of 
the scenarios influences the degree of scenario liking and, consequently, judged safety. 
Unfortunately, both manipulations failed to influence scenario liking, making it impossible to 
test causality. In Paper 2, we discuss some interesting consequences of those failed 
manipulations. 
How affect emerges in response to a stimulus is an important consideration when studying the 
relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments. Affective responses can be evoked 
by the real or imagined features of a judged stimulus (Cohen et al., 2008). Each of those features 
can have a distinct subjective affective value that influences—to a greater or lesser degree—
the global liking evaluation of the target stimulus. In that way, liking, as a global affective 
response, is the aggregation of the affective values of a stimulus’ multiple features. This aligns 
with the theoretical perspective in the field of attitude research that global attitudinal responses 
(liking-disliking) are generalized evaluative judgments based on an integration of multiple 
features of the target stimulus and the context in which it is perceived (Schwarz, 2007, 2012). 
The affective value of some things may be virtually universal such as the negative response to 
rotting food, whereas the varied affective responses evoked by other things may be far more 
subjective. Additionally, some feature(s) of a judged stimulus may elicit greater affective 
responses according to the ease with which they are ascribed affective value, making them more 
easily used within the judgment process (Wilson & Arvai, 2006). Finally, some feature(s) of a 
stimulus might also have a “stigmatizing” association by which extreme weight or importance, 
either positive or negative, is ascribed to a single feature that influences the integration of all 
other affective features of the stimulus (Finucane & Holup, 2006). 
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It has been proposed that the relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments is a 
beneficial cognitive mechanism that facilitates the processing of complex evidence to enable 
quick and efficient judgments (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; King & Slovic, 2014; Slovic et al., 
2005). Attending to an affective response should increase the normative accuracy of risk 
judgments when that affective response is elicited by the content of the judgment task 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Pham, 1998; Schwarz, 2012). Yet research on the role of product 
appearance in consumer choices found that the symbolic value of a single feature of a product 
can influence product evaluation and consumer choice, despite that feature having no bearing 
on product functionality (Creusen & Schoormans, 2005). Does the influence of the affective 
value of a single feature of a stimulus extend beyond consumer evaluations to judgments of risk 
and personal safety? Might the affective value of a single judgment-irrelevant feature of a 
complex, highly uncertain, and potentially deadly situation bias the perceived safety of that 
situation? Answers to these questions are needed in order to better understand the role of 
affective evaluations in risk judgments. It is crucial to ascertain whether the affective evaluation 
influencing a risk judgment conveys complex information borne of valid experience about the 
value or quality of the stimulus, or if in some circumstances an affective evaluation can instead 
be the mere expression of motivational aspects that are irrelevant to the risk judgment. 
 
6.2 Better risk judgments and decisions 
Uncertainty and risk are ubiquitous characteristics of life, and the ability to adequately judge 
and react to risk is essential for a person’s survival and success. Fortunately judgment and 
decision making researchers are here to help. As previously mentioned, studying applied 
decision making involves three complementary forms of research: 1) examining the properties 
of the decision task and context, 2) studying how decision makers naturally respond to that task, 
and 3) investigating methods to help decision makers do better (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020; 
Hammond et al., 1975). Although the present thesis focused on the second form of research –
increasing our understanding of three aspects of the risk judgment and decision process under 
conditions of high uncertainty – the findings have implications for future research that aims to 
identify and test interventions to help decision makers do better. 
The quality of a decision maker’s performance can be evaluated in terms of its accuracy or its 
coherence. Decision accuracy concerns the degree to which the decision maker’s perception 
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corresponds to the true state of the world (i.e., correspondence theory, see Brunswik, 1955b). 
Decision coherence concerns reasoning in accordance with the rules of logic and probability 
theory in a consistent, coherent manner (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020). For tasks like decision 
making in avalanche terrain that involve inferring the likelihood of negative outcomes and then 
deciding the most appropriate behaviour, the degree to which the decision maker’s perception 
corresponds with environmental reality is the most applicable measure of performance quality. 
Interventions should seek to empower decision makers to avoid (or at least reduce the frequency 
and/or likelihood) mistakenly perceiving objectively dangerous conditions as safe. 
A focus on failed decision processes resulting in avalanche accidents has dominated the study 
of decision making in avalanche terrain for the past two decades (Johnson et al., 2020). By 
examining how backcountry skiers make inaccurate judgements, researchers have tried to 
understand the causes for judgement errors. Efforts to help backcountry skiers make better 
decisions in avalanche terrain have focused on improving the objective accuracy (i.e., the 
degree of correspondence with environmental reality) of risk judgments (Johnson et al., 2020; 
Landrø et al. 2020a, 2020b). National avalanche warning services provide detailed avalanche 
forecasts and information resources to increase and improve publicly available knowledge 
about the potential dangers in avalanche terrain (Engeset et al., 2018). Researchers and 
avalanche experts have developed (and continue to develop) a variety of decision making 
frameworks to support risk judgments and decisions (Landrø et al., 2020a, 2020b; McCammon 
& Hägeli, 2007). Avalanche safety educators train people, often according to established 
national standards, in the use of those information resources and decision making frameworks. 
Interventions targeting affective evaluations might have a role in those efforts to improve 
decision accuracy. 
In Paper 2, we found that affective evaluations relate to perceived risk across multiple, context-
specific judgments (a relation that, as I previously explained, we might regard as causal). 
Affective evaluation can be more or less accurate with respect to the objective risk. 
Interventions that improve the accuracy of affective evaluations should correspondingly 
increase the normative accuracy of risk judgment. How can that be achieved? Affective 
evaluations can boost decision accuracy if the affective response is evoked by relevant, valid 
content of the judgment task (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Pham, 1998; Schwarz, 2012). The 
accuracy with which an affective evaluation focuses on valid, relevant information cues should, 
like any other experiential learning, be developed and calibrated through valid experience 
involving informative, timely, and representative feedback (Hogarth et al., 2015). Further 
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research is required to better understand this process of calibrating of affective evaluations 
through experiential learning. Interventions that improve the validity and representativeness of 
feedback during the learning and skills refinement process should improve the calibration of 
affective evaluations and, as a result, the accuracy of risk judgments. Furthermore, as I 
explained above, research is needed to investigate if the affective value of some features of the 
stimuli bias and distort affective evaluations and, consequently, risk judgments. If affective 
evaluations are found to negatively bias risk judgments (e.g., an overly positive affective 
evaluation causes an unsafe situation to be judged safe), interventions should aim to improve 
their calibration and/or reduce their role within avalanche risk judgments. Should the latter 
strategy be pursued, researchers will face the challenge of mitigating the effect of affect within 
the decision process without unnecessarily diminishing people’s enjoyment of the activity or 
object of judgment. 
 
6.3 An alternative approach to better risk judgments and 
decisions 
It is difficult to study avalanche risk judgment performance in terms of accuracy because it is 
virtually impossible to establish the base rate p(snow instability) and the false alarm rate p(snow 
instability | avalanche not triggered), which are necessary for determining accuracy. 
Nonetheless, accident and fatality rates indicate that inaccurate risk judgments persist 
(Birkeland et al., 2017; Jekich et al., 2016; Niedermeier, et al., 2020). The various efforts to 
improve the accuracy of avalanche risk judgments mentioned above have failed to establish an 
avalanche prediction method that is free from false-positive or false-negative results 
(Simenhois & Birkeland, 2009; Landrø et al., 2020a). Reducing avalanche accidents and 
fatalities continues to elude educators and researchers (Furman et al., 2010) and it would be 
naïve to expect new interventions targeting affective evaluations (see above) to be a panacea 
that finally solves the problem of mistaken risk judgments. Might pursuing interventions to 
improve accuracy – understood as the degree to which the decision maker’s perception 
corresponds with environmental reality – be a frustratingly difficult goal that henceforth can 
furnish only diminishing returns? Might the uncertainty, complexity, and variability of the 




An alternative strategy would be to adopt a broader conceptualization of the benchmark for 
decision accuracy. A consequentialist interpretation of rationality in cognition measures 
accuracy in terms of success in achieving one’s goal in the world (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021; 
Schurz & Hertwig, 2019). In avalanche terrain, this goal would be to not trigger an avalanche 
rather than to correctly ascertain the objective degree of avalanche risk. This measure of 
accuracy concerns the degree to which a decision corresponds with reality to the extent that the 
decision maker achieves their goal under the constraints and affordances of the decision 
environment and the capacity of the decision maker (Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021). Interventions 
based on a consequentialist interpretation of accuracy should seek to empower decision makers 
to avoid (or at least reduce the frequency and/or likelihood) the negative potential outcome. 
Better decisions in avalanche terrain can be understood in terms of safety rather than their 
correspondence with the true state of the world. The ultimate aim of the risk judgment and 
decision process in avalanche terrain is to minimize the likelihood of making a “go” decision 
under objectively “no-go” conditions. Better decision making can therefore be achieved by 
increasing the likelihood of a specific behaviour, namely the decision to not ski when internal 
and/or external uncertainty is high. Such an outcome measure of decision quality is common in 
the fields of marketing (Biswas, 2009; Biswas & Grau, 2008; Levin & Gaeth, 1988) and 
communication (Block & Keller, 1995; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007) where promoting a specific decision outcome defines the criteria for measuring quality 
or success of the intervention. Interventions based on a consequentialist interpretation of 
decision quality would aim to ensure the safest decision given the available evidence rather 
than the most objectively accurate decision given the evidence. 
The discussion section in Paper 1 considers how question framing can be harnessed to boost 
people’s natural decision making competencies in order to ensure safer risk perceptions and 
behaviour. Those findings have the potential to inform the development of policies and 
practices that harness question framing in domains of applied risk perception and risk 
communication. The applied relevance of question framing is discussed in detail in Paper 1. 
Interventions targeting confidence represent another possibility to promote more cautious and 
conservative “go” decisions in the face of high uncertainty. Confidence, a decision maker’s 
belief in the accuracy of their decision, influences the likelihood that that decision is translated 
into action (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Gill et al., 1998; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Although 
improving the accuracy of risk judgments and decisions in avalanche terrain is extremely 
challenging, interventions to improve the calibration of confidence and mitigate overconfidence 
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represent an opportunity to reduce the likelihood that a mistaken risk judgment is translated 
into dangerous behaviour. By understanding the role of various internal signals in the formation 
of confidence, we might identify processes that we can leverage to reduce (over)confidence and 
thereby increase the likelihood of safer behaviour. For example, the results from Paper 3 
suggest that decision makers mistakenly perceive experience as corresponding to expertise. 
Interventions that make people more aware of the limitations of their experience and the 
frequent invalid feedback from the environment might contribute to diminishing 
overconfidence and reducing the likelihood that incorrect risk judgments are translated into 
action. A second possible intervention might target the relation between affective evaluations 
and confidence. Paper 3 found that the more a participant liked a scenario, the more confident 
they were in their judgment that that scenario was safe. If further research on the accuracy of 
affective evaluations (see above) found that liking reflected motivational factors rather than a 
risk-relevant evaluation, then interventions to reduce its dangerous magnification of confidence 
would be appropriate. 
This strategy of promoting the safest decision rather than the most accurate decision might 
resemble a perspective of paternalistic liberalism (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). It assumes that 
one risk perspective and behaviour decision is better, irrespective of accuracy (i.e., degree of 
correspondence with external reality), and emphasizes increasing the likelihood of that 
behaviour. Such a paternalistic liberal perspective seems expedient given the complexity of 
decision making in avalanche terrain, the uncertainty of the decision environment, and the 
failures of prior interventions to ensure risk judgments and decisions of sufficient objective 
accuracy. Importantly, however, my proposal to establish safety as the measure of decision 
quality is not based on the perspective that human cognition is inherently flawed. Nor does it 
constitute a nudge that systematically manipulates the decision environment (i.e., choice 
architecture) to influence behaviour in a specific manner (Fischhoff & Broomell, 2020; Hertwig 
et al., 2019; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Rather, through transparent interventions that make 
small, incremental advances, this approach aims to promote better, safer decision making 
processes from which better, safer behaviour follows. By defining safety rather than accuracy 
as the measure of decision quality, the present research aims to boost people’s natural decision 
making competencies (Hertwig et al., 2019) to promote the safest decisions given the available 
evidence. 
Fortunately, promoting the safest decision does not come at the cost of decision accuracy. In 
the case of backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain, increased accuracy and increased likelihood 
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of performing a specific behaviour are highly correlated. As the accuracy of avalanche risk 
judgments increase, the likelihood of making a safe decision about whether to ski also increases. 
We need not sacrifice accuracy in pursuit of increased likelihood of safer behaviour. By 
understanding the myriad cognitive processes that are activated during avalanche risk 
judgments and decisions, it is possible to design interventions that decrease the frequency of 
accidents and deaths by 1) increasing accuracy, 2) increasing the likelihood of more cautious 
behaviour, or 3) a combination of those two. The community of avalanche safety professionals 
has already taken note. At their invitation, the findings on question framing from Paper 1 were 
published as a popular science article in the spring 2021 volume of The Avalanche Journal 
(Stephensen et al., 2021). That same article will be re-published in a forthcoming volume (June 
2021) of the New Zealand Avalanche Dispatch. See the appendix for the text of that article. 
This strategic approach to promoting better decisions has the potential for wide implementation 
in a number of applied disciplines. By understanding the factors in the decision process that 
predict whether a certain behavioural outcome is more or less likely, we can design 
interventions that harness, exploit, or leverage specific cognitive processes that are active 




7 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, I used a context of applied decision making as the framework for designing 
experiments to study select cognitive processes during the risk judgment and decision process. 
Decision making in avalanche terrain provided a valuable context to investigate how a 
population of highly engaged individuals with domain-specific experience perform complex, 
goal-oriented decision tasks under conditions of high uncertainty. The findings from this 
research contribute to advancing our understanding of how people make complex risk 
judgments and decisions under conditions of high uncertainty. Those results also have potential 
relevance for the development of interventions to help decision makers do better, whether better 
be understood in terms of risk judgments that more accurately correspond with environmental 
reality or in terms of behaviour decisions that increase the likelihood of the safest decisions 
given the available information. The findings from Paper 1 advance our theoretical 
understanding of framing effects and the cognitive process that a question frame activates. 
Those findings have the potential to inform the development of practices that harness question 
framing for applied risk perception and communication. The findings from Paper 2 provide 
further evidence of the relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments. Those 
findings provide a dynamic picture of the degree to which cognitive and affective mechanisms 
are intrinsically intertwined in the decision making process. Finally, the findings from Paper 3 
shed light on the roles of uncertainty, domain-specific experience, and affective evaluations in 
the formation of confidence in complex risk judgments. Those findings shed light on the various 
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Linguistic polarity is a natural characteristic of judgments: Is that situation safe/dangerous? 
How difficult/easy was the task? Is that politician honest/dishonest? Across six studies (N = 
1599), we tested how the qualitative frame of the question eliciting a risk judgment influenced 
risk perception and behavior intention. Using a series of hypothetical scenarios of skiing in 
avalanche terrain, experienced backcountry skiers judged either how safe or how dangerous 
each scenario was and indicated whether they would ski the scenario. Phrasing risk judgments 
in terms of safety elicited lower judged safety values, which in turn resulted in a lower 
likelihood of intending to ski the slope. The frame “safe” did not evoke a more positive 
assessment than the frame “danger” as might be expected under a valence-consistent or 
communication-driven framing effect. This seemingly paradoxical direction of the effect 
suggests that the question frame directed attention in a way that guided selective information 
sampling. Uncertainty was not required for this effect as it was observed when judging 
objectively safe, uncertain, and dangerous scenarios. These findings advance our theoretical 
understanding of framing effects and can inform the development of practices that harness 
question framing for applied risk perception and communication. 
 







Public Significance Statement 
This study demonstrates that risk judgments framed in terms of safety (How safe is it?) result 
in more cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger (How 
dangerous is it?), irrespective of the objective risk of the judged object. These findings advance 
our understanding of the framing effect while illustrating its particular relevance for applied 





Should I Judge Safety or Danger? Perceived Risk Depends on the Question Frame 
Framing is a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon that holds much promise for applied 
risk communication and risk perception. A wealth of empirical findings have shown that the 
way in which a problem, situation, object, event, or goal is described affects how people 
respond to or evaluate it (for reviews see e.g., Kühberger, 1998, 2017; Levin et al., 1998; Maule 
& Villejoubert, 2007; Piñon & Gambara, 2005). Framing effects are traditionally regarded as a 
deviation from rational behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Recognizing the potential problems that framing effects can cause, researchers have 
investigated numerous methods for debiasing or diminishing framing effects (Almashat et al., 
2008; Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2013; Sieck & Yates, 1997; Simon et al, 2004). Yet not all 
instances of framing effects are considered problematic, harmful, or disadvantageous. The 
purposeful use of framing to promote specific judgments and decisions is an established 
practice in several fields such as media and communications (Block & Keller, 1995; Chong & 
Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) and marketing (Biswas, 2009; Biswas & 
Grau, 2008; Levin & Gaeth, 1988). Might the framing effect be similarly harnessed to boost 
people’s natural decision making competencies in order to ensure better, safer risk perceptions? 
If so, the framing effect has the potential for a real and tangible impact on how people judge 
risk and, ultimately, how they behave under risky conditions.  
In this article, we employ decision making in avalanche terrain as an exemplary case 
for investigating risk judgments and behavior in domains of applied risk perception and risk 
communication. Decision making in avalanche terrain represents a paradigmatic case of applied 
risk judgments and decisions. Avalanche terrain is a highly complex and uncertain decision 
environment in which judgment errors can result in severe injury or death. Moreover, it is an 
environment where poor decisions are frequently marked by invalid feedback (cf. Hogarth et 
al., 2015). A mismatch between perceived risk and reality can therefore be present for even the 
most experienced decision makers. Nonetheless, skiing in avalanche terrain is an increasingly 
popular but largely unregulated activity in which people voluntarily engage, most often for 
purely recreational purposes. Decision making in avalanche terrain provides a paradigmatic 
case for investigating decisions under real-life uncertainty among an experienced, highly 
motivated population. Yet the relevance of this research is not limited to backcountry skiing. 
Frame selection and the strategic phrasing of risk judgments are relevant for a range of 
disciplines and contexts including police, fire and other emergency services, military 
operations, the finance sector, work in volatile natural environments such as fisheries, illicit 
activities such as recreational drug use, and for medical diagnoses and treatment decisions. 
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Decision making in avalanche terrain offers a convenient exemplary case for investigating the 
effect of framing on risk perception under varying degrees of uncertainty. 
One type of framing that appears to be highly relevant for applied risk perception and 
risk communication is the question frame. Judgments are commonly framed in terms of a single 
dimension of an integral qualitative attribute of what is judged. For example, “How bad is the 
situation?”, “How expensive is a product?”, or “How difficult is an activity?” (as opposed to 
how good, inexpensive, or easy). Polarity is a natural characteristic of language that constrains 
and thereby defines the formulation of many judgments to a single dimension of a bipolar 
attribute (Hilton, 2011). Decision makers therefore naturally employ a single dimension of a 
qualitative reference such as safe or dangerous to frame a risk judgment. 
Using hypothetical scenarios of backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain across six 
studies (N = 1599), we examined how recreational backcountry skiers evaluated these scenarios 
when asked to judge how safe versus how dangerous they are. We also examined how the 
question frames influenced participants’ decision to ski the scenarios. We tested the effect of 
the question frames on risk perception and behavior intention when judging scenarios of 
different objective risk levels: scenarios of uncertain risk (Studies 1-6), safe scenarios (Studies 
5-6), and dangerous scenarios (Studies 5-6). Based on the existing framing literature, we can 
expect to find an effect when framing a risk judgment in terms of safety or danger. Beyond that, 
however, prior research has not established the direction of that question framing effect, the 
prevalence of that effect under different conditions of objective risk, or the association of that 
framing effect with behavior intention. How does a qualitative reference frame influence 
perceived risk? Which of the two frames – safe or dangerous – evokes a more conservative, 
cautious risk judgment? Is uncertainty a requirement for an effect or does it persist in the face 
of credible evidence of safety or danger? How does the question framing effect influence 
behavior, which is ultimately what exposes a person to risk? Different accounts of the cognitive 
processes underlying framing effects make conflicting predictions about the direction and 
prevalence of an effect evoked by a question frame. These issues must be resolved in order to 
determine if it might be possible to harness question framing to promote safer risk judgments 
and decisions. 
Divergent Accounts of Framing and the Direction of the Predicted Effect 
Framing effects are diverse and inspire broad theoretical and applied interest in 
psychology, economics, political science, health sciences, and beyond. Consequently, a variety 
of heterogeneous phenomena that evoke differing cognitive processes and divergent effects are 
classified as framing (for reviews, see e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007; Kühberger, 1998, 2017; 
 
57 
Levin et al., 1998; Maule & Villejoubert, 2007). Research on framing in psychology and 
economics has primarily focused on situations in which different but logically equivalent 
descriptions lead to different preferences or evaluations, highlighting a violation of the 
economic principle of invariance (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For example, evaluations 
tend to be more favorable when a product is described as 90% fat-free than when described as 
containing 10% fat (e.g., Levin, 1987). This research has traditionally used risky choice framing 
in which the probabilities of the choice options are differently described (e.g., the classic “Asian 
disease problem”; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and attribute framing in which a single 
attribute of the target of judgment is differently described (Levin et al., 1998; Piñon & Gambara, 
2005). Manipulating the qualitative attribute that frames the question eliciting a judgment (i.e., 
question framing) has received much less attention in this line of research and has produced 
mixed results (see e.g., Payne et al., 2013; Comerford & Robinson, 2017). 
Research in the fields of political science and health sciences have applied a broader 
conception of framing in which emphasis on different aspects of an issue leads to different 
opinions, without necessitating logical equivalence between frames (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 
2016; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Bui et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 1997). For 
example, when asked about government funded financial assistance for people in need, political 
opinions tend to be more favorable toward government spending if preempted with an emphasis 
on humanitarian aspects rather than government expenditures (Druckmann, 2001). This broader 
conception of framing effects is also relevant to survey studies (see Bruine de Bruin, 2011), in 
which questions with presumed synonyms can elicit inconsistent responses (e.g., Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2012) and questions with presumed antonyms can fail to communicate polar 
opposites (e.g., Holleman, 2006). 
The cognitive processes that a frame activates and the direction of the resulting framing 
effect likely depend on the form and domain in which the frame is achieved. Consequently, 
several cognitive, communicative, and attentional processes have been proposed for framing 
effects achieved inside and outside the lab (for a review, see Keren, 2011). These different 
accounts of framing make somewhat conflicting predictions about how the question frame we 
tested might affect people’s judgment. Does a question about “safety” evoke a more reassuring 
assessment than a question about “danger” because it triggers a positive connotation or conveys 
the assumption of safety in the question? Alternatively, does a question about “safety” direct a 
decision maker’s attention to the sparsity of evidence of safety under conditions of uncertainty, 
thereby prompting a more conservative evaluation? These different theoretical accounts of 
framing were established and predominantly tested based on risky choice framing and attribute 
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framing research. The extent to which they describe and can predict a question framing effect 
is presently unclear (see Comerford & Robinson, 2017). By testing the direction of the framing 
effect evoked when risk judgments are framed in terms of safety and danger, we can infer the 
cognitive processes that are activated. Because the success of any effort to strategically harness 
framing in applied contexts depends on correctly matching the type of frame – and the cognitive 
process that it activates – with the objective for its application, we next review these different 
accounts of framing in the context of our study. 
Valence-driven account of framing effects 
One prominent cognitive account posits that framing information in either a positive or 
a negative way evokes a valence-consistent association that influences the selection and 
encoding of information about the target(s) of judgment (for reviews, Keren, 2011; Levin et al., 
1998; Piñon & Gambara, 2005; Teigen, 2015). For example, positively framing an action (75% 
chance of success) evokes positive associations resulting in more favorable judgments of that 
action than does negatively framing the same action (25% chance of failure), despite the two 
frames being logically equivalent. Investigating the valence account of framing in the context 
of question frames, Payne and colleagues (2013) found that life expectancy predictions were 
longer when judging the probability to “live to” a certain age than when judging the probability 
to “die by” that age. Subjective probability judgments about longevity and verbal protocols both 
indicated that the “live to” frame evoked more positive thoughts than the “die by” frame did. 
For our context of risk judgments, assuming that the quality safe has a positive valence and the 
quality dangerous has a negative valence (Hedger et al., 2016), then according to the valence 
account of framing, a risk judgment phrased as How safe is it? should evoke positive 
associations that may result in higher judged safety than a risk judgment phrased as How 
dangerous is it? However, other empirical findings cast doubt on whether valence consistent 
associations adequately account for question framing effects. Although Comerford and 
Robinson (2017) replicated the results of Payne et al (2013), they also found that the response 
format influenced the direction of the question framing effect and, we can assume, the 
underlying cognitive processes. When decision makers reported life expectancy as a point 
estimate in response to a framed statement “I expect to live to/die by age…”, life expectancy 
was longer under the “die by” frame. These surprisingly contradictory results highlight the 
continuing uncertainty about the cognitive processes activated by attribute framing of questions 




Communicative accounts of framing effects 
Another influential account of framing holds that the pragmatics of language and 
communication contribute to framing effects (Hilton, 2011; McKenzie, 2004; McKenzie & 
Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006). A frame is typically selected by a source (i.e., a 
speaker) communicating information about the target(s) of judgment. Importantly, the 
speaker’s choice of frame and the listener’s inferences about that choice are not arbitrary. 
Consequently, the choice of frame “leaks” implicit information about a target beyond what is 
explicitly stated. In this way, logically equivalent frames might not be informationally 
equivalent because the choice of frame conveys judgment-relevant information, notably the 
communicator’s perspective on the target of judgment. Differently framed questions in survey 
research are typically also understood according to such a communicative theoretical 
framework that regards the interaction between researcher and survey respondent as a form of 
communication subject to the rules of everyday conversation (Grice, 1975). In our study, the 
differently framed question that elicits the risk judgment could be interpreted as leaking 
different information about the communicator’s (i.e., the researcher’s) perception of the target 
of judgment. When asked the question “How safe is it?” the decision maker may plausibly 
assume that the communicator asking the question perceives the target of judgment to be safe. 
Otherwise, the communicator would have asked “How dangerous is it?” if the target was 
perceived to be dangerous. Although the cognitive process believed to underlie this framing 
effect differs from the valence account, the communication account of framing might similarly 
predict that the term safe in the question would elicit judgments of higher safety than would the 
term dangerous in the question.  
Attentional accounts of framing 
A final account of framing highlights attentional processes. These assert that a frame 
cues the cognitive system to direct attentional resources toward a certain perspective on the 
target(s) of judgment while suppressing attention toward alternative perspectives (e.g., Keren, 
2011; Teigen, 2015). Judging a target involves cognitive processes that operate in relative 
terms. All judgments are relative to a reference that is the focus of attention, and the nature and 
location of that reference influence the judgment (Keren, 2011). Research in psychology using 
numerically framed single-bound probability judgments found that a frame defines a 
descriptive state (e.g., more than 85%) as the provisional reference point for the judgment 
(Hohle & Teigen, 2018; Teigen et al., 2007). The phrasing of the judgment task directs the 
decision maker’s attention toward evaluating whether the target of judgment meets or fulfills 
that descriptive state, and the decision maker samples different information according to the 
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perspective or reference defined by the frame. For example, a weather forecast predicting that 
the chance of rain is “greater than 60%” guides attention toward the occurrence whereas a 
forecast of “less than 70%” guides attention toward the non-occurrence of rain. In that way, a 
decision maker’s judgment in response to a frame is analogous with selectively testing a focal 
hypothesis defined by that frame (Teigen, 2015). Research in political science on emphasis 
framing similarly asserts that framing focuses attention on a certain perspective or issue, and 
consequently that focal issue will have greater weight during the judgment process because of 
its increased accessibility and applicability (Block & Keller, 1995; Chong & Druckman, 2007; 
Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). 
From the perspective of the attention account of framing, we might expect the use of 
the term safe in the question to focus the decision maker’s attention on sampling evidence to 
test the hypothesis that the scenario is indeed safe. Yet when uncertainty is high and definitive 
evidence is lacking, the decision maker might be expected to conclude that the scenario is not 
safe because of the insufficiency of evidence in support of that hypothesis. The term dangerous 
in the question would similarly focus the decision maker’s attention on searching for evidence 
of danger. When no definitive evidence of danger is found, the decision maker would conclude 
that the scenario is not dangerous because of the insufficiency of evidence in support of that 
hypothesis. According to the attention account of framing, one would expect judging how safe 
a situation is to elicit more cautious, more conservative judgments (i.e., lower judged safety 
ratings) than judging how dangerous a situation is under conditions of uncertainty. Conversely, 
one would expect judging how dangerous a situation is to elicit less cautious, less conservative 
judgments (i.e., lower danger rating or, conversely, higher judged safety ratings) than judging 
how safe a situation is. Importantly, however, it is unclear whether uncertainty is a necessary 
condition for the cognitive process described by the attention account to produce a framing 
effect. One could reasonably assume that there would be no question framing effect when 
encountering sufficient evidence to establish objective safety under the safe frame, or when 
encountering sufficient evidence to establish objective danger under the danger frame. 
Although the question frame likely directs evidence sampling under all conditions of 
(un)certainty, this might only result in a framing effect under conditions of objective 
uncertainty. 
Summary and Research Hypotheses 
Three influential accounts of framing make opposing predictions about how the 
question frames we tested might affect the perceived risk of scenarios of backcountry skiing in 
avalanche terrain. It is important to note, however, that none of these accounts were developed 
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in the context of qualitatively framing the question that elicits a judgment. Nevertheless, all of 
these accounts have been used to explain different types of question frames, as reviewed above. 
Our study differs from previous research investigating these accounts of framing in that we 
presented participants with highly uncertain visual scenarios in addition to verbal question 
frames. Although both the valence account and the communication account of framing might 
predict that judging how safe a situation is would initially elicit higher judged safety, neither 
account makes strong predictions about how participants subsequently search for information. 
It is also possible that several or all of the cognitive processes proposed by the different accounts 
of framing are activated simultaneously or sequentially upon encountering the question frame, 
in which case we might expect a mixture of effects or no overall effect of framing whatsoever. 
We test the effect of question framing under conditions of objective uncertainty, safety, and 
danger in order to ascertain the direction(s) of the effect(s), and thereby infer the cognitive 
processes activated by a risk judgment framed in terms of safety or danger. 
Based on our review of the abovementioned accounts of framing, we predicted in 
Studies 1 to 4 that the framing of the question that elicited the risk judgment would influence 
the judged safety of the scenarios, all of which were of uncertain risk. In line with previous 
work on valence-consistent question framing (e.g., Payne et al., 2013), in Studies 1 and 2 we 
predicted that a risk judgment phrased as “How safe is it?” would elicit higher judged safety 
than a risk judgment phrased as “How dangerous is it?” When the results of Studies 1 and 2 
did not confirm this valence-consistent hypothesis, we updated the direction of the predicted 
effect in Studies 3 and 4 according to the attention account of framing (see, e.g., Keren, 2011). 
We predicted that the question “How safe is it?” would elicit lower judged safety than the 
question “How dangerous is it?” In Studies 5 and 6, we investigated whether the direction of 
the question framing effect is consistent when judging scenarios of different objective risk 
levels. We tested two competing hypotheses: 1) the experimental condition would have the 
same effect on the judged safety of all scenario categories, versus 2) the experimental condition 
would only influence the judged safety of scenarios of uncertain risk and there would be 
negligible effects for objectively safe and dangerous scenarios. Finally, we also predicted for 
all six studies that the variable judged safety would predict behavior intention. In what follows, 
we report the methods of data collection and analysis that were common for all six studies, and 





Methods of Data Collection and Analysis for Studies 1 to 6 
Across six studies (N = 1599), we tested how risk perceptions and decisions are 
influenced by the qualitative frame of the question that elicits the risk judgment (i.e., the 
question frame). Using a series of hypothetical scenarios involving backcountry skiing in 
avalanche terrain, participants judged either how safe or how dangerous each scenario was and 
indicated whether they would ski the scenario. We confirm that at the time of writing, the six 
studies reported in this article are all the studies we conducted on the effect of question framing 
on risk judgments and decisions. We report all measurements assessed and all manipulations 
implemented in each study. The studies were approved by the Department of Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee, UiT The Arctic University of Norway. All studies except Study 4 
were pre-registered. The pre-registrations, data, R script for data processing and analysis, and 
the scenarios used in the studies are available on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/sknxf/). 
Participants. Table 1 presents the sample size and information about the sample for 
each of the six studies. Due to a technical failure, we were unable to collect data on participant 
age, gender, or experience measures in Study 1. Each of the six studies was conducted during 
a public seminar on safety and decision-making for backcountry skiers in avalanche terrain, 
with the seminar audience members as participants. Each seminar was at a different location in 
Norway during the winter of 2019 to 2020. The audience members at the six seminars were 
recreational backcountry skiers with varying degrees of experience judging avalanche risk 
during ski tours in avalanche terrain. Consequently, there was a self-selection for experienced 
participants in all six studies. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on participants’ experience 
with the judgment tasks and the activity presented in the scenarios. The seminar in which we 
conducted Study 1 had a nominal entry fee of NOK 50 (approximately 6 USD) whereas the 
other five seminars were free to attend. Participation was voluntary and all participants 
indicated their informed consent to participate. All six studies were conducted in Norwegian. 
We did not conduct a priori power analysis to determine target sample size for any 
study. The audience size at a seminar determined the possible number of participants in the 
study conducted at that event. We recruited as many participants as possible during each 
seminar and did not continue data collection for the respective study beyond that seminar, but 
otherwise had no control over the final sample size of each study. We set a minimum sample 
size for each study of approximately 60% of the anticipated audience size for that seminar. 
Participation exceeded 60% of the actual audience size for all six studies and we met the 
estimated minimum number of participants for Studies 1 to 5. Although more than 60% of the 
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audience participated in Study 6, we overestimated the expected audience size and did not meet 




Participants in Studies 1 to 6, including sample sizes, division of participants by experimental 
condition, and data on participants’ gender and age. Gender self-identification categories are 
male (M), female (F), other (O), withheld (W), and data not available (NA). Gender and age 
data are unavailable for Study 1. 
 










Safe Danger  M F O W NA  
1 735 351 384  - - - - 735 - - - 
2 197 102 95  131 53 2 1 10 37 10.95 18-62 
3 255 132 122  156 99 0 0 0 38 11.40 18-65 
4 173 86 87  90 81 2 0 0 37 11.79 18-73 
5 168 66 102  94 74 0 0 0 32 10.17 18-67 




Participant experience with the judgment tasks for Studies 1 to 6, including average number of 
years skiing in avalanche terrain (M Years , response scale from 0 to 40 years), average number 
of days in avalanche terrain per season (M Days , response scale from 0 to 100 days), and median 
level of self-reported avalanche safety training (M Training , reported on 7-point scale with “1 – 
None” and “7 – Expert level qualifications” at the scale ends). 
 
Study N M Years M Days M Training 
1 735 - - - 
2 197 8.51 12.02 3 
3 255 11.77 14.38 2 
4 173 9.54 15.03 2 
5 168 7.87 8.36 3 





Design. All six studies used the same experimental design, measures, and procedures 
described here. We used a between-subject design with two experimental conditions—the Safe 
Group or the Danger Group—for the qualitative attribute that framed the risk judgments. All 
judgment tasks were programmed in Qualtrics. One seminar leader conducted Studies 1, 2 and 
6, another seminar leader conducted Studies 3 and 5, and a third seminar leader conducted 
Study 4. Each seminar began with a presentation of the information resources that are publicly 
available online from the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service. After that, the seminar leader 
announced the study explaining that researchers were investigating information use for 
avalanche risk judgments. The seminar leader then projected the link to the online study for 
participants to access via their internet connected mobile devices. Upon accessing the study, 
participants were randomly assigned by the software to one of the two experimental conditions 
after indicating their informed consent to participate. 
Materials. Participants judged a series of hypothetical scenarios of backcountry skiing 
in avalanche terrain. Each scenario consisted of a photograph of a person skiing a snow-covered 
slope (one scenario photo included three people). We hold the rights of use for all photos. In 
the upper right corner of each photograph were icons indicating the slope angle, the prevailing 
regional avalanche problem(s), and the forecasted regional avalanche danger level (5-point 
scale) for that scenario. The icons used are standardized icons defined by the European 
Avalanche Warning Services (EAWS) and used by the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service 
in daily regional avalanche danger forecasts throughout the country. These icons provide 
valuable objective information for judging the degree of risk. 
We developed three categories of scenarios: scenarios of uncertain risk, safe scenarios, 
and dangerous scenarios, as defined by avalanche experts. An avalanche expert selected 
photographs from a personal library and assigned icons to those photographs to create scenarios 
of differing risk level. The combination of visual evidence in the photograph and the 
information conveyed by the icons established the objective risk level of each scenario. 
Uncertain scenarios lacked definitive evidence of safety or danger because the available 
evidence in the photo and the icons were ambiguous and/or conflicting. For example, although 
the icons on the steepness of the slope and the prevailing avalanche problems together indicate 
an increased probability of an avalanche, the icon indicating a danger level of two (on a five-
point scale) and the terrain features depicted in the photograph indicate a reduced probability 
of avalanche. The risk level of that scenario would be objectively uncertain given the conflicting 
evidence. By contrast, the photographs and icons in the safe and dangerous scenarios conveyed 
sufficient evidence to ascertain the objective safety or danger of the scenario. For example, 
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although an icon indicates the prevailing regional avalanche problem, no signs indicative of the 
presence of that problem are evident in the photograph. Additional icons in that scenario 
indicate a low regional danger forecast and a low slope angle. That scenario is objectively safe 
because all the evidence align to indicate that an avalanche is extremely unlikely. The objective 
uncertainty of the uncertain scenarios, the objective safety of the safe scenarios, and objective 
danger of the dangerous scenarios were established by the avalanche expert who designed the 
scenarios, and independently confirmed by a second avalanche expert. All scenarios used in the 
six studies are available on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/sknxf/. 
Participants in Studies 1 to 4 judged six uncertain scenarios. We used the same six 
uncertain scenarios for all four studies, changing their order of presentation between studies to 
account for any possible order effect. Participants in Studies 5 and 6 judged ten scenarios: four 
scenarios of uncertain risk, three safe scenarios, and three dangerous scenarios. We used the 
same set of ten scenarios for both studies. The four uncertain scenarios used in Studies 5 and 6 
were selected from among the six uncertain scenarios previously used in Studies 1 to 4. The 
three safe scenarios and the three dangerous scenarios used in Studies 5 and 6 were new. We 
anticipated the possibility of an effect from the order in which the categories of scenarios were 
judged. We therefore reversed the order of presentation between Studies 5 and 6. In Study 5, 
we first presented the three dangerous scenarios followed by the four uncertain scenarios, and 
lastly the three safe scenarios. In Study 6, we first presented the three safe scenarios, then the 
four uncertain scenarios, and finally the three dangerous scenarios. Although we reversed the 
order of the scenario categories in Study 6, the order of the scenarios within each category was 
the same in both studies. 
Measures. The scenarios were sequentially projected onto the auditorium screen for all 
participants in the audience to see. All questions were displayed exclusively in Qualtrics on 
participants’ personal mobile devices. Participants in the Safe Group judged the scenarios by 
answering the question “How safe is it?” responding on a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all safe” 
and “Completely safe” at the extreme points. Participants in the Danger Group judged the same 
scenarios by answering the question “How dangerous is it?” responding on a 7-point scale 
labeled “Not at all dangerous” and “Completely dangerous” at the extreme points. Upon 
completing each risk judgment, participants in both experimental groups were asked the 
question “Would you ski this slope?” with the three response options “No”, “I cannot say” or 
“Yes”. Participants had approximately one minute per scenario to answer the risk judgment and 
the behavior intention questions before the next scenario was projected. Participants were 
instructed not to discuss with their neighbors during the study and the seminar leaders 
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confirmed that all auditoriums were silent during data collection. Participants were not required 
to answer the questions to proceed to the next scenario. Upon completing the scenarios, 
participants answered questions about their age, gender, and nationality. Finally, participants 
reported their skiing ability, avalanche training, years of backcountry skiing experience, 
average number of backcountry skiing days per season, and past exposure to avalanche 
incidents. However, due to a technical failure, these covariates were not measured at all 
locations and are therefore not considered in our analysis. 
Data preparation and analysis: We used R (R Core Team, 2017) for all data 
preparation and analyses. We reverse coded the risk judgment scores of participants in the 
Danger Group to make them comparable to the risk judgments of participants in the Safe Group. 
We henceforth refer to the judged risk as judged safety for both experimental conditions. There 
were missing values of judged safety (Study 1 = 2.3%; Study 2 = 5.1%; Study 3 = 1.0%; Study 
4 = .5%; Study 5 = .1%; Study 6 = .6%) and behavior intention (Study 1 = 2.4%; Study 2 = 
4.6%; Study 3 = 1.2%; Study 4 = .4%; Study 5 = .1%; Study 6 = 0%) within the data. We 
deemed those values to be missing at random. Mixed model analyses can handle missing values 
without requiring the exclusion of participants for whom only partial data was collected 
(Baayen et al., 2008). We therefore did not impute any data for missing values. For Studies 5 
and 6, we subset the data by scenario category. We treated judged safety and behavior intention 
as ordinal variables. To examine whether the experimental condition influenced the odds of 
each value of judged safety, we used the ordinal package (Christensen, 2019) to implement 
cumulative link mixed models via Laplace approximations for the hypothesized model with 
judged safety as the outcome variable and the experimental condition as the predictor variable. 
We included intercepts for participants and scenarios as random effects to account for by-
subject and by-scenario variability. We calculated Chi-square values (χ2) with likelihood-ratio 
tests comparing the model that included the predictor variable(s) under investigation as the 
fixed effect (and participants and scenarios as random effects) against an equivalent model that 
excluded that predictor variable(s). To examine predictors of behavior, we estimated ordinal 
mixed models via Laplace approximations to analyze whether the predictor variables 
experimental condition, judged safety or their interaction predicted the odds of the outcome 
variable self-reported behavior intention. We defined the response order of behavior intention 
as “No” < “I cannot say” <  “Yes”. We treated the predictor judged safety as an interval variable 
for all analyses involving behavior intention as the outcome variable. We included intercepts 
for participants and scenarios as random effects, thereby accounting for by-subject and by-
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scenario variability. We calculated Chi-square values (χ2) with likelihood-ratio tests using the 
method described above. 
Results 
Studies 1 to 4: Single Reference Judgments of Uncertain Scenarios 
         Table 3 presents the proportions of judged safety values per experimental condition for 
Studies 1 to 4, with mode values clearly marked. The experimental condition influenced judged 
safety in all studies: Study 1, χ2(1) = 30.49, p < .001; Study 2, χ2(1) = 12.25, p < .001; Study 3, 
χ2(1) = 19.65, p < .001; and Study 4, χ2(1) = 8.14, p = .004. The log-odds coefficients and odds 
ratios for the main effect experimental condition for each study are presented in Table 4. 
Participants in the Danger Group who judged “How dangerous is it?” were at least 1.6 times 
more likely to judge a scenario to be safer than participants in the Safe Group who judged “How 
safe is it?”. The probabilities of each value of judged safety per experimental condition are 
presented in Figure 1. In all four studies, judged safety was higher when judged in terms of how 
dangerous the scenario was than when judged in terms of how safe the scenario was. 
         Table 3 presents the proportions of behavior intention values per experimental condition 
for Studies 1 to 4, with mode response clearly marked. Judged safety predicted behavior 
intention in all four studies: Study 1, χ2(1) = 1995.60, p < .001, Study 2, χ2(1) = 451.93, p < 
.001, Study 3, χ2(1) = 609.66, p < .001, and Study 4, χ2(1) = 388.44, p < .001. The experimental 
condition alone, as a main effect, marginally predicted behavior in Study 2, b = -.37, SE = .20,  
χ2(1) = 3.56, p = .059, although that effect is mediated by the main effect judged safety (see 
Table 5). Otherwise, the experimental condition alone did not predict behavior in Studies 1, 3 
or 4. The addition of the main effect experimental condition to the model with the main effect 
judged safety predicted behavior intention in Study 1, χ2(1) = 17.76, p < .001, and Study 3, 
χ2(1) = 11.51, p < .001, and marginally predicted behavior in Study 4, χ2(1) = 2.69, p = .101. 
The log-odds coefficients and odds ratios for the influence of the main effects judged safety 
and experimental condition on behavior intentions are presented in Table 5. Figure 2 illustrates 
the probability of each behavior per judged safety value per experimental condition. An 
interaction between the experimental condition and judged safety did not predict behavior 
intention in any of the four studies: Study 1, χ2(1) =1.56 , p = .211, Study 2, χ2(1) = 1.05, p = 
.305, Study 3, χ2(1) = .02, p = .896, or Study 4,  χ2(1) = .00, p = .949. Overall we found that as 
the value of judged safety increased, the probability that participants in both experimental 
groups would ski the slope in the scenario increased. If participants in both experimental 
conditions judged safety to be equal, the probability that participants in the Safe Group would 
ski a slope was higher than that of participants in the Danger Group. However, based on the 
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magnitude of the log-odds coefficients and the odds ratios, judged safety had the greatest 
predictive power of behavior intention. Consequently, participants in the Safe Group were 
qualitatively less inclined to indicate that they would ski a slope because they were more likely 
to judge safety as lower. 
To further investigate the robustness and scope of these measured effects, we conducted 
two additional studies using a broader set of scenarios with different levels of objective risk. 
Participants in Studies 1 to 4 judged scenarios that were all of uncertain risk. Is it possible that 
the high degree of uncertainty in some way influenced or accounted for the observed effect? Is 
uncertainty a prerequisite for the effect or does the question framing effect extend to situations 
that are objectively safe or dangerous? These are important questions because in a real world 
context, people encounter a range of situations of different objective risk with varying degrees 
of uncertainty. Understanding the contexts to which the observed question framing effect 
extends will inform strategies for its potential application. We therefore conducted Studies 5 
and 6 using scenarios in three categories of objective risk—uncertain scenarios, safe scenarios, 
and dangerous scenarios—to examine if the effect observed in Studies 1 to 4 is present under 





Percentage of judged safety values (values 1 to 7) and percentage of behavior (No = No, I 
would not ski the slope, UD = Undecided, I cannot say, and Yes = Yes, I would ski the slope) 
per experimental condition for Studies 1-4. The mode judged safety value and the mode 
behavior per experimental condition is marked by bold font. 
 
Frame Judged safety score  Behavior 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  No UD Yes 
Study 1            
Safe 17.7 21.2 22.0 17.4 14.2 5.7 1.8  49.7 7.9 42.4 
Danger 12.7 15.5 23.1 22.5 17.9 7.3 1.0  49.9 5.5 44.6 
Study 2            
Safe 24.0 27.0 20.6 13.5 9.9 4.1 .9  56.6 8.9 34.5 
Danger 18.9 17.5 22.0 21.0 14.1 6.1 .4  52.2 4.2 43.6 
Study 3            
Safe 22.9 19.8 21.6 20.1 12.0 2.4 1.2  47.1 6.1 46.8 
Danger 11.8 17.0 24.0 25.3 17.5 3.7 .7  45.9 7.7 46.4 
Study 4            
Safe 25.2 26.6 24.1 16.1 5.6 2.0 .4  61.8 6.6 31.6 




Coefficients of the model (judged safety ~ experimental condition) predicting whether the 
experimental condition influences judged safety for Studies 1-4 
 
 bDanger frame (SE) 95% CI for Odds Ratios (OR) p-value 
  Lower OR Upper 
Study 1 .47 (.08) 1.36 1.60 1.89 < .001 
Study 2 .63 (.18) 1.33 1.89 2.68 < .001 
Study 3 .72 (.16) 1.50 2.04 2.79 < .001 






Probabilities of judged safety values by experimental condition, with 95% confidence intervals, 







Coefficients of the model (behavior ~ judged safety + experimental condition) predicting 
whether the terms judged safety and experimental condition influences behavior intention in 
Studies 1-4  
 
 b (SE)  95% CI for Odds Ratios (OR) p-value 
   Lower OR Upper  
Study 1       
Judged safety 1.67 (.06)  4.76 5.34 5.98 < .001 
Safe frame .57 (.14)  1.36 1.78 2.32 < .001 
Study 2       
Judged safety 1.60 (.11)  3.98 4.98 6.23 < .001 
Safe frame .15 (.26)  .69 1.17 1.96 .562 
Study 3       
Judged safety 1.77 (.11)  4.78 5.90 7.29 < .001 
Safe frame .86 (.25)  1.43 2.36 3.88 < .001 
Study 4       
Judged safety 1.71 (.13)  4.30 5.54 7.13 < .001 






Probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals, of skiing the scenario slope by judged safety 





Studies 5 and 6: Single Reference Judgments of Uncertain, Safe and Dangerous Scenarios 
Table 6 presents the proportions of judged safety values per experimental condition for 
each category of scenarios in Studies 5 and 6, with the mode values clearly marked. In Study 
5, the experimental condition influenced judged safety—presented according to the order in 
which participants judged the categories of scenarios—for dangerous scenarios, χ2(1) = 52.59, 
p < .001, and scenarios of uncertain risk,  χ2(1) = 10.28, p = .001, but did not influence the 
judged safety for safe scenarios,  χ2(1) = .55, p = .457, which participants judged last. In Study 
6, the experimental condition influenced judged safety—presented according to the order in 
which participants judged the categories of scenarios—of safe scenarios, χ2(1) = 12.45, p < 
.001, did not influence the judged safety of scenarios of uncertain safety,  χ2(1) = 2.29, p = .130, 
and influenced the judged safety of dangerous scenarios,  χ2(1) = 85.37, p < .001. The log-odds 
coefficients and odds ratios for the main effect experimental condition per scenario category 
are presented in Table 7. The probabilities of each value of judged safety per scenario category 
by experimental condition are presented in Figure 3. Apart from the safe scenarios that were 
judged last in Study 5 and the uncertain scenarios that were judged second in Study 6 for which 
there was no effect, participants in the Danger Group were more likely to judge all categories 
of scenarios to be safer than participants in the Safe Group. Study 5 and Study 6 replicated the 
result that framing the risk judgment in terms of safety was more likely to result in lower judged 
safety whereas framing the risk judgment in terms of danger was more likely to result in higher 
judged safety. 
Table 6 presents the proportions of behavior intention values per experimental condition 
for Studies 5 and 6, with the mode response clearly marked. The main effect judged safety 
predicted behavior intention for safe scenarios in Study 5, χ2(1) = 112.21, p < .001, and Study 
6, χ2(1) = 113.67, p < .001; for uncertain scenarios in Study 5, χ2(1) = 322.23, p < .001, and 
Study 6, χ2(1) = 133.74, p < .001; and for dangerous scenarios in Study 5, χ2(1) = 28.32, p < 
.001, and Study 6, χ2(1) = 3.14, p < .076. The experimental condition alone, as a main effect, 
predicted behavior for safe scenarios in Study 6, χ2(1) = 8.47, p < .003; an effect that is mediated 
by the main effect judged safety (see Table 8). Otherwise, the experimental condition alone did 
not predict behavior intention in either Study 5 or Study 6. The addition of the main effect 
experimental condition to the model with the main effect judged safety predicted behavior 
intention for uncertain scenarios in Study 5,  χ2(2) = 6.41, p = .011, and an interaction between 
judged safety and the experimental condition predicted behavior for the safe scenarios in Study 
5, χ2(1) = 6.78, p = .009. However, the experimental condition had no influence on behavior 
for the safe scenarios or the uncertain scenarios in Study 6 beyond what was predicted by judged 
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safety. The log-odds coefficients and odds ratios for the influence of the main effect judged 
safety together with the main effect experimental condition (and their interaction, if relevant) 
on behavior intentions are presented in Table 8. As the value of judged safety increased, the 
probability that participants in both experimental groups would ski the slope increased for safe 
scenarios and scenarios of uncertain risk. Studies 5 and 6 replicated the result that judged safety 
had the greatest predictive power of behavior intention. Participants in the Safe Group were 
therefore qualitatively less inclined to indicate that they would ski a slope because they were 
more likely to judge safety as lower. As for dangerous scenarios, there were too few measures 
of judged safety values greater than 4 in Study 5 and greater than 3 in Study 6 to reliably test 
for an interaction effect between judged safety and experimental condition. This is indicated by 
the range of the 95% CI in Figure 4. Participants in both experimental groups in Studies 5 and 






Percentage of judged safety values (values 1 to 7) and percentage of behavior (No = No, I 
would not ski the slope, UD = Undecided, I cannot say, and Yes = Yes, I would ski the slope) 
per experimental condition (column Group) and per scenario category (column Scenario, S = 
safe, UR = uncertain risk, and AD = dangerous) for Studies 5 and 6. The mode judged safety 
value and the mode behavior per experimental condition and per scenario category is marked 
by bold font. 
 
Frame Scenario Judged safety score  Behavior 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  No UD Yes 
Study 5             
Safe Safe 1.0 3.1 6.6 11.7 22.3 34.5 20.8  8.6 2.0 89.4 
Danger Safe .0 1.0 6.8 10.8 23.9 37.9 19.6  5.6 2.9 91.5 
Safe Uncertain 11.7 27.6 29.6 19.7 9.8 .8 .8  59.1 9.1 31.8 
Danger Uncertain 8.6 15.9 26.5 30.4 14.7 3.4 .5  57.1 7.6 35.3 
Safe Dangerous 66.2 25.8 6.0 2.0 .0 .0 .0  96.0 2.5 1.5 
Danger Dangerous 37.2 24.5 15.7 13.4 6.9 1.6 .7  95.1 .3 4.6 
Study 6             
Safe Safe 3.2 7.4 14.9 18.1 28.7 14.9 12.8  16.7 13.5 69.8 
Danger Safe .8 2.6 6.8 9.4 29.1 29.9 21.4  10.2 2.6 87.2 
Safe Uncertain 26.0 32.3 23.6 9.4 5.5 2.4 .8  68.7 13.3 18.0 
Danger Uncertain 21.9 22.0 31.6 14.2 10.3 .0 .0  69.2 10.3 20.5 
Safe Dangerous 92.7 6.3 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0  96.9 2.1 1.0 




Coefficients of the model (judged safety ~ experimental condition) predicting whether the 
experimental condition influences judged safety per scenario category for Studies 5 and 6. 
 
 bDanger frame (SE) 95% CI for Odds Ratios (OR) p-value 
  Lower OR Upper 
Study 5      
Safe scenarios .20 (.27) .72 1.22 2.08 .457 
Uncertain scenarios .88 (.27) 1.42 2.42 4.15 .001 
Dangerous scenarios 1.97 (.28) 4.14 7.17 12.42 < .001 
Study 6      
Safe scenarios 1.62 (.46) 2.07 5.08 12.45 < .001 
Uncertain scenarios .43 (.28) .88 1.53 2.66 .130 




Figure 3  
Probabilities of judged safety values per experimental condition and per scenario category, 






Coefficients of the model predicting whether the terms judged safety and experimental 
condition influences behavior intention per scenario category in Studies 5 and 6 
 
 b (SE) Odds Ratios (OR) 95% CI p-value 
  Lower OR Upper  
Study 5, safe scenarios 
Judged safety 1.36 (.28) 2.25 3.90 6.75 < .001 
Safe frame -4.71 (2.23) .00 .00 .71 .034 
Judged safety * safe frame 1.28 (.59) 1.14 3.60 11.39 .029 
Study 5, uncertain scenarios 
Judged safety 2.18 (.19) 6.11 8.88 12.91 < .001 
Safe frame .89 (.35) 1.22 2.44 4.88  .012 
Study 6, safe scenarios 
Judged safety 2.02 (.46) 3.09 7.56 18.46 < .001 
Safe frame .11 (.55) .37 1.11 3.33 .849 
Study 6, uncertain scenarios 
Judged safety 1.79 (.25) 3.68 6.00 9.78 < .001 








Probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals, of skiing the scenario slope by judged safety 








Results from six studies demonstrate that risk perception is influenced by the frame of 
the question that elicits the risk judgment. Framing a risk judgment in terms of safety (“How 
safe is it?”) was more likely to result in lower judged safety than framing that risk judgment in 
terms of danger (“How dangerous is it?”). The results of Studies 5 and 6 indicate that 
uncertainty is not a prerequisite for this framing effect. The question frame had a consistent 
direction of effect when judging safe scenarios, uncertain scenarios, and dangerous scenarios, 
suggesting that, in principle, the effect from framing risk judgments in terms of safety or danger 
applies in all situations of objective risk. 
Question Frames Guide Attention during Information Sampling 
A question frame elicits a judgment that is relative to the reference defined by the frame. 
This process can be thought of as analogous to testing the hypothesis defined by the frame. The 
question “How safe is it?” defines safe as the provisional reference point for the risk judgment, 
whereas the question “How dangerous is it?” defines dangerous as the provisional reference 
point for the risk judgment. This has the effect of focusing the decision maker’s attention on 
selectively sampling evidence to evaluate whether the target of judgment meets or fulfills the 
descriptive state defined by the question frame rather than judging the degree of risk according 
to the two complementary poles completely safe and completely dangerous. Participants 
presented the safe frame judged whether the available evidence was sufficient to establish 
whether a scenario was indeed safe. Participants presented the danger frame judged the 
available evidence with a focus on ascertaining whether the same scenario was indeed 
dangerous. To ask how safe a scenario is or to ask how dangerous it is are therefore not 
informationally equivalent frames, despite being complementary dimensions of the bipolar 
attribute risk. Each question focuses the decision maker’s attention on selectively sampling 
different evidence in relation to different reference points (Chong & Druckman, 2007; 
Druckman, 2001; Keren, 2011; Teigen, 2015), effectively making each question a different 
judgment task. This is particularly relevant in a decision environment such as avalanche terrain 
where information cues rarely have logically equivalent opposites. There is an asymmetry of 
relevant evidence between the frames. Although the presence of one sign indicates increased 
danger and the greater probability of an avalanche, that sign may have no logically equivalent 
opposite. Moreover, the absence of that sign is not necessarily an indication of increased safety. 
Participants in our studies sampled different evidence in relation to the reference point 
defined by the question frame and reported their judgment on a scale similarly defined by that 
reference point. As illustrated in Figure 5, participants searched for evidence of safety if safe 
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framed the question eliciting the risk judgment, or searched for evidence of danger if danger 
framed the question. Yet under conditions of high uncertainty, there was insufficient evidence 
to definitively establish or reject the descriptive state that either reference point emphasized. 
The evidence in favor of either reference point was ambiguous and therefore participants 
judging safety concluded that a scenario was not definitively safe, whereas participants judging 
danger similarly concluded that the same scenario was not entirely dangerous. Under both 
frames, participants adjusted their reported judgment according to the perceived (in)sufficiency 
of evidence for their respective reference point defined by the question frame. Those 
adjustments were made in relation to the limits, also defined by the question frame, of their 
respective reporting scales. However, the available evidence and consequently the adjustment 
on the response scale differed between the framing conditions. As a result, participants who 
were presented the safe frame judged the scenarios to be relatively more dangerous 
(alternatively, relatively less safe), while participants who were presented the danger frame 
judged the same scenarios to be relatively safer (alternatively, relatively less dangerous). 
Interestingly, we observed this effect when participants judged dangerous and safe 
scenarios. Despite the availability of what avalanche experts consider to be definitive evidence 
of the objective safety and danger of the scenarios, participants who faced the safe frame did 
not accept the reference point safe for safe scenarios, and consequently judged them to be 
relatively less safe than participants who faced the danger frame did. Similarly, when judging 
dangerous scenarios, those who faced the danger frame did not accept the reference danger 
defined by that frame, and consequently judged dangerous scenarios to be relatively less 
dangerous (i.e., more safe) than participants under the safe frame. Objective uncertainty was 
not a requirement for the question frame to evoke selective evidence sampling relative to the 
reference point defined by the frame. Although a framing effect was not measured for 
judgments of safe scenarios in Study 5 and uncertain scenarios in Study 6, we suspect this to 
be the result of the order in which participants judged the scenarios. When judging scenarios of 
different objective risk levels, participants might have judged a given scenario in relation to the 
sufficiency of evidence and the judged safety/danger of the previous scenario(s). We also 
suspect that an order effect was the cause of the different magnitude of measured effects 
between scenarios categories in Studies 5 and 6. Examining the role of presentation order more 
directly may be an interesting direction for future work, but a challenge would be to ensure that 
such an investigation is ecologically valid. It is unlikely that a person would judge vastly 
different conditions in close temporal proximity. Thus the order effects we observed here may 
have been, to some extent, an artifact of overly stark contrasts between objective risk levels. 
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The Possibility of Other Cognitive Processes during Question Frames 
The direction of the question framing effect we observed across six studies runs counter 
to what might be expected based on alternative accounts of framing that assume a valence or 
communication driven mechanism. In particular, both the valence account and the 
communication account of framing would be consistent with judged safety being higher when 
judging “How safe is it?” Earlier research found on the direction of the question framing effect 
and the underlying cognitive processes found conflicting results. Payne and colleagues (2013) 
found credible evidence of a question framing effect consistent with the valence account of 
framing. Although Comerford and Robinson (2017) replicated the results of Payne and 
colleagues when testing the same judgment task, when they replaced the reporting format from 
a probabilistic estimate to a point estimate, their results indicated a framing effect in the 
opposite direction. 
This apparent mismatch between the predictions of other framing accounts and our 
findings may be linked to the specific framing paradigm we used. In addition to specifying a 
verbal question frame (how safe vs. dangerous is it?), the judgment task we used involved 
sampling information beyond what was described by the question frame. This process of 
information sampling is not a common element in most judgment tasks used in other research 
on framing, and the cognitive processes underlying framing effects likely depend on the method 
by which the frame is achieved. Kreiner and Gamliel (2018), for instance, found evidence that 
attention mechanisms contribute to attribute framing but recognized that their experimental 
design prevented them from ruling out the potential contribution of valence mechanisms to the 
overall framing effect. Similarly, in our paradigm, attentional mechanisms may have played a 
dominant role because we included an information-sampling component and because the frame 
was achieved by the phrasing of a question (rather than a statement). Yet we cannot rule out 
that valence-driven and communicative mechanisms also played a role in the results of our 
study. Participants’ initial prior when prompted with the question How safe is it? may well have 
leaned toward the valence of that frame, but was then revised in the process of gathering 
insufficient evidence to support this initial hypothesis. Thus, framing may be an aggregation of 
different forces resulting from distinct cognitive processes that are evoked by the judgment task 
and the manner in which the frame is achieved. An interesting avenue for future research is to 






A conceptualization of the decision making processes under each experimental framing 
condition. The person on the left represents the Safe Group judging risk in response to the 
question “How safe is it?” The person on the right represents the Danger Group judging risk 
in response to the question “How dangerous is it?” The thought bubbles illustrate the assumed 
cognitive process up to the behavior decisions expressed in the speech bubbles. The icons in 
the top left and the “35°”are examples of the information provided in the scenarios. They 






The Indirect Influence of Question Framing on Behavior Decisions 
Beyond the effect of question framing on judged safety, the results from all six studies 
indicate that judged safety influenced participants’ hypothetical behavior intention. The 
probability that participants would ski the slope monotonically increased with an increase in 
judged safety. The only exception to this clear result concerned the judgments of dangerous 
scenarios, for which participants were effectively unanimous that irrespective of judged safety 
they would not ski the slope (see Figure 4). However, it is very rare for dangerous slopes to be 
so clearly marked as dangerous, as they were in our studies, by evidence of an active avalanche 
on that particular slope. Typical of a wicked learning environment (Hogarth et al., 2015), a 
dangerous slope commonly resembles an uncertain slope until someone travels on it triggering 
an avalanche, thus providing clear but rare evidence of the objective risk level, albeit a little too 
late. 
Indecision was a response option for the measure of behavior intention, and a small 
proportion of responses (ranging from .3 to 13.5% across all studies and scenario categories) 
indicated that participants were undecided about their intended action. The likelihood of such 
indecision was highest when scenarios were perceived to be neither completely safe nor 
completely dangerous, with judged safety values in the middle range of the response scale. This 
establishes that the judged safety response scale captured the equivalent poles of the bipolar 
attribute of judgment, despite only one of those poles framing the judgment task. However, it 
is important to point out that indecision is not a true response option in a real-world situation; 
either skiing the slope or not skiing the slope are only ever observed. 
Behavior is what exposes people to risk. That judged safety influenced behavior 
intention is particularly important for our examination of question framing and the possibility 
of harnessing that framing effect to promote safer risk judgments and decisions. Although there 
was no overall effect of framing on hypothetical behavioral intent, it is important to emphasize 
the process by which question framing influenced behavior. Question framing was found to 
influence judged safety, and judged safety was in turn found to be a powerful determinant of 
behavior decisions. Since behavior is the immediate cause of risk exposure, any factor that can 
directly or indirectly influence behavior can potentially be utilized to reduce the frequency of 
accidents and fatalities. Phrasing the risk judgment in terms of how safe the slope is resulted in 
lower values of judged safety, which in turn resulted in a lower likelihood of deciding to ski the 
slope. This suggests that judging how safe a risk is will result in the safest behavior with respect 
to the potential risk. The safe frame was found to indirectly result in more cautious behavior 
via the direct effect of framing on judged safety. We illustrate the indirect influence of question 
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framing on behavior intention via the effect on judged safety in Figure 5. This illustration is 
intended to make clear both the presumed cognitive processes and the potential applied 
relevance of question framing to the widest possible audience. By selectively phrasing the 
question that elicits a risk judgment, a decision maker’s attention can be directed in a way that 
strategically influences the perception of risk with the effect of making one behavior outcome 
more likely.  
Interestingly, at any given level of judged safety—if participants in the two 
experimental groups judged safety to be the same—those prompted with the safe frame 
indicated that they were more likely to ski the slope than were participants prompted with the 
danger frame. To understand this apparently contradictory effect, consider the conditions under 
which judged safety will be equal between the two framing conditions. Due to the question 
framing effect, the judged safety of a given scenario was more likely lower under the safe frame 
and higher under the danger frame. That framing effect must be offset or overcome in order for 
judged safety between the two framing conditions to be equal. We can therefore assume that 
when judged safety under the two frames was equal, the perceived evidence basis for the 
judgments were not equivalent. The intention to ski may have been higher under the safe frame 
because that decision maker perceived more evidence of safety (more in terms of validity, 
relevance, weight, or even volume of evidence), and/or the intention to ski may be lower under 
the danger frame because that decision maker perceived similarly more evidence of danger. 
The behavior decisions under each frame are based on an asymmetry of evidence, an asymmetry 
that was necessary to offset the framing effect in order for judged safety to be equal. Although 
we appear to find more risk acceptance under the safe frame when judged safety between the 
experimental conditions is equal, the behavior decisions under the safe frame are potentially 
made on a more valid, relevant sample of evidence. Importantly, however, this finding must be 
placed in the context that judged safety was the strongest predictor of behavior intention. 
Participants who judged how safe a scenario is were more likely to judge safety as lower, and 
the likelihood of skiing a slope decreased as judged safety decreased. The safe frame was found 
to indirectly result in more cautious behavior via the direct effect of framing on judged safety. 
Implications for Applied Risk Judgments and Risk Communication 
 Backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain exemplifies a crucial challenge in applied risk 
communication and risk perception: people desire to engage in an activity despite knowing the 
inherent risk of serious injury or death. Avalanche accidents are overwhelmingly the result of 
human error. In 90% of fatal avalanche accidents, the victim or someone in the victim’s party 
triggered the avalanche (McClung & Schaerer, 2006), implying that people’s risk perception 
 
85 
and decisions are critical factors in avalanche fatalities. Information on the conditions in 
avalanche terrain such as the complex conditions of the snowpack, its metamorphosis over time, 
and the effects of terrain and weather, together with the knowledge of how to use this 
information are essential for judging avalanche risk. In an attempt to reduce the number of 
accidents and fatalities, stakeholders such as national avalanche warning services and education 
providers have done much work to provide detailed avalanche forecasts and improve public 
knowledge of the dangers and best practices for safety in avalanche terrain (for a review, see 
e.g., Engeset et al, 2018). Yet despite these efforts, avalanches continue to claim the lives of a 
troubling number of participants in this increasingly popular and unregulated activity. The 
dissemination of information—which as a stand-alone activity is a failed strategy for changing 
how people perceive risk and behave (Kelly & Barker, 2016; Simis et al, 2016)—has been 
insufficient for ensuring avalanche safety among backcountry skiers. Might question framing 
serve as a complementary strategy to promote more cautious risk perception and behavior? 
Decision makers, avalanche warning services, and education providers have substantial 
control over the formulation of questions about the risks assessed during a backcountry ski tour. 
Our findings illustrate how the language used to formulate risk judgments and its influence on 
the cognitive processes has the potential for a real and tangible impact on how people perceive 
risk and, ultimately, behave in the face of risk. Selectively framing risk judgments might serve 
as one effective component of a multifaceted strategy to promote more cautious and 
conservative decisions in avalanche terrain and other domains involving risks. These findings 
have potential real-world application in teaching methods, tools, and strategies for reducing 
accidents and fatalities. At the public and institutional level such as a national or regional 
avalanche forecasting service, the frame used when presenting information about conditions in 
avalanche terrain might influence how users (i.e. the general public) both perceive the current 
risk and, more critically, how they decide to act. At the individual or group level, 
communication between members of a group travelling in avalanche terrain, while typically 
presented with little thought toward framing, could be positively impacted by increased 
awareness of the framing effect. Specifically, if a group member is presenting route options or 
tour alternatives, the way in which information and questions are framed could influence other 
group members’ perceptions of the current risk and the decisions that are made or 
communicated by members of the group. 
Despite the apparent promise, there are several important considerations and potential 
limitations for the application of question framing to increase skier safety in avalanche terrain, 
or to promote certain judgments and decisions within any other discipline or context. It is 
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currently an open question whether people can prompt themselves to frame questions about 
risky situations in a way that promotes safer judgments, highlighting an interesting avenue for 
future research. It is unlikely that how a decision maker internally represents the problem or 
judgment is entirely determined by externally presented information and/or the formulation of 
the judgment task (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Decision makers clearly use their own 
experience and knowledge when modelling the world in order to judge the probabilities of 
potential outcomes (e.g., Wulff et al., 2019), and they may automatically do so with a familiar, 
default reference when not prompted with a question frame. Another important consideration 
is whether actual behavior in the mountains, when judging a slope to really ski while facing 
the real risk of avalanche, would be affected differently than hypothetical behavioral intent 
measured in an auditorium using fictional scenarios. Behavior often deviates from intention 
(Sheeran & Webb, 2016). Moreover, contextual cues only encountered in the natural decision 
environment can reduce an anticipated framing effect (Bless et al., 1998). A third consideration 
is that we may fail to see the same framing effect outside of the experimental setting. Unlike a 
natural setting, participants in our study had limited time to judge the risk and decide their 
behavior intention for each scenario. Although there is conflicting evidence as to whether more 
thought reduces framing effects (for example, see LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003; Martiny-Huenger 
et al, 2020), we may fail to see the same effect in a natural environment where decision makers 
have more time for reflection and where the potential consequence of error is considerably 
greater. A fourth consideration is the necessity to establish whether people’s natural decision 
making process is to first judge risk in terms of safety or danger before then deciding behavior. 
The risk judgment itself may be a contrivance of the experimental design. Outside of an 
experimental setting, the behavior decision may encompass the risk judgment. Finally, any 
application of these findings should be tested in an applied setting before prescribing them for 
use in practice. 
Research on framing effects informs policies and practices in other applied domains 
such as health (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2011; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; 
Peters et al., 2011; Rothman & Salovey, 1997) and finance (Kirchler et al, 2005; Weber et al., 
2000). Our findings highlight a promising direction for the strategic application of question 
framing for increased safety in various domains of applied risk perception and communication. 
The aim of public risk management is to optimize the decision matrix to enable users to 
maximize their personal enjoyment and benefit while minimizing both individual and collective 
public risk. Critically, as in avalanche terrain, one wants to minimize the probability that a “go” 
decision is made under objectively “no-go” conditions. We do not believe that the framing of 
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risk judgment questions alone will be sufficient to ensure safe behavior among all decision 
makers and or in all risky domains. It is no substitute for the availability of valid evidence of 
the objective risk, and the necessary knowledge and experience to understand and apply that 
information. However, the adoption of a procedure strategy such as that afforded by framing 
risk judgment questions may boost an individual’s overall competency for risk judgments or 
behavioral decisions. Various disciplines can conceivably harness the questions framing effect 
to make desired judgments and behaviors more likely. Risk management strategies, tools and 
education should recognize and account for this effect, and leverage these emergent findings to 
reduce the potential for accidents and fatalities. 
Conclusion 
 The present research makes several contributions to the existing literature on framing 
effects. First, our research establishes the direction of the framing effect when a risk judgment 
is framed in terms of safety or danger. Risk judgments framed in terms of safety (How safe is 
it?) result in more cautious, conservative judgments than when framed in terms of danger (How 
dangerous is it?). Second, uncertainty was not a requirement for that effect. There was a 
framing effect when judging risk under varying degrees of uncertainty, be it under conditions 
of objective safety, uncertainty, or danger. These findings suggest that the question frame 
directed attention in a way that guided selective evidence sampling, rather than indicating a 
valence-consistent or communication-driven framing effect. Finally, our findings demonstrate 
the indirect influence of the question frame on behavior intention. The adoption of a procedure 
strategy such as that afforded by framing risk judgment questions can boost people’s natural 
decision making competencies in order to ensure safer risk perceptions and behavior. These 
findings have the potential to inform the development of policies and practices that harness 
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ABSTRACT
Prior research on the affect heuristic demonstrated that the more a per-
son likes an object or activity, the safer and more valuable it is judged
to be. That relation was found when judging stimuli at the categorical
level (e.g., nuclear power, airplane travel, heart surgery). Yet risk judg-
ments and decisions usually pertain to specific instances of an object or
activity rather than their categorical representations. We examined
whether the relation between liking and perceived safety holds across
multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity distinguished by
contextual information. In four studies (N¼ 372), participants with
domain-specific experience (backcountry skiers) completed multicue risk
judgments under high uncertainty (judging the avalanche risk in back-
country skiing scenarios) and reported their degree of liking the scen-
arios. We demonstrate that the positive relation between liking and
perceived safety holds across multiple judgments of specific instances
of the activity. Furthermore, the liking-perceived safety relation (i.e.,
judging liked slopes to be safe, judging disliked slopes to be unsafe)
held among backcountry skiers who like the activity and consider it safe
at the categorical level. We discuss these findings from the perspective
that contextual valence and perceived risk can dynamically diverge from
categorical valence and perceived risk when perceiving specific instan-
ces of that category. These findings have implications for research on
attitudes toward risk in extreme sports and other high-risk activities.
Although it has been proposed that participants in extreme sports like
risk and the thrill it provides, we found that backcountry skiers exhibit a
healthy positive relation between liking and perceived safety when
judging specific instances of skiing in avalanche terrain.
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The affect heuristic across judgments of distinct instances of a category of activity
Standing atop a snow-covered mountain beyond the groomed slopes of a ski resort and the
watchful eye of its ski patrol, a backcountry skier contemplating a ski descent is faced with the
complex task of judging the risk of avalanche in a highly uncertain environment. Affective proc-
esses have been shown to play a role in a range of judgments (Blanchette and Richards 2010;
Damasio 1994; Lerner et al. 2015; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Schwarz 2012; Slovic et al. 2004;
Wardman 2006; Zajonc 1980) and risk judgments are no exception. Research found that the
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more a person likes an object or activity, the safer and more valuable it appears, whereas the
more a person dislikes an object or activity, the more unsafe and less valuable it appears
(Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002). The positive relation between
liking and perceived safety was found when judging categorical representations of objects (e.g.,
chemical plants, pesticides, nuclear power, and menopause drugs) and activities (e.g., cigarette
smoking, heart surgery, airplane travel, and surfing) independent of specific contextual informa-
tion, details, or constraints. Although our skier likes to ski in the backcountry and generally con-
siders it a safe activity at the categorical level, sentiments that have certainly influenced her
decision to be atop the mountain, she must now selectively attend to affective and cognitive
information cues to judge the risk of her specific situation. Does the positive relation between
liking and perceived safety (alternatively, disliking and perceived danger) found when judging
categorical representations hold when our skier perceives a specific instance of backcountry ski-
ing distinguished by contextual details? What the research on the liking-perceived safety relation
has not adequately examined is whether that relation is dependent upon the level at which the
target of judgment is perceived, be it the abstract, general level of categorical representations
(e.g., backcountry skiing) or at the level of a distinct, context-specific instance of that category
(e.g., skiing a specific mountain under certain conditions).
Both liking and safety can be judged either at the level of a distinct instance of an activity or
at the level of a prototypical, categorical representation of that activity (Medin 1989; Yee and
Thompson-Schill 2016). For example, the category valence of an activity is the positive or nega-
tive affective response evoked when considering a general, categorical representation of that
activity (e.g., I like backcountry skiing). By contrast, we define contextual valence as the affective
response evoked when perceiving a specific instance of that activity that is distinguished by con-
text-specific information (e.g., I like to ski this specific mountain under these particular condi-
tions). Research on approach-avoidance motivations and emotions found that the categorical
valence of a stimulus that is (relatively) isolated from a contextual situation and the contextual
motivational valence of a stimulus that is determined by contextual affordances and constraints
are distinct evaluative responses that do not necessarily converge (Elliot, Eder, and Harmon-
Jones 2013; Moors and De Houwer 2001). This evidence raises an important issue concerning lik-
ing, perceived safety, and the relation between the two. Although it is reasonable to assume
that affective evaluations and risk perceptions can similarly differ between levels of perception,
what is presently unclear is if both contextual valence and contextual perceived risk diverge
from categorical perspectives in a way that defies or upholds the positive relation between liking
and perceived safety.
Category-level and context-level judgments can diverge in various ways that have implications
for the robustness of the relation between liking and perceived safety. It is possible that judg-
ments of specific instances of an object or activity defy the positive relation between liking and
perceived safety found for judgments of categorical representations. For example, our backcoun-
try skier who likes that category of activity and generally considers it to be safe could maintain
that category-level liking and have a similarly positive affective evaluation of a specific instance
of backcountry skiing despite judging it unsafe. Or she could dislike a specific instance of back-
country skiing while maintaining her category-level perspective of safety, thereby judging the
disliked instance to be safe. Both cases represent context-level judgments diverging from cat-
egorical perspectives in a way that defies the positive relation between liking and perceived
safety. Alternatively, the liking-perceived safety relation found for judgments at the categorical
level could hold across multiple distinct instances, despite both contextual judgments failing to
converge with the established valence and perceived safety of that activity at the categorical
level. Our skier might dislike a specific instance of an activity and perceive it to be unsafe despite
generally liking that category of activity and considering it safe. In the present research, we
tested evidence for the latter reasoning that would indicate that the positive relation between
liking and perceived safety holds across judgments of specific, distinct instances of an activity.
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The conceptualization of affect
The affect heuristic theory is one of several theories that explain the role of affective evaluations
in guiding judgments and decisions. The affect heuristic theory proposes that feelings of good-
ness or badness reflect the positive and negative qualities associated with a stimulus. Such
affective responses occur rapidly and automatically before more elaborate cognitive processes
occur. Consequently, people rely on these affective evaluations as a valuable and compelling ori-
enting mechanism for quick and efficient judgments (Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002,
2004). Other theoretical frameworks that describe the role of affect in judgments and decisions
are, for example, the feelings-as-information hypothesis (Schwarz 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983,
2007), the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001), and the somatic marker hypoth-
esis (Damasio 1994). A key point on which these theories all agree is that the affective response
to a stimulus influences the ensuing judgment of that stimulus. In our present research, the
affect heuristic theory serves as a representative case of those various theories describing the
role of affect in guiding judgments and decisions. We privilege the affect heuristic theory
because our conceptualization of affect reflects the way in which it is regarded in the affect
heuristic theory. The various theories describing the influence of affect on judgments and deci-
sions disagree about how affect is conceptualized, with several of the theories regarding affect
as equivalent to emotions or feelings (for a detailed discussion, see Wardman 2006). By contrast,
Slovic and colleagues (2004) regard affect as “a faint whisper of emotion” (p. 312) rather than a
complex range of visceral emotions. In accordance with the affect heuristic theory, we conceptu-
alize affect as a generalized positive or negative response to the target of judgment. Although
we align our research with the affect heuristic’s conceptualization of affect, our findings are rele-
vant for the various existing theories on the role of affect in guiding risk judgments
and decisions.
The present studies
Backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain is a useful context for examining if the relation between
liking and perceived safety holds when judging specific instances of an activity. We interpret
backcountry skiers’ prior behavior of going backcountry skiing as indication that they like the
activity and consider it safe at the categorical level. This reflects the positive relation between lik-
ing and perceived safety that Alhakami and Slovic (1994), Finucane et al. (2000), and Slovic et al.
(2002) proposed under the affect heuristic theory. What is important for our investigation, how-
ever, is that skiing in avalanche terrain is objectively risky under certain circumstances (Engeset
et al. 2018; Niedermeier et al. 2019). Avalanche terrain is a complex and highly uncertain envir-
onment, where poor decisions are seldom marked by valid feedback, making it extremely diffi-
cult for even the most experienced backcountry skier to judge avalanche risk (Ebert 2019;
Hogarth, Lejarraga, and Soyer 2015; Zweifel and Haegeli 2014). It is therefore possible to examine
whether objectively uncertain or dangerous instances of backcountry skiing are disliked and per-
ceived as unsafe, in accordance with the liking-perceived safety relation, despite the population
liking the activity and perceiving it as safe at the categorical level.
Across four studies, we presented participants with a series of specific instances of backcoun-
try skiing scenarios. We employed a method similar to that used by Alhakami and Slovic (1994)
of directly measuring valence and perceived safety. Participants judged the safety of each scen-
ario in terms of the avalanche risk, henceforth referred to as judged safety, and reported their
degree of liking each scenario, henceforth referred to as scenario liking. We define liking as a
generalized positive or negative affective response associated with a stimulus (Alhakami and
Slovic 1994; Finucane et al. 2000; Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz 1997; Zajonc 1980). Through
our use of the term liking, we distinguish our valence-based measurement of the positive-nega-
tive evaluative dimension of affect from more emotional responses such as happiness and
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sadness (see Sj€oberg 2006, and Wardman 2006 for a more detailed discussion). Participants in
Study 1 included a mix of student participants and backcountry skiers in order to obtain a broad
range of participant experience. The participant samples for Studies 2, 3, and 4 were exclusively
recruited from among active backcountry skiers.
In addition to examining the liking-perceived safety relation when judging specific instances,
we attempted to test the causal direction associated with the affect heuristic (see Finucane et al.
2000; Slovic et al. 2002; Slovic et al. 2004). To test whether liking influenced judged safety, we
included a within-subject manipulation in each of the studies with the aim of manipulating scen-
ario liking while holding constant the objective risk level of each scenario. We attempted to
manipulate the attractiveness of the scenarios by subtly including cues that the slopes were
either untracked or had recently been skied (Studies 1-3), or through a more salient manipula-
tion of presenting the slopes in sunny, high contrast or cloudy, low contrast conditions (Study
4). Anecdotal evidence (McCammon 2002, 2004) suggests that backcountry skiers value access to
untracked slopes and should therefore prefer scenarios without tracks. As for the weather
manipulation, the results of pre-testing indicated that scenario photos with a background of
sunny, clear blue skies were preferred to otherwise identical scenario photos with a background
of overcast, cloudy grey skies. Unfortunately, the manipulations did not successfully influence
scenario liking and we were unable to test for a causal effect. Nonetheless, this failure provides
valuable insight into the theoretical framework that dominates avalanche research and educa-
tion, to which we return in the General Discussion. Importantly, the failed manipulations did not
adversely affect our main focus of presenting evidence of the positive relation between liking
and perceived safety.
We confirm that at the time of writing, the four studies reported here are all the studies we
conducted on the relation between liking and perceived safety. We report all measurements
assessed and all manipulations implemented in each study. These studies were conducted in
accordance with the ethical research protocols of UiT The Arctic University of Norway and the
Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD). Study 4 was pre-registered. The data, R script for
data processing and analysis, the pre-registration of Study 4, and the scenarios used in the stud-
ies are available on the Open Science Framework (https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/VA28N).
Study 1
In an internet-based study, a mixed sample of participants were presented four scenarios of
backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain. Participants reported judged safety and scenario liking
for each scenario.
Method
Participants. Forty-six participants (18 self-identified as male, 28 as female, Mage ¼ 26, range 18-
52, SD¼ 8.34) were recruited from a psychology course (63% of participants), receiving course
credit for participation, and recruited from among backcountry skiers in Norway (37% of partici-
pants). We did not conduct a priori power analysis because of the difficulty of estimating power
for linear mixed models (Johnson et al. 2015; Westfall, Kenny, and Judd 2014). We instead set
the minimum sample size at 40 and recruited as many participants as possible within a prede-
fined 4-week period for data collection. We did not commence analysis before completing data
collection. Participants could complete the study in Norwegian or English.
Materials. We conducted the study online and used the jsPsych programme (de Leeuw 2015)
to control the stimulus presentation in the web browser. We developed six hypothetical scen-
arios each depicting a distinct backcountry ski descent on a snow-covered mountain slope (i.e.,
avalanche terrain, see Figure 1 for an example). Each scenario began with a description of the
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tour that included basic information on the terrain, elevation, average and maximum slope
steepness, and the current weather; information that is relevant for judging the avalanche risk.
We presented the tour description according to the format and content of local backcountry ski-
ing guidebooks. A photograph of the mountain slope was located below the tour information.
Beneath the photograph was the forecasted avalanche danger, the current avalanche problem(s)
caused by the combination of weather and snow conditions, and the weather history. We based
the content and format of the avalanche hazards information on historic avalanche forecasts
from the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service (Varsom, n.d.). We did not include any extreme
indicators of either very low or very high risk levels in the scenarios; by design, all scenarios
were highly uncertain. We prepared two versions of each of the scenarios—one version included
the clearly visible ski tracks on the mountain slope in the scenario photograph, whereas there
were no ski tracks in the photograph of the other version (see Figure 1 for an example).
Procedures. Participants accessed the online study via a web browser at a time and device of
their choosing. All participants indicated their informed consent to participate by first checking a
confirmation box and then clicking a button to proceed to the study. They were then instructed
to read the scenario information and answer the questions for each scenario. The questions were
presented immediately below each scenario and participants viewed them by scrolling down the
web page. All the questions for each scenario were presented simultaneously on the same page
and could be answered in any order.
For the safety judgments, participants answered three questions following the general statement
“Regarding the avalanche risk… ”: 1) “Is it safe to ski the slope in these conditions?” 2) “Is it dangerous
to ski the slope in these conditions?” 3) “Is the snowpack stable enough to ski this slope?” on a 7-point
scale labeled “Not at all” and “Very much” at the extreme points. For the degree of liking the
Figure 1. Example of the backcountry skiing scenarios judged by participants. There were two versions of each scenario: one
version included ski tracks in the photo whereas the photo in the second version was untracked. Participants were presented
with only one version of the scenario.
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scenario, following the general statement “Regarding your desire to ski this slope, the slope appear-
s… ” participants rated the scenario according to the following three adjectives: 1) “Attractive”, 2)
“Uninteresting”, and 3) “Enjoyable” on a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all” and “Very much” at the
extreme points. A third set of three questions concerned participants’ degree of confidence in their
safety judgment. We measured confidence for purposes unrelated to the focus of the current article
and do not investigate or discuss the measure here. Participants were required to answer all ques-
tions on judged safety, scenario liking, and confidence to proceed with the study.
Each participant judged four scenarios. The selection of four scenarios from the available six,
which scenarios were presented with or without tracks, and the order of presentation were ran-
domly determined for each participant. Upon completing four scenarios, participants reported
their age and gender. Participants then reported their skiing ability, avalanche training, years of
backcountry skiing experience and average number of backcountry skiing days per season, each
of which was measured on a 7-point scale. For exploratory purposes unrelated to the current art-
icle, we measured participants’ past exposure to avalanches and their use of backcountry ski
guides. Upon completing these questions, participants were asked to answer an open question
about the purpose of the study to check if they had identified the manipulation; no participant
identified the manipulation.
Data preparation and analysis. We calculated mean scores for judged safety (3 items, the
question on danger reverse-coded, Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .90, N¼ 184, M¼ 3.45, SD¼ 1.40) and for
scenario liking (3 items, the question on uninteresting reverse-coded, Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .92,
N¼ 184, M¼ 4.59, SD¼ 1.63) per participant and scenario. We calculated a mean experience
score per participant from the measurements of skiing ability, avalanche training, years of back-
country skiing experience and average number of backcountry skiing days per season (4 items,
Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .92, N¼ 46, M¼ 3.21, SD¼ 1.88). Two participants did not respond to all four
measures of experience. We calculated their mean experience scores using the available meas-
ures for those two participants (Schafer and Graham 2002).
We used R (R Core Team 2017) and the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2015) to fit linear mixed
models to predict judged safety, estimated using maximum likelihood and Nelder-Mead opti-
mization. We included intercepts for participants and scenarios as varying effects, thereby
accounting for by-subject and by-scenario variability. We report the intraclass correlation (ICC)
for the varying effect participant as an indication of the amount of variance in judged safety
accounted for by individual difference between participants. Similarly, we report the ICC for the
varying effect scenario as an indication of the amount of variance in judged safety accounted for
by objective differences between scenarios. We used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova,
Brockhoff, and Christensen 2017) with Satterthwaite approximations to obtain p-values. After fit-
ting the regression models, we analyzed the observations (N¼ 184, 1 observation per scenario
per participant) for outliers using the LMERConvenienceFunctions package (Tremblay and Ransjin
2020). We excluded three outlier observations with a standardized residual value greater than
2.5 standard deviations from 0.
Results and discussion
Scenario liking predicted judged safety, b ¼ .46, SEb ¼ .06, 95% CI [.34, .58], p < .001, with an
effect size std. b ¼ .53. Consistent with the findings from prior research (Alhakami and Slovic
1994; Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002), scenario liking positively relates to judged safety.
The more a participant liked a backcountry ski tour, the higher that participant judged ava-
lanche-related safety. Importantly, in contrast to prior research in which participants judged cat-
egorical representations of objects and activities, we found this relation across multiple
judgments of specific instances of an activity for a range of scenario liking (1.00 to 7.00) and
judged safety (1.00 to 6.33) scores. 27.9% of variation in judged safety was attributable to the
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difference between participants, v2 (1) ¼ 15.55, indicating that participants’ safety judgments
were not stable but differed (72.1% within participant variance) between judgments. Moreover,
2.9% of variation in judged safety was attributable to the difference between scenarios, v2 (1) ¼
2.35, indicating that each scenario did not elicit a stable judgment of safety. Judged safety varied
greatly for each scenario according to subjective interpretation of the characteristics.
Student participants had less experience with both the activity depicted in the scenarios and
the judgement task (63% of the sample, student subgroup Mexperience ¼ 2.13 with a possible
range from 1 to 7) than the backcountry skier participants did (37% of the sample, skier sub-
group Mexperience ¼ 5.01). Yet analysis for a moderation effect by experience indicated that an
interaction between scenario liking and experience, b ¼ .02, SEb ¼ .03, 95% CI [-.09, .04], p ¼
.518, did not predict judged safety. There was no evidence that the relation between scenario
liking and judged safety differed between the less experienced student participants and the
more experienced backcountry skiers. Finally, the presence or absence of tracks did not influence
scenario liking, b ¼ .00, SEb ¼ .16, 95% CI [-.31, .33], p ¼ .965, or judged safety, b ¼ .14, SEb ¼
.15, 95% CI [-.44, .15], p ¼ .344. The failure of this manipulation to affect scenario liking made it
impossible to test for causality in the liking-perceived safety relation. We next sought to replicate
these findings in a study with a sample of exclusively backcountry skiers for whom the categor-
ical valence and categorical perceived safety of the activity are established.
Study 2
We tested the relation between scenario liking and judged safety with a non-student sample of
exclusively backcountry skiers who like the activity and judged it to be safe and valuable at the
categorical level. We conducted this study with the identical design, materials and procedures
used in Study 1. In what follows, we only report the unique aspects of this replication.
Participants. Fifty-four participants (41 self-identified as male, 13 as female, Mage ¼ 32, range
17-54, SD¼ 9.68) were recruited among backcountry skiers in Norway. We announced the study
to the attendees at two avalanche safety seminars in February 2018, inviting them to participant
at any time during the following 3weeks. The minimum sample size was set at 40, as per Study
1. There was no upper limit on the number of participants in the study; we recruited as many
participants as possible during the predefined 3-week period for data collection. Participants had
on average more experience with backcountry skiing and avalanche safety judgments than par-
ticipants in Study 1 (Study 2, MExperience ¼ 4.96 with a possible range from 1 to 7, as compared
to Study 1, MExperience ¼ 3.21). Notably, the topic of the seminars from which we recruited partici-
pants was improved decision-making in avalanche terrain, where they were instructed on the
correct methods and potential errors when judging avalanche risk. We did not commence ana-
lysis before completing data collection. The study was conducted in Norwegian.
Data preparation and analyses. We prepared and analyzed the data according to the same
methods reported for Study 1. We calculated mean scores for judged safety (Cronbach’s alpha ¼
.92, N¼ 216, M¼ 3.34, SD¼ 1.43) and for scenario liking (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .89, N¼ 216,
M¼ 5.29, SD¼ 1.50) per participant and scenario, and a mean experience score (Cronbach’s alpha
¼ .77, N¼ 54, M¼ 4.96, SD¼ 1.11) per participant. Two observations were identified as outliers
(standardized residual value greater than 2.5 standard deviations from 0) and removed from
the data.
Results
Consistent with the results of Study 1, scenario liking predicted judged safety, b ¼ .18, SEb ¼ .07,
95% CI [.05, .30], p ¼ .008, with an effect size std. b ¼ .20. Scenario liking positively corresponds
to judged safety across multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity, for a range of
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scenario liking (1.00 to 7.00) and judged safety (1.00 to 7.00) scores. 15.2% of variation in judged
safety was attributable to the difference between participants, v2 (1) ¼ 6.34, while 5.5% of vari-
ation in judged safety was attributable to the difference between scenarios, v2 (1) ¼ 5.71.
Judged safety was not stable for each participant. Nor was it stable for each scenario. Analysis to
test for a moderation effect by experience indicated that an interaction between scenario liking
and experience, b ¼ .09, SEb ¼ .06, 95% CI [-.22, .03], p ¼ .144, did not predict judged safety.
Overall, the results of Study 2 provide further evidence of a positive relation between scenario
liking and safety judgments at the contextual level, qualitatively replicating the results of Study
1. Finally, unlike in Study 1, the presence of tracks increased scenario liking, b ¼ .30, SEb ¼ .15,
95% CI [.00, .60], p ¼ .050, contrary to the direction of effect we predicted for the manipulation.
Despite that effect on scenario liking, neither the main effect tracks, b ¼ .09, SEb ¼ .17, 95% CI
[-.24, .43], p ¼ .591, nor an interaction between scenario liking and the tracks manipulation, b ¼
.07, SEb ¼ .12, 95% CI [-.17, .30], p ¼ .569, predicted judged safety. To investigate whether the
smaller effect size in Study 2 was in any way specific to the population of backcountry skiers, we
conducted a third study with a sample of exclusively backcountry skiers in a different country
using new scenarios adjusted for that new population.
Study 3
We conducted a direct replication of the previous study with a sample of exclusively backcountry
skiers recruited from a different population. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 were recruited in
Norway, reflecting a Scandinavian perspective on backcountry skiing and avalanche risk.
Participants in Study 3 were recruited from the USA, reflecting a North American perspective on
backcountry skiing and avalanche risk. Otherwise, we conducted this study with the identical
design and procedures used in Studies 1 and 2 using new scenarios that were conceptually the
same but adjusted to the norms of the population. In what follows, we only report the unique
aspects of this replication.
Participants. Forty-one participants (29 self-identified as male, 12 as female, Mage ¼ 26, range
15-50, SD¼ 7.85) were recruited via an email announcement sent to backcountry skiers in the
western USA in March 2018. We obtained the email addresses from a registry of individuals who,
when registering to attend an avalanche seminar, indicated their willingness to participate in
studies on avalanche safety. Participants who completed the study were eligible to register for a
prize draw to win one of six USD 50 gift certificates for an online store. The minimum sample
size was set at 40, as per Studies 1 and 2. We recruited as many participants as possible during
a predefined 4-week period for data collection. We completed all data collection before begin-
ning analysis. The study was conducted in English.
Materials. We used six new scenarios of the same design as those previously reported, but
with new content suited to the norms of the target population. We developed six hypothetical
scenarios using measurement units (e.g., Fahrenheit), geography, tour descriptions and photo-
graphs familiar to a population in the western USA. We changed the scenario photos to depict
terrain similar to that of the Rocky Mountain region from where participants were recruited. We
based the tour descriptions – both content and language – on descriptions found in American
backcountry skiing guidebooks for that region. We based the weather, avalanche danger forecast
and avalanche problems in each scenario on historic avalanche forecasts from local avalanche
warning services (Colorado Avalanche Information Center, n.d.; Gallatin National Forest
Avalanche Center, n.d.; Utah Avalanche Center, n.d.). A senior avalanche researcher at Montana
State University reviewed all the scenarios to ensure that their content was suitable for the tar-
get population. We did not include any extreme indicators of either very low or very high risk
levels in the scenarios. By design, the avalanche risk in all scenarios was uncertain.
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Data preparation and analyses. We prepared and analyzed the data according to the same
procedures reported for Studies 1 and 2. We calculated mean scores for judged safety (alpha ¼
.93, N¼ 164, M¼ 3.07, SD¼ 1.43) and for scenario liking (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .84, N¼ 164,
M¼ 5.46, SD¼ 1.29) per participant and scenario, and a mean experience score (Cronbach’s alpha
¼ .60, N¼ 41, M¼ 3.92, SD¼ 1.00) per participant. One participant did not answer all questions
measuring experience and we calculated the mean experience score for that participant using
the available measures. Two observations were identified as outliers (standardized residual value
greater than 2.5 standard deviations from 0) and removed from the data.
Results
Consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2, scenario liking predicted judged safety, b ¼ .15,
SEb ¼ .08, 95% CI [.00, .30], p ¼ .050, with an effect size std. b ¼ .18. Scenario liking positively
relates to judged safety across multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity, for a range
of scenario liking (1.00 to 7.00) and judged safety (1.00 to 6.33) scores. 20.5% of variation in
judged safety was attributable to the difference between participants, v2 (1) ¼ 13.82, while
27.0% of variation in judged safety was attributable to the difference between scenarios, v2 (1)
¼ 51.74. Judged safety was not stable for each participant. Nor was it stable for each scenario.
Analysis to test for a moderation effect by experience indicated that an interaction between
scenario liking and experience, b ¼ .04, SEb ¼ .07, 95% CI [-.09, .19], p ¼ .502, did not predict
judged safety. The results of Study 3 provide further evidence of a positive relation between
scenario liking and safety judgments at the contextual level, replicating the results of Studies 1
and 2. Replicating this result within a different population and with new materials indicates that
the results of the previous two studies were not unique to the population or to the materials
and manner in which they were presented in Studies 1 and 2. However, although we adjusted
the scenarios used in Study 3 so that their content would be suited to the target population, it
is possible that any unforeseen mismatch between scenarios and the real-world decision environ-
ments that are familiar to the participants could limit the comparability and generalizability of
the studies.
The presence of tracks did not influence scenario liking, b ¼ .12, SEb ¼ .14, 95% CI [-.16, .40],
p ¼ .394. However, unlike previous studies, the presence of tracks increased judged safety, b ¼
.31, SEb ¼ .15, 95% CI [.00, .61], p ¼ .049. Moreover, there is some evidence that an interaction
effect between scenario liking and tracks predicted judged safety: scenario liking, b ¼ .04, SEb ¼
.09, 95% CI [-.14, .23], p ¼ .645; tracks, b ¼ .96, SEb ¼ .69, 95% CI [-2.32, .40], p ¼ .170; and their
interaction, b ¼ .23, SEb ¼ .12, 95% CI [-.01, .48], p ¼ .064. This suggests that the relation
between scenario liking and judged safety was stronger for scenarios with tracks. Nonetheless,
we were unable to examine causality because our manipulation did not affect scenario liking
as expected.
Study 4
In Studies 1, 2, and 3, the questions on judged safety were presented before the questions on
scenario liking. To test for an order effect, in Study 4 we counterbalanced the order of the liking
and safety judgments so that half of the participants judged safety first while the other half
judged liking first. Moreover, after the inconsistent effect of the tracks manipulation on scenario
liking and judged safety in Studies 1 to 3, we used a more salient manipulation of weather in an
attempt to affect scenario liking to test for a causal effect on judged safety. Pre-testing indicated
that scenario photos with a background of sunny, clear blue skies were preferred to otherwise
identical scenario photos with a background of overcast, cloudy grey skies.
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Methods
Participants. Two-hundred and thirty-one participants (162 self-identified as male, 68 as female,
1 as other; Mage ¼ 35, range 19-62, SD¼ 10.06) were recruited via email announcements sent to
backcountry skiers in Norway in January 2020. We obtained the email addresses from a registry
of individuals who, when registering for an avalanche seminar, indicated their willingness to par-
ticipate in studies on avalanche safety. Participants who completed the study were eligible to
register for a prize draw to win one avalanche airbag and air cylinder. The minimum sample size
was set at 105 based on a priori simulation-based power analysis using the smallest effect size
measured in Studies 1, 2, and 3. We recruited as many participants as possible during a prede-
fined 4-week period for data collection. We completed all data collection before beginning ana-
lysis. Participants could complete the study in English or Norwegian.
Materials and procedures. We developed four scenarios of the same design as those previ-
ously reported (all scenario photos were without tracks) for Studies 1 to 3. We prepared two ver-
sions of each scenario: the photo in one version had a sunny, clear blue sky and the mountain
was brighter and in higher contrast, whereas the photo in the other version had an overcast,
cloudy grey sky and the mountain was darker and in lower contrast. Each participant in the
study judged four scenarios. The only fixed aspect was the ratio of two sunny scenarios and two
cloudy scenarios per participant. Whether the scenarios were sunny or cloudy and their order of
presentation were randomly determined for each participant. As per Studies 1 to 3, the three
safety judgment questions and the three liking judgment questions were presented together on
the same page below the scenario. However, the order of those question blocks was counterbal-
anced between participants. The three questions on rated liking were presented above the three
questions on rated safety for even-numbered participants, and presented below the three ques-
tions on rated safety for odd-numbered participants.
Data preparation and analyses. We prepared and analyzed the data according to the same
procedures reported for Studies 1 to 3. We calculated mean scores for judged safety (Cronbach’s
alpha ¼ .88, N¼ 924, M¼ 3.07, SD¼ 1.29) and for scenario liking (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .88,
N¼ 924, M¼ 4.94, SD¼ 1.54) per participant and scenario, and mean experience score
(Cronbach’s alpha ¼ .73, N¼ 231, M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.08) per participant. Nine observations were
identified as outliers (standardized residual value greater than 2.5 standard deviations from 0)
and removed from the data.
Results
Consistent with our previous results, scenario liking predicted judged safety, b ¼ .22, SEb ¼ .03,
95% CI [.17, .28], p < .001, with an effect size std. b ¼ .26. A higher value of scenario liking
relates to a higher value of judged safety across multiple judgments of specific instances of an
activity, for a range of scenario liking (1.00 to 7.00) and judged safety (1.00 to 6.33) values. This
replicates the results of Studies 1 to 3. 29.1% of variation in judged safety was attributable to
the difference between participants, v2 (1) ¼ 89.59, while 2.1% of variation in judged safety was
attributable to the difference between scenarios, v2 (1) ¼ 17.42. Judged safety was not stable for
each participant. Nor was it stable for each scenario. Analysis for a moderation effect by experi-
ence indicated that an interaction between scenario liking and experience, b ¼ .03, SEb ¼ .02,
95% CI [-.09, .01], p ¼ .147, did not predict judged safety. Analysis for an effect from the order of
the questions revealed weak evidence that the order of the questions influenced judged safety,
border ¼ .21, SEb ¼ .11, 95% CI [-.01, .43], p ¼ .067, effect size std. b ¼ .16. Judged safety was on
average higher when safety was judged before scenario liking. More importantly, however, an
interaction between scenario liking and question order did not predict judged safety, b ¼ .02,
SEb ¼ .06, 95% CI [-.13, .09], p ¼ .709. There was no evidence that the order of the questions
influenced the magnitude of the relation between scenario liking and judged safety. Finally,
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despite being more salient than the subtle tracks manipulation used in Studies 1 to 3, the wea-
ther condition of the scenario photo did not influence judged safety, b ¼ .00, SEb ¼ .07, 95% CI
[-.14, .14], p ¼ .988, or scenario liking, b ¼ .01, SEb ¼ .07, 95% CI [-14., .15], p ¼ .915. Failing to
manipulate scenario liking as expected, we were again unable to test the causal direct of the
relation between affective evaluations and risk judgments.
Synthesis of evidence across studies 1 to 4
We used the meta-analytic Q test with studies as a fixed effect to assess the magnitude of vari-
ation in the effect sizes across the studies (Schauer and Hedges 2020). Although the effect
parameters in all four studies are all in the same direction (i.e., there is a positive relation
between liking and judged safety) with p-values equal to or less than the conventional inference
threshold of .05 for null hypothesis significance testing, the Q test revealed evidence of hetero-
geneity of effect size, v2 (3) ¼ 15.42, p ¼ .002, across the studies. We measured a larger effect
size in Study 1 (see Figure 2). To synthesize the evidence across all studies, we combined individ-
ual participant data from the four studies (372 participants, 1472 observations) for pooled ana-
lysis to more accurately estimate the effect parameter of the relation between liking and judged
safety (da Costa and Sutton 2019). As described for Study 1, we fitted linear mixed models using
maximum likelihood to predict the outcome variable judged safety. To account for the hetero-
geneity of effect parameters between studies, we assigned a varying intercept for studies when
estimating all models (in addition to varying intercepts for participants and scenarios). Analysis
of the combined data indicates that scenario liking predicted judged safety with an effect size
std. b ¼ .28, SEb ¼ .03, 95% CI [.22, .32], across all four studies. These effect parameters are iden-
tical to those obtained by calculating the average weighted effect size using the effect param-
eter results from each study. 23.9% of variation in judged safety was attributable to the
difference between participants, v2 (1) ¼ 128.54, 13.2% of variation in judged safety was attribut-
able to the difference between scenarios, v2 (1) ¼ 90.70, and 1.1% of variation in judged safety
was attributable to the difference between studies (apart from the different scenarios), v2 (1)
¼ 1.00.
One might reasonably assume that the larger, heterogeneous effect size in Study 1 was
caused by 63% of participants being students who had less experience with the activity depicted
in the scenarios and the risk judgment task. We therefore included experience in the pooled ana-
lysis. We fitted a model with the effects scenario liking, participant experience, and their inter-
action to assess whether it predicted judged safety. Multicollinearity between scenario liking and
participant experience was high (VIF ¼ 18.80) so we standardized the predictor and response
variables. The combined data indicate that an interaction between scenario liking and participant
Figure 2. Standardized regression coefficients and 95% CI for scenario liking predicting judged safety for Studies 1-4 and the
combined data.
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experience predicted judged safety: scenario liking, b ¼ .28, SEb ¼ .03, 95% CI [.23, .33], p < .001;
experience, b ¼ .13, SEb ¼ .03, 95% CI [-.20, .07], p < .001; and their interaction, b ¼ .08,
SEb ¼ .02, 95% CI [-.13, .03], p ¼ .001. 23.1% of variation in judged safety was attributable to
the difference between participants, v2 (1) ¼ 119.94, 13.9% of variation in judged safety was
attributable to the difference between scenarios, v2 (1) ¼ 91.83, and 0.0% of variation in judged
safety was attributable to the difference between studies (apart from the different scenarios), v2
(1) ¼ 0.00. There is evidence in the pooled data that participant experience moderates the rela-
tion between scenario liking and judged safety: the magnitude of that relation was lower when
participant experience was higher (see Figure 3). However, the size of the interaction effect is
extremely small.
General discussion
Across four studies, we found evidence that higher self-reported liking of backcountry ski scen-
arios corresponded to judgments of higher avalanche safety. This aligns with earlier research
using judgments of categorical representations of stimuli (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Finucane
et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002). Our present research extends those prior findings by demonstrat-
ing that the liking-perceived safety relation holds across multiple judgments of highly uncertain,
specific instances of an activity that are distinguished by contextual information. Furthermore,
the liking-perceived safety relation was found to hold when individuals for whom the activity
has established categorical valence and safety judged multiple distinct instances of that activity.
Despite the facts that backcountry skiers like backcountry skiing in avalanche terrain and deem
the activity to be safe, specific instances of backcountry skiing assumed a negative contextual
valence and were perceived as unsafe in accordance with the liking-perceived safety relation.
Echoing findings from the field of approach-avoidance motivation and emotion (Elliot, Eder, and
Harmon-Jones 2013; Moors and De Houwer 2001), our results show that categorical valence and
contextual valence (and, similarly, categorical perceived safety and contextual perceived safety)
are distinct judgment processes that do not necessarily converge. The relation between liking
Figure 3. Scenario liking as predictor of judged safety at þ1 SD, mean, and -1 SD participant experience scores.
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and perceived safety holds at the contextual level of perception, even when the valence and
perceived safety of a specific instance of a stimulus conflicts with the established valence and
perceived safety of that category of stimulus for the decision maker.
All experiences of phenomena are marked, to varying degrees, with affect. Those positive and
negative affective markers are aggregated to create an “affect pool” that provides an affective
frame of reference for interpreting any new phenomena a decision maker encounters (Slovic
et al. 2004; see also Schwarz 2007, for a similar argument in the context of attitude construction).
A categorical representation has an affective value or valence that reflects the aggregated posi-
tive and negative markers of prior experiences of specific instances of that category of phenom-
enon. In that way, a categorical representation is a prototypical expression of the affective frame
of reference. By contrast, a distinct, context-specific instance of that category will be marked by
a unique array of affective characteristics. The affective response that that distinct instance of a
phenomenon evokes depends upon the salience of those affective characteristics and the ease
with which the decision maker interprets or maps them according to the affective frame of refer-
ence for that category of phenomena (Slovic et al. 2004; Wardman 2006; Wilson and Arvai 2006).
A specific instance of an affect-rich phenomenon such as backcountry skiing can include certain
affective characteristics that a decision maker does not include in the mental image of a categor-
ical representation, or may lack other affective characteristics typically associated with the cat-
egorical representation. When those differences in affective characteristics are great enough, the
valence of a distinct, context-specific instance of a phenomenon will diverge from the valence of
that category of phenomena. Risk perceptions can differ between levels of perception in similar
manner. Because the salient affective qualities and risk characteristics of each scenario differed
(to lesser or greater degrees) from participants’ categorical representations of backcountry skiing,
contextual valence and risk perception diverged from categorical valence. This resulted in
dynamic changes between contextual judgments of specific instances.
The focus of our research on contextual judgments of specific instances of a phenomenon is
not a methodological contrivance. We believe that such contextual judgments are a common
aspect of daily life and, as such, are ecologically valid representations of real-world decisions.
Although judging the risk, benefit, and degree of liking an activity in general – such as back-
country skiing – is a valid and realistic judgment task, it is a very different task from judging the
risk, benefit, and degree of liking a specific instance of that activity. The salience of affective
qualities and risk considerations will be different between the two judgment tasks, despite one
target of judgment being a categorical representation of the other. That contextual judgments
should diverge from judgment of categorical representations, and differ between distinct con-
textual judgments, is both natural and beneficial. When faced with a specific potential hazard
and high uncertainty, people should ideally decide behavior based on a contextual judgment
rather than their general, category-level orientation. Otherwise, decision makers would find
themselves trapped by their category-based judgments, doomed to repeat the affective response
and risk perception irrespective of contextual characteristics.
The moderating effect of experience
We found evidence that a decision maker’s prior experience with the stimulus activity and risk
judgment task appears to moderate the relation between affective evaluations and judged risk.
As participant experience increased, the magnitude of the relation between scenario liking and
judged safety decreased. This moderating effect of experience was found in the analysis of the
combined data from all four studies but was not found in any of the individual studies.
However, the size of that effect was very small, making its practical relevance questionable. Care
must be taken to not overemphasize the moderating effect of experience found in the pooled
data, and further research is required to determine whether that observed effect is meaningful.
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Do skiers’ preferences influence their perception of risk?
We attempted to manipulate the attractiveness of the backcountry skiing scenarios while holding
the risk level constant to test whether liking has a causal influence on perceived safety.
Unfortunately, the failure of both manipulations to influence liking made it impossible to test caus-
ality. Nonetheless, those failed manipulations are relevant for the field of avalanche research and
education. For the past two decades, a focus on erroneous decision heuristics (referred to as heur-
istic traps) has dominated examinations into the decision processes that result in avalanche acci-
dents and fatalities (Johnson et al. 2020). One of the heuristic traps specified in that conceptual
framework is the scarcity heuristic. It is based on the assumption that skiing untracked, fresh pow-
der snow is so highly valued among backcountry skiers that they take greater risks to be the first
to ski it (McCammon 2002, 2004). Evidence of the scarcity heuristic in previous research is conflict-
ing. Furman, Shooter, and Schumann (2010) found evidence that an untracked slope was positively
related to the likelihood of skiing that slope, whereas Marengo, Monaci, and Miceli (2017) found
contradictory evidence that the presence of tracks increased the likelihood of skiing that slope.
Our research found no evidence that the presence or absence of tracks influenced either liking or
perceived safety. Another feature that avalanche experts believe influences the attractiveness of a
ski slope and that they anecdotally associate with increased avalanche accidents is the sunny
cloudless weather that can follow a night of snowfall, which skiers refer to as the highly prized
bluebird days (Avalanche Canada 2016; Enright 2017; Morris 2016). Our research found no evidence
that sunny versus cloudy skies influenced liking or perceived safety. These findings are applicable
for the ongoing evaluation of the heuristic traps conceptual framework and its relevance for ava-
lanche risk management strategies, tools and education (see Johnson et al. 2020). We recognize,
however, that the task of judging avalanche risk may have focused participants’ attention on risk
to a greater degree than it would be in a natural situation. This increased focus on risk may have
undermined any effect of their preference for the absence of tracks or for sunny blue skies. Future
research could manipulate participants’ focus on risk to test for an effect on liking.
Risk in extreme sports
The backcountry skiing context and those who perform the activity together provide an intriguing
opportunity to study a real-world case of individuals who appear to like a dangerous activity. A
prominent theoretical perspective on extreme sports contends that these activities are synonymous
with risk and that participation is about risk-taking and the thrill it provides (Brymer, 2010).
Moreover, measures of attitudes toward risk such as self-report questionnaires and lab-based tasks
generally involve measuring affective disposition toward risk as the degree to which one likes tak-
ing risk (e.g., General Risk Propensity Scale (Zhang, Highhouse, and Nye 2019), Domain-Specific
Risk Taking (DOSPERT) scale). A consequence of both that theoretical perspective on extreme
sports and such measures of risk preference is that some people are deemed to like risk, defying
the positive relation between liking and perceived safety. However, our data show that even peo-
ple who like and perform a risky activity (at the category level) such as skiing in avalanche terrain
exhibit a healthy positive relation between liking and perceived safety when judging specific
instances of that activity (at the contextual level), rather than liking it because it is risky. This find-
ings aligns with an alternative perspective on extreme sport participation that contends that peo-
ple recognize the inherent risk of the activity, acknowledging the possibility of injury or death, but
that they like safety and seek to maximize it when performing the activity (Brymer 2010).
Conclusion
Risk judgments and behavior decisions in the real world most often focus on specific instances
of objects and activities rather than their categorical representations. Although prior research
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demonstrated the positive relation between liking and perceived safety when judging categorical
representations of stimuli, in the present research we have shown that that relation holds across
multiple judgments of specific instances of an activity. Our findings contribute to understanding
risk judgments and decision making as an interplay of cognitive and affective factors. That liking
and perceived safety systematically vary, but that the positive relation between the two remains,
when judging specific instances of an activity that a decision maker broadly likes and considers
safe provides a dynamic picture of the degree to which cognitive and affective factors are
intertwined.
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Disagreement persists about the origin of confidence and the internal signals that influence its 
formation. Using combined individual participant data from four studies (N = 181), we 
examined confidence in relation to the perceived source of uncertainty for a risk judgment, 
and explored the roles of domain-specific experience and affective evaluations in the 
formation of confidence. In each study, participants with domain-specific experience 
(backcountry skiers) performed complex risk judgments (judging avalanche risk) for multiple 
highly uncertain contexts (hypothetical avalanche terrain scenarios). We investigated whether 
more experienced participants could better recognize the inherent uncertainty of the decision 
environment, and if they did so with greater confidence. For complex tasks such as judging 
avalanche risk, experience should increase a person’s understanding of the probabilistic, 
unpredictable nature of that environment. However, our findings suggests that participants of 
all levels of experience attributed uncertainty to their own judgment process rather than to the 
limitations and inherent uncertainty of the environment. We then examined whether 
participants’ affective evaluations influenced their confidence in their risk judgments. 
Affective evaluations are understood to play a crucial orienting role in the risk judgment 
process. We found evidence of an interplay between affective and cognitive judgments in the 
formation of confidence. Participants were more confident when their affective evaluation 
matched their risk judgment, and less confident when there was a mismatch between the two. 
Our research illustrates a troubling limitation in the development of confidence with 
experience, and the potential (dis)advantageous effect of affective evaluations on confidence 
in certain contexts. 
 




Confidence in complex risk judgments: the roles of uncertainty, experience, and affect 
Doubt is unpleasant, but certainty is absurd 
                                                                                           -Voltaire 
Introduction 
Judging risk involves evaluating the available evidence to make inferences about the 
likelihood of negative outcomes. Faced with uncertainty, people must have confidence in the 
accuracy of their risk judgments in order to act (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Gill et al., 1998; 
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Yet despite its importance, contention persists about the origin of 
confidence and the internal signals that influence its formation (Boldt et al. 2017; Meyniel et 
al., 2015; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Although confidence has 
been extensively investigated using a variety of simple decision tasks, such as confidence in 
trivia knowledge, the applicability of this research to real-world judgements remains unclear 
(Dhami et al., 2004; Juslin et al., 2000; Koehler et al., 2002; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). 
The complex, goal-oriented judgment tasks that typify human behavior often involve various 
sources of uncertainty and a multiplicity of cognitive processes and internal signals. In this 
article, we examine the formation of confidence in relation to the perceived source of 
uncertainty for a complex risk judgment task, and explore the roles of domain-specific 
experience and affective evaluations in that formation of confidence. 
To capture the complexity and uncertainty of real-world decision environments, we 
asked backcountry skiers with varying levels of experience to judge the risk of snow 
avalanches in a series of uncertain hypothetical skiing scenarios modelled on the natural 
decision environment. Judging avalanche risk is a complex task for which no single cue or 
combination of cues allows perfect predictions. The reliability and validity of the available 
evidence are often limited, ambiguous, or conflicting. Consequently, there is always some 
uncertainty when assessing avalanche risk (Landrø et al., 2020). One might reasonably expect 
experienced backcountry skiers to confidently recognize that in many cases, avalanche risk in 
a complex environment is inherently probabilistic. By examining their confidence in relation 
to their risk judgments, we could ascertain whether they indeed recognized these situations as 
fundamentally uncertain with regard to the decision environment. We then investigated how 
domain-specific experience influenced that perception of uncertainty and their confidence 
judgments. 
Uncertainty can take two qualitatively distinct forms based on its source. Internal 
uncertainty (i.e., epistemic uncertainty) is rooted in a decision maker’s incomplete 
knowledge, skill, or information, while environmental uncertainty (i.e., aleatory uncertainty) 
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stems from the stochastic nature and inherent unpredictability of the environment (Fox & 
Ülkümen, 2011; Gillies, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021; 
Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Peterson & Pitz, 1988; Teigen & Løhre, 2017; Ülkümen et al., 2016). 
Each form of uncertainty elicits a different type of probabilistic judgment. Internal uncertainty 
evokes an epistemic probabilistic judgment that involves reporting a subjective degree of 
belief in a predicted outcome, whereas environmental uncertainty evokes an aleatory 
probabilistic judgment that involves estimating the long-run frequency of an outcome given 
the external conditions (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Gillies, 2000; Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2021; 
Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Peterson & Pitz, 1988; Ülkümen et al., 2016). The perception of 
uncertainty and corresponding interpretation of the judgment task is highly subjective and 
contextual. People can disagree about the source of uncertainty for a particular judgment task, 
and a given individual can perceive different sources of uncertainty between specific 
instances of a category of judgment task (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011, Ülkümen et al., 2016). 
Crucially, confidence in a risk judgment provides insight as to how a decision maker 
perceives the uncertainty of that judgment task. Because people make different probabilistic 
judgments in response to either form of uncertainty, the meaning of what is reported on a risk 
rating scale differs according to how the uncertainty of the judgment task is perceived (Fox & 
Ülkümen, 2011; Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Teigen & Løhre, 2017; Ülkümen et al., 2016). That 
meaning can be interpreted based on the retrospective confidence judgment. If the uncertainty 
of judging avalanche risk is attributed to a lack of knowledge and/or inadequacy of the 
judgment strategy, interpreting the task as an epistemic probabilistic judgment, then the 
reported risk value reflects a participant’s subjective degree of belief in the safety/danger of 
the scenario (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Løhre & Teigen, 2016). Since confidence is equivalent 
to degree of belief for epistemic judgments, we would expect confidence to track that reported 
risk value: confidence should be highest at either limit of the response scale where the degree 
of belief in the safety/danger of the scenario is highest, and lowest at the midpoint of the 
response scale where the degree of belief is lowest. By contrast, if participants attribute 
uncertainty to the stochastic nature of the decision environment, interpreting the task as an 
aleatory probabilistic judgment, then reported risk reflects the long-run frequency of either 
outcome given the available evidence (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Løhre & Teigen, 2016). One 
can be more or less confident in any aleatory probabilistic estimate of the state of the world if 
the evidence supports that judgement. For example, when randomly drawing a card from a 
full deck, one can be highly confident that 25% of the time the suit of the card will be hearts. 
We could therefore expect equal confidence ratings across all values of judged safety. The 
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two forms of uncertainty evoke different probabilistic judgments and, correspondingly, 
different confidence judgments. By examining retrospective confidence reports in relation to 
what is reported on the risk rating scale, we can infer how participants perceive the 
uncertainty of the risk judgment. This is important because for complex tasks such as judging 
avalanche risk, people should ideally understand that the decision environment is probabilistic 
and that correctly judging the outcome is not exclusively dependent upon a decision maker’s 
knowledge and judgment strategy. 
In addition to examining confidence in relation to the perceived source of uncertainty, 
we explore the role of participants’ backcountry skiing experience in the formation of 
confidence in avalanche risk judgments. Although experience is intuitively associated with 
expertise, the relationship between experience, confidence, and the degree to which a 
judgment corresponds with the true state of the world is not straightforward. As people gain 
experience, their judgment strategies tend to become more established resulting in greater 
confidence (Fischer & Budescu, 2005; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020). We might therefore 
expect experience with judging avalanche risk to correspond to reduced internal uncertainty 
and an increased understanding of the inherent environmental uncertainty. Unfortunately, 
greater experience and confidence do not guarantee that a person’s judgment strategy 
represents a correct model of the world (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Koriat, 2008; Hogarth et 
al, 2015). The acquisition of experience increases the conviction and tenacity with which a 
person holds to a judgment strategy more rapidly than it refines the content of that judgment 
strategy (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020). We examine whether 
more experienced individuals are better able to recognize the inherent environmental 
uncertainty when judging avalanche risk, and if they have greater confidence in that 
recognition. 
Beyond this examination of confidence in relation to experience and the perceived 
source of uncertainty, we also explore whether a backcountry skier’s affective evaluation of a 
scenario influences their confidence in their judgment of the avalanche risk. Affective 
evaluations serve as a valuable and compelling orienting mechanism in the perception of risk 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Finucane et al, 2000; Lerner et al., 2015; Lowenstein et al., 
2001; Schwarz, 2012; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2002, 2004). Given that relation, it is 
reasonable to assume that affective evaluations might also influence the formation of 
confidence in risk judgments. That mood (i.e., incidental affect) has been found to influence 
confidence (Koellinger & Treffers, 2015; Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 2004; Massoni, 2014; Prinz 
et al., 2019; Sidi et al., 2018) is further reason to suspect that affective evaluations (i.e., 
 
117 
integral affect) are an important internal signal during the formation of confidence in a 
complex risk judgment. We conceptualize affective evaluations as a generalized positive or 
negative response to the target of judgment, which we measure as scenario liking. Liking has 
a motivational component that is relevant for the risk judgment process: people are more 
likely to approach liked and avoid disliked stimuli (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Generally, liking 
positively relates to perceived safety. The more a backcountry skier likes (i.e., approach 
motivation) a scenario, the safer it is perceived, whereas the more they dislike (i.e., avoid 
motivation) a scenario, the more dangerous it is perceived (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; 
Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002; Stephensen & Martiny-Huenger, 2021). However, 
despite this general relation, it is possible that an individual likes a scenario that is perceived 
as dangerous or dislikes a scenario perceived as safe. We explore whether the congruence 
(e.g., liking a scenario perceived as safe) and incongruence (e.g., liking a scenario perceived 
as dangerous) between affective evaluations and risk judgments influence the formation of 
confidence. 
Methods 
Participants. We obtained data from one-hundred and eighty-one individuals (59 
women, 122 men, Mage = 31, SD = 11.18, range = 15-63) who participated in one of four 
independent studies. As explained below when reporting our methods of analysis, we 
combined the individual participant data from those four studies for pooled analysis. 
Participants in Studies 1 (N = 40) and 3 (N = 54) were backcountry skiers from Norway. 
Participants did not receive compensation for participating. Participants in Study 4 (N = 41) 
were backcountry skiers from the western USA who received compensation for participation. 
To obtain data from participants with a wide range of experience, participants in Study 2 (N = 
46) were a mixed sample comprising backcountry skiers from Norway (37% of participants) 
who did not receive compensation for participating, and psychology students at a Norwegian 
university (63 % of participants) who received course credit for participating. The 
backcountry skier participants in each study had experience in performing similar risk 
judgments in preparation for and during actual ski tours in avalanche terrain. Arguably, the 
activity of backcountry skiing, the environment of avalanche terrain depicted in the scenarios, 
and the task of judging avalanche risk were familiar, meaningful, and important for those 
experienced participants. 
We obtained informed consent for all participants in each study. All studies were 
conducted in accordance with the ethical research protocols of UiT – The Arctic University of 
Norway and the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD ref. numbers 54651 and 58839). 
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Data on judged safety, scenario liking, and participant experience from Studies 2 to 4 were 
previously published in the context of testing a hypothesized relation between scenario liking 
and judged safety (see Stephensen & Martiny-Huenger, 2021). However, confidence did not 
pertain to the focus of that investigation; we neither analyzed nor published data on 
confidence from any study in that article. 
Materials. We conducted all four studies online using the jspsych programme (de 
Leeuw, 2015). We developed hypothetical scenarios each depicting a distinct backcountry ski 
tour on a snow-covered mountain slope (i.e., avalanche terrain, see Figure 1 for an example). 
Each scenario began with a description of the tour that included basic information on the 
terrain, elevation, average and maximum slope steepness, and the current weather. A 
photograph of the mountain slope was located below the tour information. Beneath the 
photograph was the forecasted regional avalanche danger level (5-category scale), the current 
avalanche problem(s) caused by the combination of weather and snow conditions, and the 
weather history. The avalanche danger scale and the avalanche problems are standardized 
tools used by the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service (Varsom), the European Avalanche 
Warning Services (EAWS), the American Avalanche Association, and the National 
Avalanche Center in the USA. The photograph and textual content of each scenario provided 
objective information for judging the degree of avalanche risk (i.e., judged safety). 
All the hypothetical scenarios represent realistic situations typically encountered in 
avalanche terrain. We designed each of the scenarios to have low predictability and high 
environmental uncertainty. None of the scenarios included indicators of either very low or 
very high risk of avalanche. The available information cues in the photo and textual content 
were ambiguous and/or conflicting. For example, although the danger level of 3-considerable 
(on a five-category scale), the weather history, and the prevailing avalanche problems in the 
scenario depicted in Figure 1 together indicate an increased probability of an avalanche, the 
terrain features, low slope angle, and the lack of any signs in the photograph indicative of the 
presence of the avalanche problems indicate a reduced probability of avalanche. It was not 
possible to ascertain that any scenario was safe or dangerous. Each scenario was marked by 
high environmental uncertainty. 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 used the same six scenarios. For Study 4, we used six new 
scenarios. The content of all the scenarios such as the measurement units (e.g., Celsius and 
meters vs Fahrenheit and feet), geography, tour descriptions, and photographs were suited to 
the norms and familiar conditions of the participants. We based the content and format of the 
avalanche hazards information on historic avalanche forecasts from the Norwegian Avalanche 
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Warning Service (Varsom, n.d.) and from local US avalanche warning services (Colorado 
Avalanche Information Center, n.d.; Gallatin National Forest Avalanche Center, n.d.; Utah 
Avalanche Center, n.d.). All scenarios used in the four studies are available on the Open 




Example of the backcountry skiing scenarios judged by participants. 
 
                                                     
1 We prepared two versions of each of the scenarios: one version included the clearly visible 
ski tracks on the mountain slope in the scenario photograph while the other version did not 
include ski tracks in the photograph (see Figure 1 for an example). As reported in Stephensen 
and Martiny-Huenger (2021), this within-subject manipulation (the presence vs. absence of 
ski tracks) was an attempt to manipulate scenario liking while holding constant the objective 
risk level of each scenario. However, this manipulation failed to influence judged safety, 
confidence, or scenario liking. We therefore do not investigate or discuss this manipulation 




Procedure. Participants accessed the online study via a web browser at a time and 
device of their choosing. Each scenario was presented on a unique webpage. The questions 
were presented immediately below each scenario on that same webpage. All the questions and 
response scales for each scenario were presented simultaneously and could be answered in 
any order. Participants in all four studies judged the safety of each scenario in terms of the 
avalanche risk, referred to as judged safety, and reported their retrospective confidence in 
judged safety, referred to as confidence. Participants in studies 2 to 4 also reported their 
affective evaluation of each scenario, referred to as scenario liking. For judged safety, 
participants answered three questions following the general statement “Regarding the 
avalanche risk…”: 1) “Is it safe to ski the slope in these conditions?” 2) “Is it dangerous to 
ski the slope in these conditions?” (reverse-coded), and 3) “Is the snowpack stable enough to 
ski this slope?” On a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all” and “Very much” at the extreme 
points. For the degree of liking the scenario, following the general statement “Regarding your 
desire to ski this slope, the slope appears…” participants in Studies 2, 3, and 4 rated the 
scenario according to the following three adjectives: 1) “Attractive”, 2) “Uninteresting” 
(reverse-coded), and 3) “Enjoyable” on a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all” and “Very much” 
at the extreme points. We did not assess scenario liking in Study 1. For the degree of 
confidence in judged safety, participants answered three questions following the general 
statement “Regarding your judgments of the avalanche risk…”: 1) “Are you confident in your 
assessment of the avalanche risk?”2) “Do you doubt your judgment of the avalanche 
danger?” (reverse-coded), and 3) “Are you confident in your judgment of the safety of the 
snowpack?” On a 7-point scale labeled “Not at all” and “Very much” at the extreme points. 
Participants were required to answer all questions for each scenario to proceed with the study. 
It was not possible to return to earlier scenarios. Participants in Study 1 judged each of the six 
available scenarios. Participants in Studies 2, 3, and 4 judged four scenarios from the sample 
of scenarios for their respective region. Selections were random for each participant. Upon 
completing the scenarios, participants reported their age and gender. Participants then 
reported their skiing ability, avalanche training, years of backcountry skiing experience, and 
average number of backcountry skiing days per season, each of which was measured on a 7-
point scale. 
Analysis. To synthesize the evidence across all studies and more accurately estimate 
parameters for any effect, we combined the individual participant data from each of the four 
studies for pooled analysis (da Costa & Sutton, 2019). The dataset comprises 804 scenario 
evaluations from the four studies. We calculated mean scores for confidence (three items, 
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Cronbach’s alpha = .89, N = 804, M = 4.62, SD = 1.42), judged safety (three items, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .92, N = 804, M = 3.18, SD = 1.44), and scenario liking (three items, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .90, N = 564, M = 5.11, SD = 1.53) per participant and scenario. We 
calculated a mean experience score per participant from the measurements of skiing ability, 
avalanche training, years of backcountry skiing experience, and average number of 
backcountry skiing days per season (four items, Cronbach’s alpha = .83, N = 181, M = 4.46, 
SD = 1.55). Three participants did not provide responses to all four measures of experience so 
we calculated mean experience scores using the available measures for those participants. We 
standardized the confidence, judged safety, scenario liking, and participant experience scores 
for all analyses. 
We first analyzed whether an increase of experience corresponds to a similar increased 
ability to distinguish the source of uncertainty for a judgment task. We tested the variance of 
judged safety scores across all levels of participant experience for each scenario to determine 
if judged safety scores clustered among more experienced participants. We used linear 
regression analysis to determine whether experience predicts judged safety for each scenario. 
We used Breusch-Pagan tests of non-constant variance for that linear relation to determine if 
variance in judged safety was constant across participant experience levels for each scenario. 
To investigate a possible U-shaped relation between judged safety and confidence, we 
used two-line regression analysis (Simonsohn, 2018) for all models predicting confidence. A 
U-shaped relation involves a sign change in the regression coefficient between confidence and 
the predictor variable. The point at which the regression coefficient changes between positive 
and negative is referred to as the breakpoint. We set the breakpoint at the midpoint of the 
judged safety reporting scale (safety judgment = 4 on a scale from 1 to 7). We split the data 
into two ranges according to the unstandardized judged safety score: one range in the 
direction of dangerous for judged safety scores < 4 and a second range in the direction of safe 
for judged safety scores ≥ 4. We fit identical models – as described in the next paragraph – for 
each of these ranges of judged safety. 
We examined how confidence relates to the distribution of judged safety and any 
influence that experience and liking have on that relation. We estimated the effect of judged 
safety on confidence moderated by participant experience (confidence ~ judged safety * 
participant experience + (1|participant) + (1|scenario) + (1|study)) using the pooled data 
from all four studies. We then investigated the role of scenario liking in the formation of 
confidence using the combined data from Studies 2, 3, and 4. We excluded data from Study 1 
in that analysis because it does not include the liking measure. We estimated the effect of 
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scenario liking on confidence when controlling for the effects of judged safety and experience 
(confidence ~ judged safety * participant experience + scenario liking + (1|participant) + 
(1|scenario) + (1|study)). 
To estimate the parameters of those models, we fit Bayesian linear mixed models to 
evaluate the probability of the predictor variable(s) to predict the response variable confidence 
given the data. An advantage of Bayesian methods is the incorporation of (un)certainty caused 
by the amount of data, which is reflected in the width of the posterior distribution(s) of the 
model parameters (Nalborczyk et al., 2020). We used the brms package (Bürkner, 2017, 
2018) in R (R Core Team, 2017) to generate posterior probability distributions to calculate 
median-based regression coefficients and 95% highest density intervals (HDI) to estimate 
parameters for each effect. We included varying intercepts for participants and scenarios in 
the models to account for by-subject and by-scenario variability. We also included varying 
intercepts for studies in the models to account for by-study clustering and the potential 
heterogeneity of effect parameter values between studies in the combined data. We defined a 
weakly informative prior distribution (Gelman et al., 2008, 2017) for the predictor judged 
safety (Normal(.2,1) for judged safety ≥ 4, Normal(-.2,1) for judged safety < 4) based on the 
assumption of a correlation between confidence and the extremeness of judged safety. We 
defined uninformed prior distributions (Normal(0,10)) for the possible effects of scenario 
liking and participant experience. We checked that Rhat values were less than 1.05 and 
greater than .9 to ensure chain convergence for all parameters of interest. Diagnostics 
indicated that all Rhat values were either 1.000 or 1.001 for all examined effects. The data 
and R script for data processing and analysis are publicly available on the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/ba6eh/). 
Results 
Participants disagreed about the avalanche risk of each scenario. Figure 2 illustrates 
that judged safety scores per scenario were uniformly distributed across the response scale. 
Participants judged the risk heterogeneously, ranging from clearly safe to clearly dangerous, 
rather than clustering at the midpoint of the response scale. How then did confidence relate to 
that distribution of judged safety scores? As Figures 3 and 4 illustrate, confidence was lowest 
at the midpoint of the response scale and increased as judged safety became more extreme, be 
it in the direction of safe or dangerous. Table 1 presents the posterior distributions of all 
parameter estimates for the relation between judged safety and confidence. Participants did 
not report equal confidence across all values of judged safety. There was a U-shaped relation 
between judged safety and confidence. 
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Domain-specific experience did not reduce the variability of judged safety of each 
scenario. Linear regression and Breusch-Pagan tests (see the supplemental materials for 
results) indicate that experience did not predict judged safety and that the variance in judged 
safety remained constant across participant experience levels for all scenarios (except 
scenario 1 used in Studies 1 to 3). Although judged safety scores did not converge around the 
midpoint of the response scale at greater experience levels, experience magnified confidence 
in those judgments. Table 1 presents the posterior distributions of all parameter estimates for 
the influence of experience on confidence. As Figure 3 illustrates, higher participant 
experience predicted higher confidence, irrespective of judged safety values. Yet experience 
did not moderate the U-shaped relation between judged safety and confidence. 
Scenario liking predicted confidence. Figure 4 illustrates that the effect of scenario 
liking on confidence was specific to whether a scenario was judged in the direction of safe or 
dangerous. Table 1 presents the posterior distributions of all parameter estimates for the 
relations between scenario liking and confidence. When a scenario was perceived as 
dangerous to some degree (judged safety < 4), confidence decreased with higher scenario 
liking. However, when a scenario was perceived as safe to some degree (judged safety ≥ 4), 
confidence increased with higher scenario liking. Liking a scenario perceived as safe or 
disliking a scenario perceived as dangerous increased confidence. By contrast, liking a 
scenario perceived as dangerous or disliking a scenario perceived as safe reduced confidence 






Distribution of judged safety scores per scenario. Scenarios 1 to 6, which were used in Studies 
1 to 3 (640 observations), show highly uniform distributions of judged safety scores. The 
distribution of judged safety scores for scenarios 7 to 12, which were only used in Study 4 
(164 observations), are less uniform but nonetheless exhibit a large range of values indicating 








The effects of judged safety and participant experience on confidence (confidence ~ judged 
safety * participant experience) when a scenario is perceived as dangerous to some degree 
(plot on left, judged safety < 4) or perceived as safe to some degree (plot on right, judged 
safety ≥ 4). The effect of judged safety is plotted on the x-axis. The effect of participant 
experience is plotted as a solid line for -1 SD participant experience, a dashed line for mean 









The effects of judged safety, scenario liking, and participant experience on confidence 
(confidence ~ judged safety * participant experience + scenario liking) when a scenario is 
perceived as dangerous to some degree (plot on left, judged safety < 4) or perceived as safe to 
some degree (plot on right, judged safety ≥ 4). The effect of judged safety is plotted on the x-
axis. The effect of participant experience is plotted as a solid line for -1 SD participant 
experience, a dashed line for mean participant experience, and a dotted line for +1 SD 
participant experience. The effect of scenario liking is faceted into -1 SD scenario liking in 
the left column of each plot, mean scenario liking in the middle column of each plot, and +1 








Posterior parameter distributions of the effects predicting confidence in the judgment that a 
scenario is dangerous to some degree (judged safety < 4) or is safe to some degree (judged 
safety ≥ 4). 
 
 Judged safety < 4 Judged safety ≥ 4 
Effect b (SE) 95% HDI b (SE) 95% HDI 
Confidence ~ judged safety * experience 
Judged safety -.69 (.06) -.82, -.57 .63 (.08) .47, .79 
Experience .10 (.08) -.05,  .25 .28 (.11) .06, .50 
Judged safety * experience -.17 (.06) -.28, -.06 -.02 (.08) -.18, .14 
Confidence ~ judged safety * experience + scenario liking 
Judged safety -.55 (.08) -.71, -.39 .61 (.10) .42, .80 
Experience .15 (.09) -.02,  .33 .22 (.13) -.04, .47 
Scenario liking -.16 (.05) -.26, -.05 .19 (.08) .04, .34 




Experience with a judgment task ideally should reduce internal, epistemic uncertainty 
by increasing the accuracy of a person’s judgment theories and practices. In a highly complex 
decision environment, experience should also increase a person’s understanding of the 
probabilistic nature of that environment. More experienced backcountry skiers should be 
better able to recognize when the complexity of the environment is so great that it exceeds 
their ability to reliably determine whether the conditions are safe or dangerous. Yet this is not 
what we found. Confidence in avalanche risk judgments increased with domain-specific 
experience, echoing previous findings on the development of confidence (Fischer & Budescu, 
2005; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020). Yet that greater confidence did not correspond to an 
increased ability to recognize the inherent uncertainty of the scenarios. More experienced 
participants were not better able to understand that the safety or danger of each scenario could 
not be established. Our pattern of finding suggests that participants of all levels of experience 
attributed uncertainty to their own judgment process rather than to the limitations and inherent 
uncertainty of the environment. 
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That people fail to recognize the unpredictability of the decision environment and 
instead attribute uncertainty to their own incomplete knowledge, competency, or information 
is problematic from a policy perspective. Ideally, we want backcountry skiers in avalanche 
terrain – and decision makers in other fields performing similarly complex risk judgments – 
to understand when the safety or danger of a situation cannot be established because of the 
inherent uncertainty of the decision environment. We do not want people mistakenly 
assuming that safety or danger can always be determined or that they have the expertise to 
outthink the information limits and uncertainty of the environment. Unfortunately, the 
experience of avalanche terrain can lead many backcountry skiers to make those mistaken 
assumptions. Avalanche terrain is a decision environment in which poor decisions are 
infrequently marked by valid feedback (Ebert, 2019; Johnson et al., 2020; Zweifel & Haegeli, 
2014). Valid feedback is essential for the experiential learning and calibration process 
(Fischer & Budescu, 2005; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018, 2020). The absence of valid 
performance feedback makes it problematic for decision makers to evaluate their performance 
and refine their judgment strategy. This obstructs skill development and magnifies the 
likelihood of overconfidence in erroneous decision making practices (Hogarth et al., 2015). 
Although confidence increased with domain-specific experience, even the most experienced 
participants did not confidently recognize that the conflicting, ambiguous evidence made it 
impossible to establish the safety or danger of any scenario. In this regard, experience did not 
correspond to expertise. 
We recognize that the design of the scenarios and the studies might offer alternative 
explanations for the high variance in judged safety across all levels of experience and the 
perceived source of uncertainty. The use of exclusively uncertain scenarios may have been 
ecologically invalid for an experienced participant sample (Dhami et al, 2004). In the real 
world, experienced participants will have previously encountered situations that are 
objectively safe or dangerous among other situations that are uncertain. The distribution of 
reported judged safety and the confidence in those judgments per participant may partly 
reflect the probabilistic distribution (i.e., base rate) of safety, danger, and uncertainty 
encountered in their own real-world experience. However, had ecological validity been 
crucial, we would expect less experienced participants to have shown less variance in their 
risk judgments because their prior assumptions about base rates of safe, uncertain, and 
dangerous conditions are weaker. That they did not suggests that the lack of ecological 
validity was not a problem. 
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Another possible limitation concerns the interpretation of confidence to infer the 
perceived source of uncertainty. By asking participants about their confidence, we may have 
prompted them to assess their degree of belief in their risk judgment rather than the likelihood 
of their risk judgment being correct. Previous research (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Løhre & 
Teigen, 2016; Ülkümen et al., 2016) has shown that people’s choice of language when 
communicating uncertainty differs as function of where they locate the source of uncertainty. 
Aleatory or environmental uncertainty is expressed in likelihood statements (e.g., “I’d say 
there is a 90% chance,” or “I think there is a high probability”) whereas epistemic uncertainty 
is expressed in confidence statements (e.g., “I am 80% sure,” or “I am reasonably certain”). 
Because the perception of uncertainty influences the choice of language, one might 
conversely assume that the language used to formulate a judgment task could influence the 
perception of uncertainty. By using the language of confidence when asking participants to 
retrospectively judge the accuracy of their risk judgments, we may have made epistemic 
uncertainty more salient. However, the relation between language and perceived uncertainty 
was found when the choice of language pertained to judging a possible outcome or state (e.g., 
“I am __% sure that Germany will win the FIFA World Cup” versus “I think there is a __% 
chance that Germany will win the FIFA World Cup”). That relation has not been 
demonstrated (or, to the best of our knowledge, investigated) when the choice of language 
pertains to retrospective judgments of performance (i.e., metacognitive judgments). Judging 
performance accuracy is different from judging a possible outcome. 
The final question we examined concerned whether affective evaluations influenced 
confidence. Our research found evidence of an interplay between affective and cognitive 
judgments in the formation of confidence. Judged safety and scenario liking each served as a 
cue for the formation of confidence, and their relative configuration introduced additional 
variability into confidence reports. Agreement between the cognitive and affective 
evaluations (liking scenarios perceived as safe, disliking scenarios perceived as dangerous) 
magnified confidence whereas disagreement between the two (liking scenarios perceived as 
dangerous, disliking scenarios perceived as safe) decreased confidence. The influence of the 
(in)congruity between cognitive and affective evaluations appears beneficial under 
uncertainty. Confidence functions as a control process for whether a decision is translated into 
action (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Gill et al., 1998; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Cognitive and 
affective evaluations appear to check and balance each other to prevent overconfidence and 
mistaken actions. A disagreement between cognitive and affective evaluations would suggest 
that either evaluation overlooked or misjudged a valid, relevant cue(s) or mistakenly relied on 
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an invalid, irrelevant cue(s). If both cognitive and affective evaluation processes are well 
calibrated for a judgment task, reduced confidence when there is disagreement between the 
two would be highly advantageous because it would decrease the likelihood of acting on 
mistaken evaluations. However, if an affective evaluation is based on irrelevant features, a 
negative affective response could diminish confidence in an objectively correct judgment of 
danger. 
In conclusion, our research provides insight into some of the multiple internal signals 
that influence the formation of confidence in complex risk judgments under uncertainty. 
Specifically, our findings illustrate a troubling limitation of the development of confidence 
with experience and the potential (dis)advantageous effect of affective evaluations on 




Alhakami, A. S., & Slovic, P. (1994). A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship 
Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit. Risk Analysis, 14(6), 1085-1096. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1994.tb00080.x 
Blanchette, I., & Richards, A. (2010). The influence of affect on higher level cognition: A 
review of research on interpretation, judgment, decision making and reasoning. Cognition 
and Emotion, 24(4), 561-595. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
Boldt, A., de Gardelle, V., & Yeung, N. (2017). The impact of evidence reliability on 
sensitivity and bias in decision confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 43(8), 1520-1531. https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000404 
Bürkner, P-C. (2017). brms: An R Package for Bayesian Multilevel Models Using Stan. 
Journal of Statistical Software, 80, 1-28. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v080.i01 
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate 
behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 25, 215–224. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299025002007 
Colorado Avalanche Information Center. (n.d.). Forecasts. Retrieved from 
https://avalanche.state.co.us/ 
da Costa, B. R., & Sutton, A. J. (2019). A comparison of the statistical performance of 
different meta-analysis models for the synthesis of subgroup effects from randomized 
clinical trials. BMC medical research methodology, 19(1), 198-198. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12874-019-0831-8 
Dhami, M. K., Hertwig, R., & Hoffrage, U. (2004). The Role of Representative Design in an 
Ecological Approach to Cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 130(6), 959-988. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.6.959 
de Leeuw, J. R. (2015). jsPsych: A JavaScript library for creating behavioral experiments in a 
web browser. Behavior Research Methods, 47, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-014-
0458-y 
DePaulo, B. M., & Pfeifer, R. L. (1986). On-the-job experience and skill at detecting 
deception. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16(3), 249-267. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1986.tb01138.x 
Ebert, P. A. (2019). Bayesian reasoning in avalanche terrain: a theoretical investigation. 




Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1978). Confidence in judgment: Persistence of the illusion 
of validity. Psychological Review, 85, 395–416. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.85.5.395 
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in 
judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1), 1-17. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1%3C1::AID-
BDM333%3E3.0.CO;2-S 
Fischer, I., & Budescu, D. V. (2005). When do those who know more also know more about 
how much they know? The development of confidence and performance in categorical 
decision tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 98(1), 39-53. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.04.003 
Fitzgerald, L. M., Arvaneh, M., & Dockree, P. M. (2017). Domain-specific and domain-
general processes underlying metacognitive judgments. Consciousness and Cognition, 
49(Supplement C), 264-277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.011 
Fox, C. R., & Ülkümen, G. (2011). Distinguishing Two Dimensions of Uncertainty. In W. 
Brun, G. Keren, G. Kirkebøen, & H. Montgomery (Eds.), Perspectives on Thinking, 
Judging, and Decision Making: A Tribute to Karl Halvor Teigen. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
Gallatin National Forest Avalanche Center. (n.d.). Avalanche Forecast. Retrieved from 
https://www.mtavalanche.com/forecast 
Gelman, A., Jakulin, A., Pittau, M. G., & Su, Y.-S. (2008). A weakly informative default 
prior distribution for logistic and other regression models. The Annals of Applied 
Statistics, 2(4), 1360-1383, 1324. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AOAS191 
Gelman, A., Simpson, D., & Betancourt, M. (2017). The Prior Can Often Only Be 
Understood in the Context of the Likelihood. Entropy, 19(10), 555. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/e19100555 
Gill, M. J., Swann Jr, W. B., & Silvera, D. H. (1998). On the genesis of confidence. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(5), 1101-1114. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.75.5.1101 
Gillies, D. (2000). Philosophical theories of probability. London: Routledge. 
Hogarth, R. M., Lejarraga, T., & Soyer, E. (2015). The Two Settings of Kind and Wicked 




Johnson, J., Mannberg, A., Hendrikx, J., Hetland, A., & Stephensen, M. (2020). Rethinking 
the Heuristic Traps Paradigm in Avalanche Education: Past, Present and Future. Cogent 
Social Sciences, 6(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2020.1807111 
Juslin, P., Winman, A., & Olsson, H. (2000). Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence 
research: A critical examination of the hard–easy effect. Psychological Review, 107(2), 
384-396. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.384 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). Variants of uncertainty. Cognition, 11(2), 143-157. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(82)90023-3 
Koehler, D. J., Brenner, L., & Griffin, D. (2002). The Calibration of Expert Judgment: 
Heuristics and Biases Beyond the Laboratory. In D. Griffin, D. Kahneman, & T. Gilovich 
(Eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (pp. 686-715). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Koellinger, P., & Treffers, T. (2015). Joy Leads to Overconfidence, and a Simple 
Countermeasure. PLoS ONE, 10(12), e0143263. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0143263 
Koriat, A. (2008). When confidence in a choice is independent of which choice is made. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 997–1001. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.15.5.997 
Koriat, A., & Goldsmith, M. (1996). Monitoring and control processes in the strategic 
regulation of memory accuracy. Psychological Review, 103(3), 490-517. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.490 
Kozyreva, A., & Hertwig, R. (2021). The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological 
rationality. Synthese, 198(2), 1517-1547. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02140-w  
Kuvaas, B., & Kaufmann, G. (2004). Impact of mood, framing, and need for cognition on 
decision makers' recall and confidence. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17(1), 
59-74. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.461 
Landrø, M., Pfuhl, G., Engeset, R., Jackson, M., & Hetland, A. (2020). Avalanche decision-
making frameworks: Classification and description of underlying factors. Cold Regions 
Science and Technology, 169, 102903. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.coldregions.2019.102903 
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and Decision Making. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 799-823. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-
010213-115043 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 267-286. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 
 
134 
Løhre, E., & Teigen, K. H. (2016). There is a 60% probability, but I am 70% certain: 
communicative consequences of external and internal expressions of uncertainty. 
Thinking & Reasoning, 22(4), 369-396. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2015.1069758 
Massoni, S. (2014). Emotion as a boost to metacognition: How worry enhances the quality of 
confidence. Consciousness and Cognition, 29, 189-198. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.006 
Meyniel, F., Schlunegger, D., & Dehaene, S. (2015). The Sense of Confidence during 
Probabilistic Learning: A Normative Account. PLOS Computational Biology, 11(6), 
e1004305. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004305 
Nalborczyk, L., Batailler, C., Loevenbruck, H., Vilain, A., & Bürkner, P. (2019, May 14). An 
Introduction to Bayesian Multilevel Models Using brms: A Case Study of Gender Effects 
on Vowel Variability in Standard Indonesian. https://doi.org/10.1044/2018_JSLHR-S-18-
0006 
Peterson, D. K., & Pitz, G. F. (1988). Confidence, uncertainty, and the use of 
information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
14(1), 85–92. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.14.1.85 
Petrusic, W.M., & Baranski, J.V. (2003). Judging confidence influences decision processing 
in comparative judgments. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 177–183. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196482  
Prinz, A., Bergmann, V., & Wittwer, J. (2019). Happy but overconfident: positive affect leads 
to inaccurate metacomprehension. Cognition and Emotion, 33(3), 606-615. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2018.1472553 
R Core Team (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. 
Sanchez, C., & Dunning, D. (2018). Overconfidence among beginners: Is a little learning a 
dangerous thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(1), 10-28. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000102  
Sanchez, C., & Dunning, D. (2020). Decision fluency and overconfidence among beginners. 
Decision, 7(3), 225-237. https://doi.org/10.1037/dec0000122 
Schwarz, N. (2012). Feelings-as-Information Theory. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. 
Kruglanski, & T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 1 
(pp. 289-308). London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
135 
Sidi, Y., Ackerman, R., & Erez, A. (2018). Feeling happy and (over)confident: the role of 
positive affect in metacognitive processes. Cognition and Emotion, 32(4), 876-884. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2017.1346501 
Simonsohn, U. (2018). Two Lines: A Valid Alternative to the Invalid Testing of U-Shaped 
Relationships With Quadratic Regressions. Advances in Methods and Practices in 
Psychological Science, 1(4), 538-555. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918805755 
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). The Affect Heuristic. In D. 
Griffin, D. Kahneman, & T. Gilovich (Eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of 
Intuitive Judgment (pp. 397-420). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk as Analysis and 
Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality. Risk 
Analysis, 24(2), 311-322. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x 
Stephensen, M. B., & Martiny-Huenger, T. (2021). Liking and perceived safety across 
judgments of distinct instances of a category of activity. Journal of Risk Research, 1-17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2021.1905693 
Teigen, K. H., & Løhre, E. (2017). Expressing (un)certainty in no uncertain terms: reply to 
Fox and Ülkümen. Thinking & Reasoning, 23(4), 492-496. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2017.1314965 
Ülkümen, G., Fox, C. R., & Malle, B. F. (2016). Two dimensions of subjective uncertainty: 
Clues from natural language. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145(10), 
1280-1297. https://doi.org10.1037/xge0000202 
Utah Avalanche Center. (n.d.). Forecasts. Retrieved from https://utahavalanchecenter.org/ 
Varsom. (n.d.). Avalanche Bulletins for Norway. Retrieved from 
http://www.varsom.no/en/avalanche-bulletins/ 
Yeung, N., & Summerfield, C. (2012). Metacognition in human decision-making: confidence 
and error monitoring. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 367(1594), 1310-1321. https://doi.org10.1098/rstb.2011.0416 
Zweifel, B., & Haegeli, P. (2014). A qualitative analysis of group formation, leadership and 
decision making in recreation groups traveling in avalanche terrain. Journal of Outdoor 







Results of linear regression analysis of the relation between experience and judged safety per 
scenario used in Studies 1 to 4, and the results Breusch-Pagan tests of non-constant variance 
for that linear relation. The null hypothesis for the Breusch-Pagan test assumes 
homoscedasticity of variance. 
 
Scenario Judged safety ~ experience  Breusch-Pagan test (df = 1) 
bexperience (SE) 95% CI p-value  χ
2 p-value 
1 - .15 (.06) -.26, -.04 .007  3.69 .055 
2 .01 (.05) -.10, .11 .864  1.02 .313 
3 - .08 (.07) -.22, .06 .249  .17 .684 
4 - .01 (.05) -.11, .09 .858  .64 .424 
5 - .02 (.06) -.15, .11 .761  .01 .927 
6 .00 (.06) -12, .11 .950  .00 .965 
7 - .03 (.14) -.30, .25 .835  .37 .544 
8 - .06 (.12) -.31, .18 .603  .63 .426 
9 - .32 (.22) -78, .13 .155  .89 .346 
10 - .12 (.18) -.51, .26 .505  .05 .817 
11  .06 (.20) -.34, .47 .746  .38 .535 






This popular science article based on Paper 1 was published in the spring 2021 volume of The 
Avalanche Journal. 2 The article was re-published in the June volume of the New Zealand 
Avalanche Dispatch.3 
Should We Judge Danger or Safety in Avalanche Terrain? 
 




Mindy and Kelsey hike up the valley, weaving their way through thinning forest and steepening 
terrain to the top of a small rise where they stop. They are entering avalanche terrain and it is 
time to decide if they should continue on their planned route. Ahead of them is a long, steep 
climb up a broad face to reach the more gradual ridgeline that they intend to follow to the 
summit. They dig a snow pit but do not find any sign of the persistent weak layer mentioned in 
the regional avalanche forecast. The snowfall has been light but steady and the winds variable 
over the past 48 hours. Although no cornices are visible on the ridgeline, spindrift indicates the 
wind is starting to pick up. They have not seen any obvious avalanche clues. They stand there, 
pondering the uncertainty of the conditions. 
Mindy breaks the silence: “It looks good. I don’t believe it’s dangerous,” she remarks. “I think 
we should continue.” 
Kelsey wrinkles her brow: “Really? It doesn’t look safe to me,” she counters. “We should turn 
back.” 
                                                     
2 Stephensen, M.B., Landrø, M., & Hendrikx, J. (2021). Should We Judge Danger or Safety in 
Avalanche Terrain? The Avalanche Journal, 126, 18-19. 
3 Stephensen, M.B., Landrø, M., & Hendrikx, J. (2021). Should We Judge Danger or Safety in 
Avalanche Terrain? New Zealand Avalanche Dispatch, June, 47-50. 
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Why might two recreationists with similar training, competency, and experience make opposite 
decisions when judging the same evidence about the conditions? To try to answer that question, 
we must consider the cognitive mechanisms involved in the decision making process. 
Question Framing 
When we judge risk, we are judging the attribute of an object, action, or situation. Attributes 
are commonly understood in terms of their multiple dimensions. For example, the attribute 
‘speed’ is often understood in terms of two dimensions: fast and slow. Those two dimensions 
are like two sides of a coin, distinct but indivisible. They provide opposing but complementary 
perspectives. 
We tend to focus on a single dimension when making a judgment. For example, when judging 
speed, we commonly ask “Is it fast?” or, alternatively, “Is it slow?” rather than formulating a 
judgment using both dimensions. It is a natural process of language and thought to frame 
judgments with only one qualitative dimension of the judged attribute. 
Similarly, when touring in avalanche terrain, we might also use a single qualitative dimension 
to frame avalanche risk judgements such as “How safe are the conditions?” or “How dangerous 
are the conditions?” 
What we wanted to know is: does the choice of frame have an effect on perceived risk and 
behavioural decisions? If so, might we strategically employ that frame to increase the likelihood 
of more cautious, conservative judgments and decisions in avalanche terrain? 
Our research found that frames influence perceived avalanche risk and behaviour intention. In 
a series of studies, we examined how backcountry skiers judged hypothetical scenarios of skiing 
in avalanche terrain (presented in the form of a photo and basic regional avalanche advisory 
information) when asked to judge safety or danger. We found that risk judgments framed in 
terms of safety (“How safe is it?”) resulted in more cautious, conservative judgments and a 
lower likelihood of skiing than judgments framed in terms of danger (“How dangerous is it?”).  
This happens because the frames “safe” or “dangerous” direct the decision maker’s attention 
during the judgement process. Judging “How safe is it?” defines safe as the reference point for 
the risk judgment. This focuses attention on finding and evaluating evidence of safety. Under 
conditions of uncertainty when there is no definitive indication of safety, such as in our example 
with Mindy and Kelsey, safety is judged as lower due to the lack of supporting evidence. Lower 
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safety implies the unspecified opposite dimension—higher danger—resulting in a lower 
likelihood of deciding to ski.  
Conversely, when judging the danger (How dangerous is it?) of the same scenarios, danger is 
judged to be lower (and consequently safety is perceived to be higher) because of the lack of 
definitive evidence of danger, resulting in a higher likelihood of deciding to ski. 
By asking backcountry travellers to judge how safe the conditions are, we exploit the lack of 
definitive evidence of safety to actually promote more cautious judgements and behaviour. 
Failing to find evidence of danger should not be considered an indication of safety. Yet failing 
to find evidence of safety must be considered an indication that it is not safe. 
Strategically Framing Risk Perception in Avalanche Terrain 
Decision making in avalanche terrain is seldom free of uncertainty. How we formulate risk 
judgments can have a real impact on how people perceive risk and, ultimately, when and how 
they decide to act. How then might we harness the power of framing in the avalanche industry?  
The use of framing to promote specific judgments and decisions is an established practice in 
fields such as media and marketing. We can similarly employ framing to promote safer risk 
perceptions and behaviour in avalanche terrain. Guides, avalanche warning services, and 
avalanche safety educators have substantial control over the phrasing of questions about the 
risks they assess for a backcountry trip. Framing can be systematically applied to numerous risk 
judgments and decisions, whether it be deciding to ski a specific line or deciding to open or 
close specific terrain. 
Communication between members of a group travelling in avalanche terrain could be positively 
impacted by increased awareness of the framing effect. How information and questions are 
framed could influence other group members’ perceptions of the current risk and the decisions 
made or communicated between members of the group. For example, when a guide or group 
leader notices changes in the conditions, they can advantageously frame their question to the 
group to focus attention on those changes in relation to the basis for any earlier judgments of 
safety.  
Let's say that the basis for the decision to ascend a slope is that the old snowpack is stable with 
fresh, non-wind loaded powder snow on top. After some climbing, the snow surface shows 
signs of wind effect. Focusing on establishing safety forces the group to reassess the conditions 
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relative to the previous evidence of safety (non-wind affected snow) and the possibility that 
conditions have changed (evidence of wind slabs). The group must evaluate if the evidence 
previously indicating safety is no longer present or if new evidence of safety is available. The 
group must therefore reconsider its arguments and possibly change its decision.  
Asking “How safe is this slope?” increases attention paid towards evidence of safety—not just 
the absence of signs of danger—making the group more critically aware of any changes in 
conditions while guiding the decision toward a more conservative, transparent, and possibly 
safer outcome. 
Framing risk judgments alone is insufficient to ensure safer behaviour among all backcountry 
recreationists. It is no substitute for the training, knowledge, and experience to understand and 
apply information about the conditions. Nonetheless, adopting a strategy for framing risk 
judgments can increase the likelihood of more cautious, conservative behaviour.  
There is often so much uncertainty when making decisions in avalanche terrain that we must 
utilize any tool or method that can help, even if just a little. Critically, one wants to minimize 
the chance that a “go” decision is made under objectively “no-go” conditions. If the way a 
question is framed influences the decision of whether to ride or not, then avalanche risk 
management strategies, tools, and education should recognize and account for this effect and 
incorporate framing risk judgments into routine practices to reduce the potential for avalanche 
accidents.  
The next time there is uncertainty about the current avalanche conditions, stop and think about 
how the way you frame the question could influence your users’ decisions and think about how 
you might be able to harness framing to provide that extra margin of safety in times of 
uncertainty. 
A peer-reviewed article that provides a detailed account of our research on question framing 
is forthcoming in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. That article can be 
accessed at https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000354 
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